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From 1988 through 2006, the United States closed nearly two dozen large military 
sites and reclassified them to become national wildlife refuges. In this dissertation I examine 
the production of these places, covering more than one million acres of land and marine 
territory, as they have been represented through political and scientific discourses. In 
particular, I consider the implications of “ecological militarization,” which casts military 
practices and environmental conservation as compatible activities. Military-to-wildlife 
(M2W) conversions include some of the nation’s worst sites of contamination and most 
protected ecological habitat. The seeming paradox of these lands creates challenges to 
wildlife managers and other federal officials as historically restricted military places open to 
new kinds of public attention and use.  
The purpose of my research is to examine military-to-wildlife conversions through 
two main questions: How have these particular landscapes been produced, and how do they 
then function as public lands? I approach the first of these research questions by asking how 
M2W sites have been cast by politics, science, and certain narratives to effect their 
conversion. Second, I assess how these places work as integrations of nature and society to 
function as new national wildlife refuges, as former military lands, and as new geographies 
iii
where projects of militarism and environmentalism appear to coincide as complementary 
endeavors. 
I apply methods of document and discourse analysis, as well as semi-structured 
interviews and site visits, to focus on two case studies: the Rocky Mountain Arsenal in 
Colorado, and the Big Oaks National Wildlife Refuge in southeastern Indiana. These present 
different details of contamination, remediation, legislation, and public use, but highlight 
common themes of institutional control, science and technology, and discourse. I conclude 
that military-to-wildlife conversions and the broader framing of ecological militarization will 
only contribute to genuine social change, democratic politics, and environmental protection if 
they are linked to new roles for science and technology, a transfer of institutional control, the 
publicizing and preservation of M2W landscape productions, and attentiveness to impacts 
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The existence of a vast domain of federally managed public lands is one of the 
defining characteristics of the United States. For more than a dozen decades, the U.S. has 
reserved certain lands for public uses ranging from aesthetic appreciation and recreation to 
timber harvest, military activities, and wildlife conservation. To many, these national parks, 
national forests, and other public lands “have become a cherished birthright of the citizenry, a 
fundamental part of what it means to be an American.”1
These lands are also places of change subjected to shifting political agendas, 
legislation, physical processes, ecological succession, and public attention. In this 
dissertation I focus on one particular type of change that has grown increasingly common 
since the late 1980s: the conversion of military lands to new classifications as national 
wildlife refuges. During this time, nearly two dozen military sites have closed and are being 
reclassified and converted into national wildlife refuges. As new refuges born from military-
to-wildlife conversions, these lands present places where we may consider the compatibility 
of defense activities and environmental protection. As landscapes that are seen as both 
militarized and natural, military-to-wildlife refuges emerge not as singularly natural or social 
 
1 Wilkinson, Charles, from the foreword to Dombeck, Michael P., Christopher A. Wood, and Jack E. Williams,
From Conquest to Conservation: Our Public Lands Legacy (Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 2003), p. xvi.
2spaces but as interrelated networks of natural, social, and technological elements.2 At one 
level, my research describes these places as they exist in the world and how they are 
represented. By working to understand how these places are actively produced, however, 
through a combination of politics, science, and discourse, I seek also to illuminate and clarify 
the underlying ethics of defense and the environment that such conversions represent as an 
expression of democratic politics, and what this portends as a contribution to the public 
spaces associated with federal lands. Considering these discursive and material changes may 
also then inform our views of nature, technology, and society more broadly.  
These changes are important for their scope and their substance, as well as for what 
they represent and reveal. Military conversions to wildlife refuges, or military-to-wildlife 
(M2W) conversions, now involve more than one million acres of land and marine territory, 
including a mix of some of the United States’ most contaminated and most preserved 
habitats. The complexity and difficulty of cleaning up and managing obsolete military 
facilities offers important insights to the science, politics, and public understanding of 
ecological restoration projects in these places and elsewhere. Closing military sites and 
turning them to wildlife conservation purposes also suggests that militarized spaces can 
change character, a change that could signal different national priorities and values.  
Although federal lands on the whole attract more than 730 million visitors each year,3
the two categories I attend to here rest largely apart from popular tourist destinations. The 
National Wildlife Refuge System is the least visited of the four largest federal land categories 
 
2 See Latour, Bruno, We Have Never Been Modern (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993).  
3 Havlick, David G., No Place Distant: Roads and Motorized Recreation on America’s Public Lands
(Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 2002), pp. 3-4. Most land management agencies track “visitor days,”
representing one person visiting for a 12-hour period, rather than individual visitors.
3– accounting for less than five percent of all public use – and the vast majority of military 
lands managed by the U.S. Department of Defense receive only a relative handful of non-
affiliated public visits.4 The process of military base conversion itself promises to open 
historically restricted places to new kinds of public attention, and brings to the surface new 
kinds of challenges to wildlife managers and other federal officials. My work here identifies 
and illuminates military-to-wildlife conversions as a particular phenomenon and adds to our 
understanding of what the new kinds of places that result may mean as products of nature and 
society. 
The purpose of my research is to examine military-to-wildlife conversions through 
two main questions: How have these particular landscapes been produced, and how do they 
then function as public lands? I approach the first of these, the production of military-to-
wildlife lands, by asking how these sites have been cast as political and scientific narratives 
to effect their conversion. Second, I assess how these places work as new combinations of 
nature and society.5 For this, I ask how military conversion sites function as new national 
wildlife refuges, as former military lands, and as new geographies where projects of 
militarism and environmentalism appear to coincide as complementary endeavors.  
 
4 National wildlife refuges received just 35 million visitors in 2000. See
http://refuges.fws.gov/centennial/index.html, [21 February 2001]. By “non-affiliated” I mean the visiting public
that is neither employed by the DOD nor related to military and civilian personnel. The exception are the three
large military academies at West Point, NY; Colorado Springs, CO; and Annapolis, MD; which have become
tourist destinations in their own right.
5 Mitchell, Don, The Lie of the Land: Migrant Workers and the California Landscape, (Minneapolis, MN: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1996), takes a similar approach to theorize and understand landscape. 
4A Notion of Compatibility 
 
On 6 September 1990, U.S. Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney called to order an 
unusual meeting of environmentalists, military leaders, and other federal officials to discuss 
the relationship between national defense and the environment. The U.S. Department of 
Defense generates more pollution than any other institution in the nation, but Secretary 
Cheney encouraged the assembly to focus upon a bracing notion of compatibility: “Defense 
and the environment is not an either/or proposition. To choose between them is impossible in 
this real world of serious defense threats and genuine environmental concerns. The real 
choice is whether we are going to build a new environmental ethic into the daily business of 
defense.”6
Cheney’s remarks signal several themes that I take up in this dissertation. First, we 
find a refutation of any dichotomy between military defense and the environment. If this 
holds, then military geography itself must be reevaluated – as a discipline it has long been 
dedicated toward projects that pit human interests against environmental characteristics, such 
as terrain analysis, militaries surmounting environmental challenges, or using and modifying 
natural features for tactical advantage. There is also Cheney’s intimation that the business of 
defense is ready not just for an environmental ethic, but that such an ethic can accommodate 
progressive military and environmental concerns. And finally, there is the fact that a 
Secretary of Defense was taking the time to concern himself with the military’s productive 
relationship with the environment, and to bring that relationship to the attention of an elite 
 
6 Dumanoski, Dianne, “Pentagon Takes First Steps Toward Tackling Pollution,” Boston Globe, 9 September 
1990.  
5group of policymakers. Cheney’s discursive framing of the challenges facing the military and 
the environment was no doubt intended to convey a particular sensibility to an attentive 
audience. The role of this discourse proves to be important as we look further into 
contemporary connections and changes involving the U.S. military and the environment.  
 
Defense Lands and National Wildlife Refuges 
 
Before addressing the particular category of lands at the center of my research, I will 
first introduce federal lands generally, then turn to the two types of federal lands that 
encompass military-to-wildlife conversions: military lands managed by the U.S. Department 
of Defense (DOD) and the national wildlife refuges managed by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife 
Service (FWS).  
 Federal lands in the United States comprise 634 million acres or nearly thirty percent 
of the nation’s total landmass.7 An array of agencies manage these lands and each category 
comes with a unique mission, from the conservation-oriented charge of the National Park 
Service – steward of Yellowstone and other sites such as the Grand Canyon, Great Smoky 
Mountains, and Yosemite – to the U.S. Forest Service’s more utilitarian pledge to provide a 
sustainable supply of timber and water resources to the nation. The mission of Department of 
Defense lands has historically been to support the preparation and housing of troops, testing 
 
7 Statistical Abstract of the United States 2002 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Census Bureau, 2001), p. 210. 
6of weapons, and other national security needs; these purposes continue, though in recent 
years an explicit emphasis on environmental protection has also been incorporated.8
Defense Lands 
 
Though often overlooked as part of the federal public domain, the 25 million acres of 
military bases, bombing ranges, and other installations in the U.S. rank the Department of 
Defense as the fifth largest land management agency in the nation (see Figure 1-1: Map of 
Department of Defense Lands in the United States). Vast as this sum seems, it has actually 
decreased by nearly half since 1945 and the close of World War II.9 Since 1988, in the 
interest of improving its strategic capabilities, the DOD has sought to further streamline its 
domestic holdings with five rounds of systematic base closures directed by the Base 
Realignment and Closure Commission, or BRAC. Some of these BRAC closures – 
promulgated in 1988, 1991, 1993, 1995, and 2005 – continue to work their way toward 
resolution. To date, eleven BRAC closures and approximately 80,000 acres have been 
converted to national wildlife refuges (see Table 1.1: Status Report on Transfers and Refuge 
Overlay Agreements). With an average lag of nearly seven years between closure and  
 
8 For example, the first page of the 2004 Defense Installations Strategic Plan states, “DOD is working to endure
that it is delivering cost effective, safe, and environmentally sound capabilities and capacities to support the
national defense mission.” Viewed online at
http://www.acq.osd.mil/ie/irm/irm_library/2004DISPfinalsigned.pdf [14 September 2006].
9 Palka, Eugene J. and Francis A. Galgano, The Scope of Military Geography: Across the Spectrum from 
Peacetime to War (NY: McGraw-Hill, 2000), p. 377, report that at end of WWII the DOD held 46 million acres. 
7Figure 1.1: Department of Defense Lands in the United States10 
10 Map credit: Bill Haskins, Big Sky Conservation Institute.
8transfer from military to Fish and Wildlife Service management, the final results of BRAC 
conversions will continue to emerge for years to come.  
Unlike more visible categories of federal lands such as national parks or national 
forests that welcome a range of public activities and attract annual recreational visits 
numbering in the hundreds of millions, the DOD has tightly controlled access to its lands and 
many Americans remain only dimly aware that millions of acres of defense lands exist as 
part of the federal domain. To many Americans the military connotes men and women in the 
armed forces, but little domestic commitment of facilities or land to train, house, assemble, or 
heal these same troops. With the notable exception of those communities actually dominated 
by a military presence, the DOD seems to inhabit an invisible geography that few civilians 
enter or imagine.11 
Where bases do occur, the level of broader public awareness and interaction often 
varies depending upon the character of the base itself. In communities proximate to large 
residential bases or host to high-profile academies at West Point, Annapolis, and Colorado 
Springs, military and civilian economies often mix considerably. In some cases this relates to 
a proliferation of chain stores, heightened rates of domestic violence, and socioeconomic 
dislocations;12 in other instances, the base may even become a tourist attraction: the single  
 
11 The exception of military-dependent communities is a dramatic one, as even a short visit to places such as 
Fayetteville, North Carolina, or Cannon, New Mexico, can illustrate. For an anthropologist’s view of the 
former, see Lutz, Catherine, Homefront: A Military City and the American Twentieth Century (Boston, MA: 
Beacon Press, 2001). 
12 See Lutz, 2001; De Yoanna, Michael, “Pattern of Misconduct: Fort Carson Soldiers Allege Abuse and
Intimidation,” Colorado Springs Independent, 13-19 July 2006, pp. 14-19.
9Table 1.1: Status Report on Transfers and Refuge Overlay Agreements in the U.S.13 
Refuge Name State Acres FWS 
Acquisition 
BRAC Transfer  
Aroostook NWR ME 4,510 Fee 
Occoquan Bay NWR VA 642 Fee 
Oxbow NWR2 MA 850 Fee 
Nomans Land Island NWR2 MA 620 Fee 
Big Oaks NWR IN 51,000 Agreement 
Nansemond NWR2 VA 208 Fee 
Pearl Harbor NWR2 HI 37 Fee 
Assabet River NWR MA 2,292 Fee 
Great Bay NWR NH 1,054 Fee 
Mountain Longleaf NWR AL 7,632 P.L. 107-314 
Upper Mississippi River National 
Wildlife & Fish Refuge2
IL 9,404 Fee 
Non-BRAC Transfer  
Guam NWR PI 23,228 Fee 
Midway Atoll NWR3 PI 581,864 Fee 
Shawangunk Grasslands NWR NY 575 Fee 
Kingman Reef NWR4 PI 426,392 Fee 
Rocky Mountain NWR CO 17,000 P.L. 102-402 
Caddo Lake NWR TX 8,500 Agreement 
Vieques NWR PR 3,100 P.L. 106-398 
Vieques NWR PR 15,587 P.L. 107-107 
Patuxent Research Refuge MD 12,841 Fee 
Fishermans Island NWR VA 1,896 Fee 
1,169,232  
1 Some or all of base ownership has not transferred, and/or managed as a U.S. FWS overlay property. 
2 Addition to an existing national wildlife refuge. 
3 Authorized by Executive Order 13022. Includes marine holdings within 12 miles of emergent land/barrier 
reef. 
4 Authorized by Special Order 3223 
 
13 Modified from original provided by Barbara Wyman, Realty Division program manager for base conversion 
lands, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Washington, D.C. (6 October 2003), and incorporating additions 
provided by Cathy Osugi, Personal communication with Division of Refuge Planning BRAC Coordinator, U.S. 
Fish and Wildlife Service, Portland, OR (25 February 2004); and Doug Vandegraft, U.S. Fish and Wildlife 
Service Chief Cartographer (13 September 2006). 
10
most popular tourist site in Colorado Springs, for example, is the U.S. Air Force Academy.14 
At bases where weapons development and testing or tactical training are the focus, the 
military-civilian barrier is much less permeable and non-credentialed visitors may be barred 
outright or allowed access only under tightly regulated conditions for a brief hunting season 
or “open house.”15 
In this respect, military lands stand anomalous among most other federal lands.16 
Though defense lands are considered part of the public domain – owned by and managed for 
the citizens of the nation as a whole – public access to these same lands is extremely limited.  
The need to maintain high-security areas for training or munitions tests also exempts most 
military lands from residential developments and extractive industrial use, as well as most 
recreational uses, whether by backpackers or off-road vehicle drivers. This lack of access has 
kept many of these lands outside the civilian purview of environmental laws, monitoring, or 
enforcement.17 
14 http://www.pikes-peak.com/facts_co_spgs.htm, viewed online [21 December 2005]. 
15 Training bases such as North Carolina’s Camp Lejeune and Fort Bragg house tens of thousands of Marines 
and Army personnel respectively, while the million-acre expanses of the Yuma Proving Grounds or White 
Sands Missile Base have relatively small residential populations and visitors are essentially excluded. See 
Evinger, William R., ed., Directory of U.S. Military Bases Worldwide (Phoenix, AZ: Oryx Press, 1995). 
16 Three million acres of federal Department of Energy sites such as Hanford, Oak Ridge, Rocky Flats, and Los 
Alamos have been managed in a similarly exclusive condition. See, for example, Brown, Kathryn S. “The Great 
DOE Land Rush?” Science 282(23 October 1998): 616-617. 
17 Dycus, Stephen, National Defense and the Environment (Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 
1996); Shulman, Seth, The Threat at Home: Confronting the Toxic Legacy of the U.S. Military (Boston: Beacon 
Press, 1992); Lanier-Graham, Susan D., The Ecology of War: Environmental Impacts of Weaponry and Warfare 
(NY: Walker and Company, 1993). 
11
While military bases have been used to prepare troops for war and for the testing of 
munitions, the restrictions on many other kinds of uses on these large tracts of land has, at the 
same time, led to the production of high ecological values in many places. Though the 
contrast could hardly be more striking in some cases – for example, where unexploded 
ordnance, toxic waste, or depleted uranium shells clutter the surface – some scientists 
consider military lands, by a species-to-area measure, the richest reserves of biodiversity of 
any of the nation’s public lands.18 In addition to providing habitat for more than 300 species 
currently considered or already listed for protection as threatened or endangered, DOD lands 
cover most of the nation’s ecological regions and include some of the largest tracts of land 
reserved from human use in recent decades.19 (See Figure 1.2: Hot Spots of Rarity and 
Richness.) The Department of Defense also budgets approximately $150 million annually for 
its conservation programs.20 
Despite these conditions, the ecological significance of military lands has remained 
largely overlooked by most environmental groups and the general public.21 Military lands  
 
18 Leslie, Michele, Gary K. Meffe and Jeffrey L. Hardesty, Conserving Biodiversity on Military Lands:  A 
Handbook for Natural Resource Managers (Washington, D.C.: The Department of Defense Biodiversity 
Initiative, U.S. Department of Defense, and The Nature Conservancy, 1996), pp. 1-2. 
19 Palka and Galgano, p. 387. 
20 FY 2001 Defense Environmental Quality Program Annual Report to Congress (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office). Critics can, of course note that compared against annual spending this amount 
represents just a fraction of a percent of the DOD’s budget.  
21 Mann, Linda K., Patricia D. Parr, Larry R. Pounds and Robin L. Graham, “Protection of Biota on Nonpark
Public Lands: Examples from the US Department of Energy Oak Ridge Reservation,” Environmental
Management 20(1996): 207-218.
12
Figure 1.2: Hot Spots of Rarity and Richness22 
22 Map credit: Bill Haskins, Big Sky Conservation Institute. Source information for rarity and richness is from
Stein, Bruce A., Lynn S. Kutner, and Jonathan S. Adams, (eds.) Precious Heritage: The Status of Biodiversity
in the United States (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). The rarity and richness measure highlights
species limited in abundance and range, illustrating what Stein et al. call an “index of irreplacibility” (p. 172).
13
have long been at the center of environmental and political contestations, however, from their 
early designations and removal from civilian uses, to Congressional wranglings over base 
sitings and closures. With citizen concerns increasingly being raised about hazardous wastes, 
munitions, or the preservation of biodiversity, these lands have developed rich environmental 
histories that deserve critical attention. 
Beginning with large-scale base closures and M2W conversions late in the twentieth 
century, the United States has, in fact, recently opened a new chapter in this history. A 
number of decommissioned bases are now emerging into more public management strategies. 
With these transitions, defense officials, wildlife biologists, recreation planners, 
conservationists, and others are finding themselves faced with a number of challenges, 
opportunities, and decisions that come from the past but also may reflect values and priorities 
casting well into the future. 
This paradox of ancillary production of wildlife habitat from military spaces is not a 
particularly limited or new phenomenon. Written accounts date back to the journals of the 
Lewis and Clark expedition (ca. 1806) of wildlife-rich buffer zones existing in areas 
contested by indigenous nations.23 The Demilitarized Zone between North and South Korea 
currently provides habitat and refuge for endangered cranes and other rare species, while the 
former chemical weapons facility at Porton Down, England, is thought to host more than 80 
 
23 See Hickerson, Harold, “The Virginia Deer and Intertribal Buffer Zones in the Upper Mississippi Valley,” 
pp. 43-66, in Anthony Leeds and Andrew Vayda, eds., Man, Culture, and Animals (Washington, D.C.: 
American Association of the Advancement of Science, 1965); Martin, Paul S. and Christine R. Szuter, “War 
Zones and Game Sinks in Lewis and Clark’s West,” Conservation Biology 13:1(1999): 36-45; Flores, Dan, The 
Natural West: Environmental History in the Great Plains and Rocky Mountains (Norman, OK: University of 
Oklahoma Press, 2001). 
14
percent of all butterfly species extant in Great Britain.24 Another category of militarized 
space in the U.S., Department of Energy weapons laboratories, have also attracted attention 
in recent years for their wildlife habitat.25 Even within the particular category of national 
wildlife refuges in the U.S. there are examples of formal military-wildlife coexistence, 
perhaps most notably at Crab Orchard National Wildlife Refuge in southern Illinois, which 
was created in 1947 explicitly for, “the conservation of wildlife, and for the development of 
the agricultural, recreational, industrial, and related purposes.”26 To this day, Crab Orchard 
NWR includes a 1.2 million square foot industrial complex that includes military munitions 
manufacturing and storage.27 
Of course, the limited public access granted to most military lands facilitates control 
not just over particular “naturalizing” spaces, but also over information about the military 
and its operations more broadly. In this regard, the conversion of military lands to new 
 
24 On the DMZ, see Higuchi, Hiroyoshi, Kiyoaki Ozaki, Go Fujita, Jason Minton, Mutsuyuki Ueta, Masaki 
Soma, and Nagahisa Mita, “Satellite Tracking of White-naped Crane Migration and the Importance of the 
Korean Demilitarized Zone,” Conservation Biology 10:3(1996): 806-812; Kim, Ke Chung, “Preserving 
Biodiversity in Korea’s Demilitarized Zone,” Science 278:5336(10 October 1997): 242-243; on Porton Down, 
see McCarthy, Michael, “The Secret of Porton Down: Behind its defences it has created Britain’s finest wildlife 
reserve,” The Independent (UK), 11 August 2003. 
25 See Brown, Kathryn S. “The Great DOE Land Rush?” Science 282(23 October 1998): 616-617. Among these, 
the DOE site at Rocky Flats, Colorado, has been redesignated as a new national wildlife refuge. 
26 PL-361 (61 Stat. 770, 5 August 1947).
27 Crab Orchard National Wildlife Refuge Draft Environmental Impact Statement/Comprehensive Conservation
Plan, Appendix J: Compatible Uses (Ft. Snelling, MN: U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, September 2005), p.
326, viewed online at www.fws.gov/midwest/Planning/craborchard/DraftEIS/deisAppendixJ.pdf [28 June
2006].
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designations can present an important opening of military places and activities to a more 
visible condition. As Woodward indicates, “…the conversion of military establishments is 
important to consider as part of a discussion of military economic geographies because of the 
transparency the conversion process brings to an otherwise seemingly opaque world of 
military economic impacts.”28 This points to one way in which military-to-wildlife 
conversions can lead us to a more democratic politics that opens military spaces to greater 
public intervention and oversight. 
Far from being limited to economic impacts, military conversions also provide 
opportunities to examine other kinds of impacts in productive new ways. At sites where 
military bases are being converted to become national wildlife refuges, environmental 
attributes in particular come to the fore. Considering the opportunities that military 
conversions present to ecologists, wildlife biologists, and other scientists, these changes have 
attracted surprisingly little directed inquiry from some quarters. According to Brzoska, “Base 
closure and redevelopment is the resource re-use issue which has received the least attention 
from social science research…”29 Even less noticed is the phenomenon of military 
conversions and reclassifications to become national wildlife refuges.  
 
National Wildlife Refuges 
 
28 Woodward, Rachel, Military Geographies (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), p. 54. 
29 Brzoska, Michael, 1999, “Military Conversion: The Balance Sheet,” Journal of Peace Research 36(2): 131-
140, p. 136. 
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The National Wildlife Refuge System contains slightly more acreage than U.S. 
national parks, but is far less visited and less widely known. More than five hundred 
individual refuges in the United States cover approximately 95 million acres.30 By area, most 
refuge lands exist in multimillion-acre Alaskan tracts such as the Yukon Flats or Arctic 
National Wildlife Refuges, though by number of refuges, states along the central waterfowl 
flyway in the upper Midwest contain the most units, many coming in the form of small 
“prairie pothole” wetlands. (See Figure 1.3: U.S. National Wildlife Refuge System.) Of all 
categories of federal public land, national wildlife refuges are the most likely to be found 
within an hour’s drive of any city in the U.S.31 Despite this fact, the refuge system attracts 
fewer visitors than national parks, national forests, or the vast tracts of western lands 
managed by the Bureau of Land Management.32 Where they exist, visitor services at national 
wildlife refuges are often quite simple. In many cases national wildlife refuges have come to 
their current mission from any number of previous uses. 
Managed by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (within the U.S. Department of the 
Interior), national wildlife refuges can be established by presidential decree, administrative 
action, or act of Congress for the primary purpose of conserving wildlife, plants and habitat. 
In deference to this primary mission, however, a broad array of secondary uses may also be 
permitted on refuges including hunting, fishing, and other forms of recreation; educational 
 
30 See Fischman, Robert L., The National Wildlife Refuges: Coordinating a Conservation System Through Law 
(Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 2003), p. 21. 
31 Fulfilling the Promise: The National Wildlife Refuge System, 22 March 1999, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Department of the Interior, Fish and Wildlife Service, National Wildlife Refuge), p. 43. 
32 Viewed online at http://refuges.fws.gov/centennial/index.html [21 February 2001]. See also Fischman, 2003, 
p. 30. 
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Figure 1.3: U.S. National Wildlife Refuge System33 
33 Map credit: Bill Haskins, Big Sky Conservation Institute.
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programs; livestock grazing; water diversions and impoundments; oil and gas production; 
road construction; military overflights; and more. In a number of instances, these or other 
subsidiary uses pre-date the creation of the refuge itself. Despite a common public 
impression of wildlife refuges as inviolate sanctuaries, there are in fact any number of past 
histories, current uses, and future plans that coexist with (and in some cases undermine) their 
conservation mission. This mix of current and historic uses actually leads Fischman to 
describe the National Wildlife Refuge System as the best model for international 
conservation of any of the U.S. public lands – one that could accommodate both conservation 
interests and an integrated, non-dualistic management philosophy.34 
Even considering the array of prior and current uses of national wildlife refuges, 
however, the transitioning of military bases to become new wildlife refuges stands out as an 
extraordinary turn of events. As my case studies in Chapters Four and Five attest, military-to-
wildlife conversion sites are diverse and include a mix of characteristics. Some former bases 
such as the Rocky Mountain Arsenal remain relatively prominent due to their size or historic 
notoriety, while others continue largely in obscurity. As a category they effectively highlight 
important aspects of militarism and conservation and how these seemingly disparate worlds 




Between 1988 and 2002, the U.S. Department of Defense closed or reclassified 
approximately four hundred military sites, including about one hundred major military 
 
34 Fischman, 2003, pp. 209-210. 
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installations of at least 10 acres or $1.5 billion in assets.35 In 2005, twenty-eight additional 
major installations were similarly identified for realignment or closure.36 During this period, 
twenty-one bases on more than 1.1 million acres have been transferred to the U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife Service for management as part of the National Wildlife Refuge System.37 With the 
2005 round of closures and the lag time for closure and conversion that I noted earlier, 
additional military-to-wildlife conversions are bound to occur.38 (See Figure 1.4: National 
Wildlife Refuges Conversions from Military Base Closures; Figure 1.5: DOD Lands Closed 
and Reclassified as National Wildlife Refuges; and Table 1.2: Inventory of Military-to-
Wildlife Conversion Locations in the United States.) 
Of all the options available when a military base closes, rebirth as a national wildlife 
refuge is not often the most obvious. To many observers it surely seems only a modest 
 
35 Department of Defense Base Structure Report Fiscal Year 2003 Baseline (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Department of Defense, 2002). 
36 http://www.brac.gov/docs/final/ExecutiveSummary.pdf viewed online [21 December 2005]. 
37 Wyman, Barbara, Personal communication with Realty Division program manager for base conversion lands, 
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Washington, D.C. (6 October 2003); Vandegraft, D., Personal communication 
with Chief Cartographer, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service Realty Division (16 October 2003); Shaffer, Linda, 
Personal communication with Chief of Cartography and Spatial Data Services Branch, U.S. Fish and Wildlife 
Service, Hadley, MA (19 January 2004); Osugi, Cathy, Personal communication with Division of Refuge 
Planning BRAC Coordinator, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Portland, OR (25 February 2004). At some of 
these sites land title remains with the DOD. Acreages include several Pacific Island sites that contain extensive 
marine holdings. 
38 The Alameda National Wildlife Refuge (formerly Naval Air Station Alameda) in the San Francisco Bay area
has already been identified as an active M2W site – the FWS requested 900 acres for use as a wildlife refuge -
but official designation has been delayed by questions relating to cleanup and long-term liability.
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change to convert an Air Force base to become a commercial airport, for example, or to 
renovate Army housing to serve civilian residential needs. Such conversions of course 
require careful planning and a number of economic, social, and physical adjustments, but the 
categories of use seem largely consonant. There is something rather jarring, however, when 
we learn of a bombing range or chemical weapons plant segueing into a new mission of 
conserving wildlife.  
Reclassifications of military lands to wildlife refuge designation in many ways 
highlight an environmental paradox: DOD lands on the whole are both more contaminated 
and more biologically diverse than other federal lands such as national parks or national 
forests.39 Indeed, the coupling of military activities with environmental conservation comes 
as a surprise to any who view the former as centering upon violence and the destruction of 
life, and the latter as dedicated to wildlife and habitat protection. While the primary purposes 
of the DOD and FWS remain very different, in recent years a new relationship between these 
agencies has grown increasingly evident. In this view, military production and environmental 
protection are not cast into opposition, but rather may be seen as compatible. 
At the July 2000 dedication of the Big Oaks National Wildlife Refuge, for example, 
FWS director Jamie Rappaport Clark offered the following remarks to welcome the lands of 
the former Jefferson Proving Ground into her agency’s system: “Back in the late '80s, I 
 
39 Shulman 1992; Leslie et al. 1996; as Fischman, 2003, notes: “severe restrictions on public access to these
[DOD] lands have preserved important wildlife habitat. On the other hand, secrecy enshrouding management of
these lands has led to instances of appalling degradation and a collection of the most severely contaminated
sites in the country” p. 22. 
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Figure 1.4: National Wildlife Refuge Conversions from Military Base Closures40 
40 Map credit: Bill Haskins, Big Sky Conservation Institute.
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Figure 1.5: DOD Lands Closed and Later Reclassified as National Wildlife Refuges41 
41 Map credit: Bill Haskins, Big Sky Conservation Institute.
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Table 1.2: Inventory of Military-to-Wildlife Conversion Locations in the United States42 
Base Name Refuge Name State Acres 
Loring Air Force Base Aroostook NWR ME 4,510 
Woodbridge Research Facility/Harry 
Diamond Lab 
Occoquan Bay NWR VA 642 
Fort Devens (North Post) Oxbow NWR2 MA 850 
South Weymouth Naval Air Station Nomans Land Island NWR2 MA 620 
Jefferson Proving Ground1 Big Oaks NWR IN 51,000 
Driver Naval Radio Transmission Facility Nansemond NWR2 VA 208 
Barbers Point Achyranthes Recovery Site Pearl Harbor NWR2 HI 37 
Sudbury Training Annex, Ft. Devens Assabet River NWR MA 2,292 
Pease Air Force Base Great Bay NWR NH 1,054 
Fort McClellan  Mountain Longleaf NWR AL 7,632 
Savanna Army Depot1 Upper Mississippi River NW & 
Fish Refuge2
IL 9,404 
Guam Naval and Air Force bases Guam NWR PI 23,228 
Midway Islands Midway Atoll NWR3 PI 581,864 
Galeville Airport Shawangunk Grasslands NWR NY 575 
Kingman Reef Kingman Reef NWR4 PI 426,392 
Rocky Mountain Arsenal1 Rocky Mountain NWR CO 17,000 
Longhorn Army Ammunition Plant1 Caddo Lake NWR TX 8,500 
Naval Ammunition Support Detachment Vieques NWR PR 3,100 
Vieques Naval Training Range  Vieques NWR PR 15,587 
Fort Meade Patuxent Research Refuge MD 12,841 
Eastern Shore/Fishermans Island Fishermans Island NWR VA 1,896 
TOTAL   1,169,232 
1 Some or all of base ownership has not transferred, and/or managed as a U.S. FWS overlay property. 
2 Addition to an existing national wildlife refuge. 
3 Authorized by Executive Order 13022. Includes marine holdings within 12 miles of emergent land/barrier 
reef. 
4 Authorized by Special Order 3223 
served as the fish and wildlife administrator for the Department of the Army, a job that 
required me, among other things, to look at how military training exercises could be made 
 
42 Wyman, Barbara, personal communication with U.S. FWS Realty Division program manager for base 
conversion lands, 6 October 2003; Osugi, Cathy, personal communication with U.S. FWS Division of Refuge 
Planning BRAC Coordinator, 25 February 2004; and Vandegraft, Doug, U.S. FWS Chief Cartographer, 13 
September 2006. 
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wildlife-friendly. It was not as difficult a job as you might think, and so it is not surprising to 
me that right here on this former military range, we've got an amazing array of wildlife.”43 
Clark’s comments, as with Secretary Cheney’s from a decade earlier, suggest that top 
officials at both the DOD and FWS have sought to cast the relationship between defense and 
the environment in a certain light. There could be many reasons for this effort, including the 
simple point that military land restrictions do seem to generate certain kinds of floral and 
faunal flourishing, but one outcome of this discursive “greening” of the military is to obscure 
some of the damaging effects of military activities.44 Given this cloaking tendency it 
becomes increasingly important to evaluate such official pronouncements of compatibility by 
asking how easy the coexistence is between military activity and habitat production. How apt 
is this depiction and whose interests does it serve to encourage it?  
There are, of course, both politics and values built into this discourse and to 
conversions themselves. Identifying what M2W conversions represent, then, as political and 
ethical landscapes represents a core interest of my research. As Woodward frames this type 
of work, “the study of military geographies involves a moral decision. If we study the ways 
 
43 The new refuge is managed as an overlay with Army ownership still in place with FWS management. 
“Former Bombing Range Becomes National Wildlife Refuge,” U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, reprint from 
July/August 2000 issue of Fish and Wildlife News, online at http://news.fws.gov/articles/FormerBombing.html 
[3 December 2002]. This quote and the earlier remarks from Cheney are but two examples of this. See also 
broader treatments such as Lillie, Thomas H. and J. Douglas Ripley. 1998. “A Strategy for Implementing 
Ecosystem Management in the United States Air Force,” Natural Areas Journal 18(1): 73-80; and Hoffecker, 
John F. Twenty-Seven Square Miles. (Colorado: U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Rocky Mountain Arsenal 
National Wildlife Refuge, 2001). 
44 Woodward makes a similar point on p. 102. 
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in which military activities inscribe themselves onto space, place, environment and 
landscape, should we ignore or accept unquestioned the politics of that process?”45 My 
answer, of course, is “no,” and in the pages that follow I undertake a critical inquiry of how 
M2W conversions are taking place and what their consequences may be to nature and 
society, and how this extends into new formulations for democratic politics and public space. 
 
Research Questions and Methods  
 
As locations of both military and environmental activity, M2W lands challenge us to 
reconsider traditional views of landscapes as primarily social or natural constructions. The 
emergent geographies of M2W conversions also call for a careful examination of how lands 
long known for their hazardous materials and secretive practices may be opened as public 
spaces dedicated to conservation. Environmentalists and government officials alike seem 
uncertain whether these conversions are simply an example of military greenwashing, as the 
Department of Defense seeks to dispose of contaminated or obsolete facilities, or if there is 
an overriding environmental or public interest in converting these lands to new conservation-
focused uses. My research will demonstrate that neither of these stark positions adequately 
embraces the complexity of the changes taking place, or their many effects. 
In order to address and understand the contrasting qualities of military lands as they 
become national wildlife refuges, I frame my study with two broad questions in mind: First, 
how have military-to-wildlife landscapes been produced? And second, how do they then 
 
45 Woodward, p. 9. 
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function or work as public lands in the United States?46 I approach the first of these, the 
production of M2W lands, by examining how these sites have been cast politically, 
scientifically, and discursively to effect their conversion. This inquiry rests, in turn, upon a 
critical interpretation of landscapes as not merely an array of physical objects but as dynamic 
places built through social activities, economies, and values.47 
Research Design and Methods  
 
The politics and science of military-to-wildlife conversions do not operate in the same 
ways across disparate settings so it may come as little surprise that M2W conversions have 
occurred for different reasons in different places by a number of different processes. In order 
to understand these processes, my research relies primarily upon content and discourse 
analysis of documents and reports that guide base closures and conversion, documents that 
describe the conditions of the particular conversion sites, and public accounts of the 
conversions such as media reports and newsletters. I also conducted site visits of my 
principal case study locations and four other M2W refuges, and completed thirty-two 
interviews with key actors in M2W conversions.  
For my document analysis I visited the three principal archives that store materials for 
my case study locations: the Rocky Mountain Arsenal’s Joint Administrative Record and 
 
46 These questions reflect Mitchell’s 1996 framing of landscape theory. See supra 5, above. 
47 See Mitchell, 1996 and Mitchell, Don, “Writing the Western: New Western History’s Encounter with 
Landscape,” Ecumene 5:1(1998): 7-29; Olwig, Kenneth Robert, Landscape, Nature, and the Body Politic: From 
Britain’s Renaissance to America’s New World, (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 2002); 
Woodward, 2004. 
27
Document Facility (JARDF); Hanover College’s Duggan Library archives in Hanover, IN; 
and the refuge manager’s files stored in the Visitor Contact Office at Big Oaks National 
Wildlife Refuge. From these sources I was able to retrieve and read thousands of pages from 
environmental analyses, management plans, legislative records, agency correspondence, 
scientific studies, media reports, transcripts of oral histories, visitor guides, and other primary 
and secondary sources spanning more than seventy years. 
In addition to researching archival materials at my case study sites, I also completed, 
recorded, and later transcribed semi-structured interviews of refuge managers, FWS 
biologists and other agency staff, Army personnel coordinating base closure and transfer, 
representatives from state and local regulatory agencies, and representatives from citizen 
groups involved in base closure and conversion. Interview questions focused on why the Fish 
and Wildlife Service is taking over management of former DOD sites, what principal 
challenges are associated with these changes, the degree and character of public involvement 
in M2W conversions, and how M2W refuges differed from or resembled other refuge units 
(these questions are included as Appendix A: Questions Used in Semi-Structured 
Interviews). 
Beyond my research at the two case sites, I conducted somewhat shorter visits to four 
additional M2W conversion locations: Assabet River NWR and Oxbow NWR in eastern 
Massachusetts; Shawangunk Grasslands NWR in upstate New York; and the Lost Mound 
unit of the Upper Mississippi River National Wildlife and Fish Refuge in Illinois. I also 
corresponded either by telephone or electronically with refuge managers (or equivalent 
personnel) at all remaining M2W locations to discuss public access, current management 
issues, and transition status at these sites. 
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Working from the information I compiled and assessed through this combined 
process of content analysis and interviewing, I then identified and analyzed dominant 
discourses that continue to build from and promote M2W conversions. This discourse 
identification derived from iterative analyses and comparisons as certain themes emerged and 
converged from multiple sources at multiple sites. Discourse analysis, as I apply the term, 
involves both this identification process and the subsequent consideration of how certain 
narratives fit different base closure contexts and help produce political changes, shape public 
opinions, and articulate with scientific information and regulatory constraints. In other words, 
I examine both what discourses exist and what work these discourses do in the context of 
M2W conversions and my conceptual questions. Extending from both the content and 
discourse analysis, I develop a set of theories that respond to my principal research questions.  
I selected two case sites for three main reasons. First, they are clearly established as 
new national wildlife refuges – with dedicated Fish and Wildlife Service staff, visitor centers 
or “visitor contact stations” in place, public outreach programs, wildlife conservation 
programs, new signage, and other facilities or policies that shift at least some portion of 
control from DOD to FWS managers. These transitions have also been well-documented 
through legislation, inter-agency agreements, National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 
publications such as environmental impact statements and assessments, and by local and 
national media reports. Second, these sites represent critical cases with characteristics 
dramatic enough to warrant particular attention and concern, and prominent enough due to 
size and notoriety to highlight important aspects of military conversions.48 Third, the 
 
48 On critical cases, see Patton, M.Q. Qualitative Evaluation and Research Methods, 2nd edition, (Newbury 
Park, CA: Sage, 1990). 
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physical, political, and social characteristics of the two sites are different enough that they 
provide useful information for cross-case analysis and illustrate the breadth of issues, 
habitats, and human communities that are affected by military-to-wildlife conversions.49 
Organization of Chapters 
 
Despite the heterogeneity of M2W conversions (see Table 1.3: Characteristics of 
Selected M2W Conversions), my research acknowledges the broader processes of production 
affecting these lands generally. Toward this end, following the next chapter’s attention to 
theoretical considerations, Chapter Three provides a genealogical treatment of the two land 
use categories under consideration here – military lands and national wildlife refuges – and 
works through their respective historical geographies as they angle toward a particular 
convergence in the form of M2W refuges. 
In the next two chapters my focus tightens to look at how such conversions have been 
produced at two specific locations: Colorado’s Rocky Mountain Arsenal National Wildlife 
Refuge (NWR) in Chapter Four and in Chapter Five the Big Oaks NWR (formerly the 
Jefferson Proving Ground) in Indiana. Although politics, science, and discourse play 
important roles in any M2W conversion – or most any land use determination, for that matter 
– I foreground the political character of the changes at the Rocky Mountain Arsenal. As a 
new political geography where the control of territory, research, and information resides in  
 
49 See Stake, Robert E., The Art of Case Study Research (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1995); 
Creswell, John W., Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design: Choosing Among Five Traditions (Thousand 
Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1998). For an illustration of some of the differences between M2W sites, see 
Table 1-3.  
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Table 1.3: Characteristics of Selected M2W Conversions 
 
Rocky Mtn Arsenal 
NWR 




17,000 acres, Colorado 50,000 acres, Indiana 2,205 acres, 
Massachusetts 
land title FWS: 12,000 acres;  
DOD: 5,000 acres pending 
cleanup 
DOD: 50,000 acres, but managed 
as FWS overlay  
FWS: 2,205 acres  
type of 
transfer 




limited area; weekends only 
year-around 
limited area; M, F, alternate 
Saturdays April-November with 
signed liability release 
year-around, some 







watchable wildlife, trolley and 
other guided tours 
deer, squirrel, and turkey hunting; 
fishing; annual bird count; guided 
tours 





toxic military and commercial 
chemicals, contaminated soils 
unexploded ordnance, depleted 






urban, suburban, industrial, 
agricultural 
rural, agricultural, Air National 
Guard 
exurban, forestry, state 
park 
habitat type shortgrass prairie mixed hardwoods, cypress bald, 
grasslands, oak savannah, 
wetlands 










prescribed burning, grassland 
maintenance, UXO and DU 
cleanup 




the federal government and a military-corporate alliance, the Arsenal continues to be 
(re)produced in a deeply and often explicitly politicized manner. From the legislation that 
first established the Rocky Mountain Arsenal NWR in 1992 to conflicts between different 
jurisdictions (e.g. federal, state, county) to protracted rounds of litigation to the current 
efforts to recast the Arsenal as an amenity to neighboring communities, we find that by 
understanding the place in terms of its political construction – built by legislation, lawsuits, 
remediation, regulations, media reports, citizen activism, and bureaucratic design – we may 
finally start to understand the place as it exists as a dynamic representation of nature and 
society. 
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In Chapter Five, I turn to the creation of the Big Oaks NWR from the Army’s 
Jefferson Proving Ground. Initiated by the intentionally depoliticized BRAC process, the 
closure of the Jefferson Proving Ground and its subsequent conversion to the Big Oaks NWR 
seems to rest most significantly upon a mobilization of science, and in particular, science that 
supports biological conservation. It is through this admittedly politicized scientific lens and 
efforts largely supported by scientific studies that I analyze Big Oaks as a new type of 
landscape. With aggressive remediation of unexploded ordnance hazards largely discounted 
from the outset at Big Oaks due to the cost and physical impracticality, what we find is a 
management approach constrained by the limits of technology and encouraged by a 
constituency of wildlife and environmental advocates who have been able to promote 
arguments based in fire ecology, conservation biology, and (a certain kind of) restoration 
ecology to effect a dramatic re-orientation of purposes across 50,000 acres. As a result, Big 
Oaks has become a new kind of proving ground – from one centered upon munitions testing 
to one centered upon certain natural sciences and the restoration of military landscapes. As 
the sign above the JPG’s Site Management Team’s offices importunes, Cum Scientia 
Defendimus.
Following these case-based examinations, in Chapter Six I turn more directly to my 
second major research question and assess the work of these new M2W geographies.50 For 
this, I ask how military conversion sites act as public places that include a suite of particular 
characteristics – harboring qualities of national wildlife refuges, of former military lands, and 
of the compatibility featured in Clark’s and Cheney’s speeches. I devote Chapter Six to an 
 
50 To describe a similar objective, Mitchell, 1996, p. 30, uses the term function: “Finally, landscape theory must 
specify the processes by which material landscapes and their representations function in society.” 
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inquiry of how M2W lands are managed as new geographies where histories of public 
exclusion mix with new directives that seek to open some of these spaces to the public. What, 
in fact, are the public uses of these new lands and what kinds of lessons, values, or hazards 
are brought to the public (or kept from view) along with this revival of accessibility? As 
public lands have come to signify and relate to core American principles of open democracy, 
the degree to which M2W lands enter into the public domain may be instructive of deeper 
national values and how we intend to navigate the increasingly narrow line between lands 
managed for military purposes and those designated for environmental conservation. When it 
comes to bringing the public to converted military lands, how genuine is the compatibility 
between military activities and environmental protection, and how democratically are these 
new M2W spaces being managed?  
In Chapter Seven these questions become centrally important as I evaluate how 
military-to-wildlife conversions represent instances of what I call “ecological militarization.” 
This term as I present it extends from the concept of ecological modernization.51 Put simply, 
this is the compatibility of economic growth with environmental protections through 
improvements in technology and efficiency.52 Reframed and refined as ecological 
militarization, this taps into one of the central ideas of military-environment discourse in 
recent years: the belief that military production and environmental protection are compatible 
and that, in fact, military activities produce ecological preserves. Much as Harvey and others 
 
51 Hajer, Maarten, The Politics of Environmental Discourse: Ecological Modernization and the Policy Process 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1995). 
52 See also, Chrstoff, Peter, 1996, “Ecological Modernisation, Ecological Modernities,” Environmental Politics 
5(3): 476-500; and Dryzek, John, The Politics of the Earth: Environmental Discourses (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1997). 
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have critiqued ecological modernization,53 I also question the deeper implications of 
embracing ecological militarization as a model for land management, social change, 
environmental ethics, or conservation. 
 
53 See Harvey, David, Justice, Nature and the Geography of Difference (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1996), pp. 
382-401; also Christoff, 1996; Hajer, 1996. 
CHAPTER TWO 
CONSIDERING NEW GEOGRAPHIES 
The new geographies that emerge from military-to-wildlife conversions are both 
material places – the new wildlife refuges designated from converted military lands – and 
new conceptions of places developed through an integration of history, science, politics, and 
discourse. In order to capture the nature of the change occurring on converted military lands, 
and to understand militarism and conservation amid a new set of practices, we need to attend 
not only to the histories and stories of these places but also to the politics, policies, and a set 
of scientific and technological practices that have affected them for more than six decades. In 
this chapter I describe the theoretical contexts for my work and how these relate to issues of 
militarism and environmental conservation. 
 The issues I consider involve at once military problems and environmental problems. 
This can present difficulties, as Dryzek has pointed out, “Environmental problems by 
definition are found at the intersection of ecosystems and human social systems, so one 
should expect them to be doubly complex.”54 Geography is in many ways the perfect 
discipline from which to approach the task of understanding M2W conversions as it 
accommodates multiple research perspectives with its traditional emphases on nature and 
society, spatiality, and human-environment interactions. Within these fields, I locate my 
 
54 Dryzek, p. 8. 
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work as an historical geography that interrogates environmental politics and policy, and 
nature-society relations. My research also articulates with more recent traditions of critical 
military geographies and science and technology studies. 
 
Studies of Base Conversion and Environmental Conservation 
 
Few scholarly works specifically address the conversion of DOD installations to 
become national wildlife refuges. Of those that do, both Williams (1999) and Tierney (2001) 
attend to these changes not in terms of meaning or theoretical questions concerning 
landscape production, but rather by examining how conservation objectives advanced by 
such base conversions may be facilitated and promoted.55 Williams compares two Air Force 
base closures and assesses what factors most contributed to the protection of wildlife habitat. 
Looking primarily at local-scale processes, he found that environmental activism, community 
cohesion, and public participation were closely associated with greater habitat protection, 
while social isolation and political apathy were evident where commercial development 
prevailed over habitat protection.  
In contrast, I seek to provide a deeply contextualized study that examines how 
reclassifications are produced. For example, most M2W conversions occur as a result of 
federal legislation or administrative agreements. Are these promulgated laterally at the 
 
55 Williams, T.N., Pave It or Save It: Wildlife Protection Planning under the Base Closure and Realignment 
Acts, Ph.D. dissertation (University of Colorado-Denver, 1999); and Tierney, John R., 2001, Case Study of the 
Establishment of Great Bay National Wildlife Refuge at the Former Pease Air Force Base, New Hampshire,
(Durham, NH: University of New Hampshire, Natural Resources, Environmental Conservation Master’s 
Thesis). 
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request of the DOD or FWS, from the top down via legislation, or from grassroots through 
citizens or NGO activism? By integrating lay knowledge and processes for a public role in 
decision-making, it may be possible to create both a more humane science and one better 
able to respond to the complexities inherent in military-to-wildlife conversions. The 
traditional top-down approach, by contrast, lends itself more toward technicization and 
reductionism.56 These processes and questions are important since they will help clarify 
whether conversions are occurring because citizens, conservationists or the FWS perceive 
habitat conditions to merit protection as a wildlife refuge, or for reasons of economic, 
military, or political expedience. As I suggested earlier, such questions may in fact lend 
themselves not to either-or constructions but rather to more inclusive formulations. 
Tierney attends to the conversion of Pease Air Force Base in New Hampshire to 
Great Bay National Wildlife Refuge as a case study with an explicit goal: to develop a 
template that will encourage similar M2W conversions. He views this as a means to expand 
conservation acreage nationwide.57 While this is a project with which I am in many ways 
sympathetic, if we approach M2W conversions without an attempt to explain their 
underlying motivations, processes, and assertions of authority than we likely will fail to 
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address critical questions of whether such conversions should occur, and if so how, where, 
and by what means. My study seeks to provide substantial context and analysis so that 
federal officials, state and local regulators, elected representatives, conservationists, and 
other citizens may more fully understand the implications of M2W conversions as material 
places, as representations of both militarism and environmentalism, and as emergent public 
spaces. 
As I indicated in the previous chapter, I turn first to a broad historical geography of 
military lands and wildlife refuges. I also introduce the site-specific cases in Chapters Four 
and Five with brief histories of particular places. With each of these treatments, however, my 
intent is not simply to cast history in a static form, but to provide a sense of the shifting 
genealogies of these landscapes – where they came from, by whose hand, and why. This is 
not to suggest a new standard of history that should necessarily apply to all places or events, 
but as extraordinary places implicated in significant environmental and political debates, 
M2W places stand out and deserve particular critical attention. 
Most historical treatments of military lands focus upon the designation and 
construction of bases, or the military practices that subsequently occurred on these lands.58 
Other political science and military accounts document the history and politics of military 
lands following the Cold War,59 but few attend directly to the environmental impacts of 
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military activities. Of those that do address environmental impacts at length, Lanier-Graham 
and Shulman focus upon the negative consequences of military management and do not fully 
capture the paradox that military land practices have also produced some of the nation’s 
richest de facto biological preserves.60 Kuletz geographically limits her excellent work on 
militarized landscapes and nuclear waste to portions of the U.S. Southwest.61 Kirsch’s 
explication of the effort to apply nuclear warheads to civilian purposes offers a thoroughly 
contextualized account that is sensitive to questions of science, technology, and authority – 
much as I intend here – but orients primarily around Project Plowshare and related tasks of 
“geographical engineering,” as opposed to my focus upon base closures, public lands, and 
conservation.62 
Traditional military geographies, meanwhile, tend to describe the spatial distribution 
and scope of military lands, or the strategic implications of military activities on the 
environment and vice versa,63 but such publications rarely engage qualitative or critical 
analyses of how or why these lands produce different “natures” that are both highly 
dangerous and rigorously protected. Much of Woodward’s recent work does pry military 
geographies open in provocative and critically important directions, but her empirical 
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emphasis is largely based in the U.K. whereas I focus upon policies and lands in the United 
States.64 
In 1998, Braun and Castree declared, “there is a need to identify and detail new and 
emerging sites at which social productions of nature occur or are contested, while attending 
to the social, ecological and political consequences of each.”65 M2W lands exemplify some 
of these new sites of contested associations and my research works through a tension that has 
developed between environmental advocacy and conservation goals on one side and views of 
nature as socially constructed on the other. Although many environmentalists and social 
constructivists may support a similarly progressive politics broadly, environmentalists tend to 
distrust the specific policy ramifications of constructivists’ efforts toward nature, or dismiss 
them as merely academic.66 For their part, constructivists often discredit environmentalists’ 
positions as naïve romanticizations of nature, neocolonial claims, or shrill and 
unsophisticated responses to complex human-environment interactions.67 Because military 
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lands simultaneously produce natural and social attributes, sites of military conversion 
present an opportunity to examine environmental conservation bundled together with social 
constructivism in productive new ways.  
 
Military Realignments and Closures 
 
Even before the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end to the Cold War, the United 
States recognized a need to “realign” its Department of Defense holdings to respond more 
efficiently to current military technologies, strategic alliances, and shifts in geopolitics.68 
Although military-to-wildlife conversions specifically have not received considerable 
research attention, military closures more broadly generate tremendous local and political 
attention and have been studied by political scientists69 and economists,70 as well as 
ecologists interested specifically in the conservation potential of these lands.71 The U.S. 
Congress has also scrutinized base closures repeatedly through its research arm, the U.S. 
Government Accountability (formerly “Accounting”) Office, which has published a number 
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of GAO blue papers.72 Many of these GAO reports include detailed descriptions of military 
conversions, including transfers to the U.S. Fish and Wildlife service for refuges and other 
uses. The goal of the reports, however, is typically to analyze how successful BRAC closures 
have been in terms of government efficiency and economic redevelopment, with relatively 
little attention to the meaning of these conversions as a shift in public land uses or their 
deeper social and environmental implications. 
A similar post-Cold War phenomenon, the reclassification of Department of Energy 
(DOE) weapons production sites, has been the focus of several broad investigations and these 
studies have highlighted the complex array of features and hazards such lands present as they 
are opened to new uses.73 While DOE and DOD lands share certain characteristics – 
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including restricted access and contamination coupled with high biodiversity – DOD lands 
are more widespread, greater in number and acreage, and have different forms of pollution 
(primarily explosives and toxic chemicals) than the Department of Energy’s sites of nuclear 
production. Both categories of land remain linked by their association with military 
production or testing, however, and shared in the kinds of risks that were accepted (or 
overlooked) in the pursuit of technological production in the national interest. DOE and DOD 
lands are also both implicated in discourses of military-environmental compatibility (i.e. 
ecological militarization) that I address in more depth in Chapter Seven. 
 
Environmental Politics of Federal Lands 
 
One important question that an examination of environmental politics helps address is 
whether existing environmental laws and management approaches can adequately 
accommodate the new kinds of lands created by military-to-wildlife conversions. The Fish 
and Wildlife Service did not receive its “organic act” prescribing clear management 
direction, or consolidate its landbase as the National Wildlife Refuge System, until Congress 
passed the National Wildlife Refuge System Administration Act in 1966. Thirty years later, 
in 1996 President Clinton further defined the mission of this system to “preserve a national 
network of lands and waters for the conservation and management of fish, wildlife and plant 
resources of the United States for the benefit of future generations.”74 In 1997, Congress 
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affirmed this in law.75 Secondary uses such as grazing, hunting, military overflights, and 
recreation on wildlife refuges have long presented challenges that disrupted the integrity of 
the system;76 unlike these largely external pressures on many refuges, M2W refuges 
effectively come with an array of secondary uses physically and historically embedded in 
them. 
Policy questions remain about how restrictions placed on refuges that come from 
military conversions may need to differ from policies elsewhere in the National Wildlife 
Refuge System or public lands more generally. For example, Fish and Wildlife Service 
officials charged with managing these new refuges for public use need to consider not just 
how the public may affect plant and wildlife populations – the agency’s usual charge on 
refuges – but also how military hazards may jeopardize the public’s safety or that of FWS 
personnel. This potentially recasts and inverts some of the basic objectives for the managers, 
and presses them to carefully consider how they balance levels of uncertainty and risk with 
goals of managing lands as a public good.77 
There is also a question of “purity.” Much as wilderness advocates fight against 
statutes that might undermine the high standards of the National Wilderness Preservation 
System, or national park defenders opposed legislation to create a looser “National Preserve” 
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category within the National Park Service, so do some supporters of existing wildlife refuges 
fear that the inclusion of heavily impacted military lands could adversely affect the integrity 
and perception of the refuge system overall. If deer face chronic maladies from toxic 
chemicals or the possibility of stepping on live ordnance, does that jeopardize our conception 
of what these lands represent as safe havens?78 
The shifting approaches to preservation of these public lands can also suggest a more 
sweeping land management question highlighted by military-to-wildlife conversions: 
whether we may now be entering an era notable for its emphasis on ecological restoration. 
Legal scholars and historians have mapped out several overlapping phases of federal land 
policy in the United States that, like other cultural projects, typically supported broader 
national objectives. These phases – acquisition, dispensation, retention, management, and 
preservation – overlap and falter at times, but provide useful structure for considering current 
land use trends.79 In fact, proponents of the “New West” suggest that public land 
management is moving into a new phase, this time characterized by the decline of extractive 
industry and a turn toward recreation or restoration priorities.80 While this shift is far from 
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pronounced in many cases, where logging, grazing, or mining operations continue apace – 
and like the earlier phases may be prone to slippage as new administrations influence policy 
– military-to-wildlife conversions may be seen as one of the land use changes that supports 
such a restoration-oriented vision.  
Each of these stages and their accompanying laws reflected certain political and 
social processes at work in a changing nation. Historian Dan Flores’ proposition that the 21st 
century may be characterized by a land management policy of restoration is illuminating, 
both for what it implies about previous actions necessitating such measures and for its 
bearing upon military-to-wildlife conversions.81 In fact, these land use changes and 
reclassifications may fit with other growing trends of dam removal and road removal as signs 
of an increasing emphasis on restoration actions, economies, and environmental policies.82 
But such a move toward restoration can be overstated and my attention to the production of 
M2W conversions helps illuminate the underlying processes that generate some of these 
landscapes of restoration. 
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Science, Technology, Nature, and Society 
 
In her (1992) examination of science and politics at the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA), Jasanoff poses a number of important questions on how science 
operates within and for a federal agency.83 Though focused on a sibling federal agency, 
Jasanoff’s inquiries contribute to understanding the operations of the DOD and FWS in the 
context of military-to-wildlife conversions. For example, Jasanoff explores how the EPA has 
balanced the need for scientific credibility with scrutiny of its research and risk assessment 
activities, asks how EPA’s scientific findings support its policy recommendations, and 
illustrates how EPA has learned from its experiences relating science to political authority.84 
She also focuses on changing strategies of managing risk, and the intersections between 
political and policy analysis with social studies of science. What she finds is that science as it 
has been conducted at the EPA is a thoroughly politicized set of practices intricately linked to 
policy determinations.  
Jasanoff’s inquiries about science and policy at the EPA encourage a further question 
for my own studies of environmental politics: How are science and policy usefully or 
credibly linked in military conversions? Science is often used to legitimate policy, but if the 
public loses confidence in scientists’ ability to function objectively or with transparency, then 
the credibility of both science and policy will erode. As I consider how legislative and 
administrative strategies are being employed to produce and promote conversions from 
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military uses to wildlife conservation, I document the work of science as an authoritative, 
integrated component of agency programs. 
The renaming of land that accompanies military-to-wildlife conversions, changing the 
Jefferson Proving Grounds in Indiana to the Big Oaks National Wildlife Refuge, for 
example, calls for a deeper ontological inquiry as well. Are there particular characteristics 
that distinguish a military base from a national wildlife refuge? Are former military bases 
being transformed nominally or in fundamental ways? Bald eagles deemed the Rocky 
Mountain Arsenal a good enough “refuge” in 1986 to establish breeding sites and hunting 
grounds, even as land managers dictated a policy of catch-and-release for human anglers due 
to contamination concerns. In this respect, is it possible for scientists to establish the essential 
identities of a place and its qualities? For example, is this place fit to be considered a 
“refuge,” and if so (or not), is this a determination made by ecologists, colonizing plant and 
animal species, regulatory policies, quantities of heavy metals in the fatty tissue of 
largemouth bass, or some other array of factors?  
Working to understand these new geographies is important both for what this project 
can (or cannot) reveal about hazards and risk,85 as well as for how it illustrates how 
problematic science can be – contributing to the creation of toxic residues, for example, as 
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well as providing the explanations for how these contaminants adversely affect us.86 
Castree’s  consideration of non-essentialist ontologies offers some useful ideas about how we 
may view lands such as the Rocky Mountain Arsenal that appear as both refuge and hazard.87 
Castree distinguishes between “materialist essentialist” views that rely upon and delineate 
fixed ontologies, and contrasts these with the more dynamic networks described by theorists 
such as Haraway, Latour, and Law.88 In the absence of rigidly fixed ontologies, we may then 
more fully consider the multiple viewpoints and complex relations that contribute to our 
understanding of places such as the Rocky Mountain Arsenal.  
Science, in this view, plays an important role, but one tempered by information from 
many other sources of knowledge as well. At many of the sites of DOD conversion, the 
relatively new sciences of restoration ecology and conservation biology hold prominent 
positions, the first for its role in cleaning up military hazards, the second for its 
documentation of biodiversity and subsequent bolstering of a conservation agenda. Both of 
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these fields merit critical consideration in looking into the processes and implications of 
military conversions, as the premises upon which they are based can be problematic 
historically,89 ethically,90 and politically,91 but both also carry real potential to increase safety 
and improve environmental conditions at severely degraded sites. As we examine science 
and how it articulates with conservation planning, we will also need to grapple with the 
fundamentally dualistic view of nature and society that undergirds it – what Margaret 
Fitzsimmons called one of the three “Great Schisms” or ontological ruptures in geography.92 
Another approach to how science contributes to the production of M2W lands comes 
from questioning its work in creating military technologies and structuring management 
programs applied at these bases and refuges. How, that is, have technologies participated in 
the production of these landscapes? As Beck has pointed out, many of the hazards now 
incorporated into military lands came from certain forms of production integral to the growth 
of modern military-industrial societies.93 Here, the millions of rounds of explosives still 
cluttering the surface of the Big Oaks NWR can be seen as a logical outcome from the kinds 
of activities, policies, and decisions that were implemented at the Jefferson Proving Ground 
during more than four decades of testing weapons. This landscape continues to be produced 
(and reproduced) scientifically, as biologists have come to study and describe the grassland 
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and savanna forest communities resulting from frequent fires and explosives testing. The 
biodiversity of these sites has itself become valued, leading to current efforts to maintain fire 
as a “natural” disturbance at the Big Oaks refuge through prescribed burns. 
A number of geographers and other scholars have already worked to consider the 
ramifications of a dualistic view of nature and society, or what is often cast as a conflict 
between realist views of a world that actually exists “out there” versus those of social 
constructivists who emphasize the role of humans in constructing nature.94 I seek to build 
upon this debate in a way that fosters both an attentiveness to the reality of environmental 
problems and attends to the way we construct and/or respond to them.  
Demeritt points to some constructivist accounts’ weak link to policy and works to 
find new, more effective approaches.95 Noting that sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK) 
constructivists tend to focus more on “telling the stories of how science works” than in 
working to influence scientific practices, Demeritt tries to redirect the attention of science 
studies and social constructivists to some of the practices of science/scientists and their 
impacts. Following Latour (1993), he suggests an approach of “articulation” that considers 
nature and society as “feats and co-constructions” that should never have been rendered into 
a dualistic relationship.96 With this, Demeritt relates to Latour’s assertions that nature and 
society have always been mixed and intertwined.97 This amodern perspective works to 
expand conceptions of the social to include “other earthlings, humans, non-humans and even 
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machines and other non-organic actors,”98 perhaps suggesting a non-anthropocentric 
environmental ethics, but effectively folds the realm of nature (as it has been traditionally 
conceived) into the social.  
Although Demeritt’s notion of articulation grants nature and society roughly equal 
ontological standing as “co-constructions,” this maneuver holds little promise for assuaging 
environmentalists’ continued distrust of constructivist projects. For activists or scholars who 
hold nature as a realm worth protecting from an array of human activities, recasting nature 
into “social nature” still comes as a reductionistic move that effectively demotes nature 
conceptually, practically, and syntactically. According to Crist, constructivist perspectives 
also presuppose an anthropocentric worldview “that grants human cognitive sovereignty over 
everything.”99 While this critique grants environmentalists’ resistance to constructivism more 
depth, it fails to bring us much closer to resolving the Cartesian nature-society dualism. 
Whiteside presents a view of French ecologism as “noncentered,” suggesting that efforts to 
protect nature in France manage to avoid the protracted debates over nonanthropocentric and 
anthropocentric environmental ethics – or more broadly, the nature-society dualism – and 
instead conceive of such projects as an interweaving of human design and biophysical 
processes.100 
What much of the nature-society debates focus upon is to find a way forward that 
commits neither an ontic nor an epistemic fallacy – they seek to avoid both the 
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oversimplified realist view that reality exists and we can fully know it (through scientific 
research, remote sensing, or other means), and the excessively constructivist perspective that 
reduces reality only to our knowledge of it.101 Eden addresses this challenge explicitly in her 
treatment of how wilderness has been critiqued and defended,102 and how scientists have 
responded defensively to some of the work in SSK:  
Both concerns arise from presuming that epistemology must lead to ontology, 
when this is not necessarily so: if we analyse how we understand or relate to 
natural things such as trees, animals or floods…, this does not mean that those 
things do not exist or matter. It does mean that we can only ever know them 
through (imperfect and changing) cultural and social ways, although we tend 
to forget this because of the ease of denominating them as ‘natural’. 
Exploding the rubric of ‘nature’ thus allows us to examine its power to move 
us to use, value or protect it but does not negate the noncultural.103 
In this way, Eden seeks to chart a course – akin to my own – that recognizes that our views 
of the environment are culturally received, mediated, and interpreted, but that this 
“construction” of nature need not undermine efforts to protect the environment.104 
Part of what is required in this effort is to liberate nature from its associations with 
stasis and theoretical conservativism. Castree has called for just such a move, critiquing the 
dual assumptions held by many critical geographers that “ideas of nature are typically about 
fixity and permanence…[and] that these ideas are, in political and moral terms, typically 
 
101 e.g. Proctor 1998: 367. 
102 e.g. Cronon, W., “The Trouble with Wilderness; Or, Getting Back to the Wrong Nature,” In: Uncommon 
Ground: Toward Reinventing Nature, William Cronon, ed. (New York: W.W. Norton, 1995); Foreman, Dave, 
“All Kinds of Wilderness Foes,” Wild Earth 6(1996): 1-4. 
103 Eden, Sally, “Environmental Issues: Nature Versus the Environment?” Progress in Human Geography 25, 
1(2001): 82-83. 
104 Eden 2001: 83. 
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conservative.”105 Much as Cronon and other critics of “wilderness” portray this constellation 
of ideas and places as something oppressively fixed in its cultural meaning and effect, so has 
“nature” and a wide array of environmentalist projects been oddly essentialized by 
constructivist critics.106 In this respect, the “postmodern deconstructionists” who have 
invoked environmentalists’ wrath may not be postmodern enough. The point here should not 
be to vilify or recategorize either the constructivists or the realists, but rather to continue to 
question the assumptions that go with these positions and work to make them more accurate 
and productive as agents of change. 
In the next chapter I extend from these theoretical considerations to the converging 
genealogies of the two principal land categories implicated in military-to-wildlife 
conversions: lands managed by the U.S. Department of Defense and those included in the 
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service’s National Wildlife Refuge System.
 
105 Castree, Noel, “Nature is Dead! Long Live Nature!” Environment and Planning A 36, 4(2004): 192. 
106 Castree, 2004 on pp. 193-194 makes a similar point on essentialism, citing Fuss. See also, Havlick, D., 2006, 
“Reconsidering Wilderness: Prospective Ethics for Nature, Technology, and Society,” Ethics, Place and 
Environment 9(1): 47-62. 
CHAPTER THREE 
HISTORICAL GEOGRAPHIES OF DOD AND FWS LANDS IN THE U.S. 
 
When President Ulysses S. Grant signed into law the 1872 bill for the designation of a 
Yellowstone National Park, he initiated what would become one of the most lasting 
environmental characteristics of the United States: the demarcation of a vast public domain 
kept in ownership by the federal government.107 U.S. federal lands today cover an expanse 
that, if consolidated into a single territory, would rank as the tenth largest country in the 
world. 
These lands are managed by a number of agencies, each with its particular mandates 
for priority uses, from the generally conservative charge of the National Park Service—
steward of Yellowstone and other treasured sites such as the Grand Canyon, Great Smoky 
Mountains, and Yosemite—to the U.S. Forest Service’s more utilitarian pledge to provide a 
sustainable supply of timber and water resources to the nation. Despite their many contrasts, 
the 92 million acres of the National Wildlife Refuge System and approximately 25 million 
acres controlled by the U.S Department of Defense contain a number of important 
convergences, some of which have been promoted and highlighted with increasing 
persistence in the past two decades. 
 
107 Zaslowsky, Dyan and T.H. Watkins, These American Lands:  Parks, Wilderness, and the Public Lands 
(Washington, D.C.: The Wilderness Society and Island Press, 1994), p. xi. 
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In this chapter, I explore the disparate yet increasingly intertwined geographies of 
military bases and national wildlife refuges in the U.S., as they have evolved from scattered 
patches of federal land to more broadly unified systems managed for certain purposes. In 
particular, I attend to questions of how and why these lands were set aside for purposes of 
military production or wildlife protection, and how it is that these two causes have found 
expanding spaces of overlap and seeming compatibility.  
For military lands, several key phases appeared during the past century: 
establishment, active base management, closure, and reclassification. I provide examples 
from the early twentieth century to highlight the first modern period of base expansions, and 
in Chapter Five will look at the Jefferson Proving Ground in Indiana as one of the more 
recent base closures. In each of these, we can glimpse some of the inherent challenges of 
these processes, and how recent military reclassifications permit a turn toward environmental 
conservation and inclusion in the National Wildlife Refuge System. 
For this second subject, the creation of the National Wildlife Refuge System, I focus 
upon the historical contexts for why such designations were deemed necessary and desirable, 
where and how such refuges could be made, and how scattered patches of refuges have 
increasingly been stitched into a network for wildlife conservation and habitat protection. 
Probing beyond the explicit conservation focus of these lands, I also examine how refuge 
lands were actively made into something new and different out of their prior uses, and how 
the mixed histories of these places relate to the addition of new refuge lands from closing 
military bases.  
As we increase our understanding of the historical and geographical contexts for both 
military and wildlife reservations, we can then more adequately assess the current 
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phenomenon of military-to-wildlife conversions. Working through these historical 
geographies provides useful foundations by which we can frame the contemporary processes 
at work and evaluate the on-going debates these M2W changes engender. 
 
Establishing Military Bases in the United States 
 
Military lands have been established by different means in a variety of social, 
political, and physical settings.  Many former bases were abandoned or redeveloped long 
before the systematic closures and realignment that began formally in 1988, and the total 
acreage of military lands now managed by the Department of Defense is barely half what it 
was fifty years ago.108 Acknowledging that the pattern of base acquisition and abandonment 
has been somewhat erratic, I highlight three main phases of creation and expansion in U.S. 
history. The first of these lasted through the first one and a half centuries of the nation, most 
prominently with the westward push by European Americans in the mid- to late-19th century. 
The second and third major expansions came in conjunction with the two world wars of the 
20th century. The actual process of designating military lands has also changed over time, 
most notably by the passage in 1958 of the Engle Act, which transferred authority from the 
executive to legislative branch. 
 
The Early Years 
 
108 According to Palka and Galgano, p. 377, at the end of WWII the DOD managed 46 million acres. 
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Early military bases were sited, predictably, with strategic concerns foremost, 
whether to defend against potential attacks by Britain, France and Spain, or in support of 
western incursions and positions against indigenous populations. For example, at the 
confluence of the Potomac and Anacostia Rivers in Washington, D.C., Fort McNair first 
opened in 1794 as part of the (unsuccessful) American effort to defend the capital against the 
British.109 Fort McNair remains a small, active installation to this day, but most bases that 
were originally established near large East Coast cities have either been significantly 
downsized or have given way entirely to other uses and developments. Philadelphia’s once-
prominent quartermaster center, naval base, and shipyard have all been closed or converted 
to non-military uses.110 
A number of forts developed at the western margins of the expanding nation, initially 
to combat American Indians or serve as centers of early commerce. Many of these sites are 
now of primarily historical interest and no longer provide an active military function. The 
Army’s Office of Military History records more than 9,000 installations,111 though a recent 
attempt to provide a comprehensive list of all active sites of the U.S. military and National 
Guard counted just 1113 worldwide.112 
109 Sorenson, David S. Shutting Down the Cold War:  The Politics of Military Base Closure (NY: St. Martin’s 
Press, 1998), p. 14; Evinger, William R., ed., Directory of U.S. Military Bases Worldwide (Phoenix, AZ: Oryx 
Press, 1995), p. 51; Army Times Guide, pp. 142-143, points out that the British leveled the fort in 1814 and it 
was subsequently rebuilt. 
110 Evinger, pp. 176-177; Army Times Guide, p. 180. 
111 Army Times Guide, p. 7. 
112 Evinger, p. vii. 
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Of course, some early forts remain. Oklahoma’s Fort Sill was built in 1869 in order to 
“pacify” the remaining Comanche and Kiowa people of the central plains.113 Fort 
Leavenworth, in Kansas, was established in 1827 as a protective outpost for the Sante Fe and 
Oregon Trails westward.114 Due to their ability to expand territorially and retain support 
politically, both these bases have persisted over the years.115 
The means of acquisition for early forts varied. Some lands and buildings were 
inherited from the departing European nations who had built and occupied early 
fortifications.116 Naval bases, then as now, were generally restricted for obvious reasons to 
the coastal periphery of the country, and particularly to sites that had protected, year-round, 
deep-water ports. Although many forts cropped up along the expanding western frontier as 
hastily-constructed stockades, some sites for early western forts, such as Leavenworth, Sill, 
and Riley, were carefully selected as permanent installations for reasons of commerce, 
strategic advantage, or geographic significance, respectively.117 
Since land was plentiful in the eyes of the U.S. Government throughout most of the 
19th Century, military reservations were most often made through executive fiat and carved 
 
113 Evinger, p. 168. 
114 Evinger, p. 91; Army Times Guide, pp. 122-126. 
115 Fort Sill now hosts more than 15,000 field artillery officers and students each year on 94,000 acres, while 
Leavenworth maintains an Army command college on 5,400 acres. See Sorenson, p. 14; Evinger, p. 91. 
116 Examples here include New York City’s Fort Wadsworth, vacated by the British in 1783, and the San 
Francisco Presidio, which was originally built by the Spanish in 1776 and passed from Mexican to U.S. control 
in 1846. Army Times Guide, p. 251 (Ft. Wadsworth) and p. 188 (Presidio). 
117 Fort Riley, in Kansas, was first named “Camp Center” as planners thought it was located in the geographic 
center of the United States. Army Times Guide, p. 203. 
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out of the existing federal domain (so-called Reserved Lands). This process often rested upon 
a prior acquisition of the lands by force and/or treaty from indigenous Americans, England, 
Spain, France, Russia, or Mexico. In an era characterized more generally by a federal policy 
of land acquisition and disposal – as the United States added to its territorial boundaries, but 
within these expanding borders steadily dispensed lands to states, individuals, and corporate 
interests – military lands proved to have staying power so long as national security interests 
could somehow be tied to the base in question. As we will see in the next section, the 
tendency of the U.S. to maintain, expand, or contract military holdings often matched 
national perceptions of domestic and international security. 
 
World War I Expansions 
 
One decade into the twentieth century, the U.S. Army still maintained forty-nine 
posts activated during the national push westward.118 Following America’s engagement in 
World War I in 1917, the government quickly opened thirty-two new Army and National 
Guard bases, including a number of major facilities that remain active today.119 Acquired 
primarily through purchases by the federal War Department (the Department of Defense’s 
predecessor),120 these new bases represented the first cohort of military lands designated and 
developed with a long-term strategic vision for a modern military.   
 
118 Palka and Galgano, pp. 376-377. 
119 These include Forts Lewis, Benning, Knox, and Bragg. Palka and Galgano, pp. 376-377. 
120 Childs, John, The Military Use of Land: A History of the Defence Estate (Bern, Switzerland: Peter Lang, 
1998), p. 229. 
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With the advent of World War I, the federal government for the first time found itself 
with a need for dramatic expansions in military facilities in a land that lacked a frontier. 
Lands purchased for these twentieth-century bases therefore faced new constraints and 
typically needed to meet a number of sociopolitical and geographic characteristics. It was no 
longer as politically or strategically tenable for the War Department to simply stake its claim 
to land by force and set up a garrison. With a broader shift in federal land policy from 
disposal to retention and management already well underway – evidenced by the 
establishment of Yellowstone and thirteen more national parks by 1916, as well as the 
increasingly stolid bureaucracy of the Forest Service – hundreds of millions of acres of 
public domain were also less available for military appropriation than they had been in 
previous decades.121 
War Department planners came up with a short list of criteria to direct their search for 
new base locations.122 The lands in question should possess low agricultural, commercial, or 
cultural value. Current federal ownership was desirable and the fewer existing residential or 
industrial occupants, the better. Bases needed to be accessible by road, rail, and/or sea.  
Modern bases needed acreage enough to permit large troop exercises, including artillery 
practice for increasingly long-range weaponry. Bases should also be remote enough to 
maximize military security. In the effort to create essentially self-contained reservations, 
these sites also needed water and other natural resources to provision bases and facilitate 
infrastructural developments. 
 
121 See for example, Flores, 1997; Dombeck et al., 2003. 
122 The following list is culled from several sources:  Childs, p. 230; Nye, pp. 76-77; and History of Camp 
Lejeune: The East Coast Training Center of the United States Marine Corps (Wilmington, NC: Wilmington 
Printing Co., June 1950), p. 12. 
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World War II Expansions 
 
With the next wartime expansion, U.S. military planners again faced a set of siting 
priorities similar to those they had tendered in 1917, but the changing technology of 
weaponry increased the scale of bases needed by an order of magnitude.123 Most of today’s 
largest Army sites were created in the period from 1942-1945 as missile and other programs 
required extensive ranges for testing. Just one week after its acquisition (in part from the 
privately-owned San Augustin Ranch), White Sands Missile Range (née Proving Ground) 
was the site of the world’s first atomic bomb test at the Trinity Site on the 16 July 1945.124 At 
3.2 million acres, White Sands and a contiguous tract of Fort Bliss remain the largest military 
installation in the country.125 
The increasing importance of the Army’s air forces by the 1940s – a shift that would 
lead to the creation of the Air Force as a new branch of the military in 1947 – also added 
significantly to the number and acreage of military installations. Air base additions also 
changed the geography of military locations as they no longer needed to meet the same terms 
of land- or water-based accessibility. Sites in the remote interior of the western U.S. and 
throughout Alaska proved the most consistently desirable and available. Land for major air 
bases in most western states was purchased during this era from private ownership or 
 
123 Lanier-Graham, p. 88, describes a twenty-fold increase in base areas. 
124 Army Times Guide, p. 262; Evinger, p. 146. 
125 Palka and Galgano, p. 363. 
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appropriated from the public domain by executive decree.126 By 1945, military land holdings 
crested at 55.2 million acres, including more than 34 million acres in the territory of 
Alaska.127 By the mid-1980s, more than 70 percent of Department of Defense lands, by 
acreage, could be found in ten western states.128 
One other class of military installations also became more prominent during the 
World War II expansion, as chemical and biological weapons facilities started in 1941 at the 
38,000-acre Redstone Arsenal in Alabama;129 and in 1942 at the 841,000-acre Dugway 
Proving Ground in Utah,130 and the 17,000-acre Rocky Mountain Arsenal just north of 
Denver.131 As we will see in Chapter Four with the case of the Rocky Mountain Arsenal, 
during this period the federal government also applied its power of eminent domain to gain 
title to lands converting to military use. This brings us to the question of how federal 
authority has been applied to designate new military sites from the existing landbase. 
 
Designating Authority and the Engle Act of 1958 
 
126 Bases included Lowry, in Colorado (1937); Kirtland, in New Mexico (1939); Elmendorf, in Alaska (1940); 
Nellis, in Nevada (1941); Vandenberg, in California (1941); and Malmstrom, in Montana (1942); among many 
others. 
127 Childs, p. 229. 
128 Palka and Galgano, p. 377.  The states included AK, AZ, CA, CO, NV, NM, OR, UT, WA, and WY. 
129 Evinger, p. 6; Army Times Guide, pp. 197-198. 
130 Evinger, p. 202; Army Times Guide, pp. 66-68. 
131 Evinger, p. 44; Army Times Guide, p. 212. 
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During the past century and a half, public land management has trended toward 
increasing Congressional direction and legislative control.132 For example, the Executive’s 
ability to set aside national forest reserves was halted in 1907 after President Theodore 
Roosevelt was widely viewed by Congress as having exceeded its intentions.133 In recent 
decades, Congressional actions have further limited the relatively free license historically 
granted to land management agencies. This has perhaps been particularly clear with the U.S. 
Forest Service, as laws such as the Wilderness Act of 1964 and National Forest Management 
Act of 1976 applied increasingly specific constraints on agency decision-making.134 Other 
laws including the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969; Endangered Species Act of 
1973; Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA); and Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA); have 
similarly included prescriptive components that had typically been kept more loosely under 
Executive or agency control. As I address later in this chapter, many of these laws now play a 
role in governing how military sites must be managed as they close and convert to new uses. 
 
132 See, for example, Wilkinson, Charles F. and H. Michael Anderson, Land and Resource Planning in the 
National Forests (Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 1987). 
133 Wilkinson, Charles F., Crossing the Next Meridian: Land, Water, and the Future of the West (Washington, 
D.C.: Island Press, 1992), pp. 126-127; Zaslowsky and Watkins, pp. 74-75.  
134 See Wilkinson and Anderson, pp. 3-4, 45, and passim for treatment of this increasingly specific 
Congressional role; see Steen, Harold K., The U.S. Forest Service: A History (Seattle, WA: University of 
Washington Press, 1976, 3rd Printing 1991), p. 313 for a description of Congressional intervention on behalf of 
wilderness. Other laws generally viewed as adding legislative constraints on the Forest Service include the 
Resources Planning Act of 1974 and Tongass Timber Reform Act of 1990. 
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Military land acquisitions generally fit within this historical trend toward 
Congressional oversight. In 1958, in response to a view that the Department of Defense had 
become “awful land hogs,”135 Congress passed the Engle Act to limit the authority of the 
President and Secretary of the Interior from withdrawing lands for military purposes.136 Prior 
to that time, Defense officials simply had to submit a request to the Department of the 
Interior for more land. During Congressional hearings for the Engle Act, military planners 
acknowledged that they could not recall ever having a land request turned down.137 
As a consequence of this Act, and somewhat similar to the process for designating 
national forests or national parks, all military reservations larger than 5,000 acres can only be 
created by act of Congress. This provision has become increasingly significant in recent 
years, as military operations rely upon mobile units and ever-longer-range weapons.138 With 
these new strategies and technologies, pressures persist for larger training areas, even as base 
closures grow more common. Because of the Engle Act, as well as increased public and 
scientific appreciation of remote desert lands, it is significantly more difficult than it was in 
either of the twentieth-century periods of expansion to establish large military bases from the 
 
135 The words are Congressman Clair Engle’s, as quoted in Loomis, David, Combat Zoning: Military Land-Use 
Planning in Nevada (Reno, NV: University of Nevada Press, 1993), p. 33. 
136 72 Stat. 27; 43 U.S. Code 155-158. 
137 Loomis, p. 34. 
138 See Instruction Memorandum No. 2001-030, “Military Activities On and Over the Public Lands” 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land Management, 8 November 2000), pp. 1-3, 
for an overview of new military pressures on public lands and the implications of the Engle Act.  
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existing public domain.139 Although claims of national security still manage to trump all 
comers in most instances, U.S. military officials in recent years have also increasingly 
mobilized rhetorics of environmental protection to add to their justifications for space both 
domestically and abroad. 
 
Military Lands as Conservation Lands 
 
Department of Defense lands currently provide a wide range of uses for the planet’s 
most heavily-equipped, richly-funded military. Approximately half of these lands, about 12.5 
million acres, are managed by the U.S. Army; nine million acres are in the hands of the Air 
Force; and the remaining 3.5 million acres are managed by the Navy, including bases for the 
Marine Corps.140 Training bases such as North Carolina’s Camp Lejeune and Fort Bragg 
house tens of thousands of Marines and Army personnel respectively, but the million-acre 
expanses of the Yuma Proving Grounds or White Sands Missile Base have relatively small 
residential populations and visitors are practically excluded. As I described in Chapter One, 
while military bases have been used to prepare troops for war and for the testing of 
 
139 This is evident in the controversy over the Army’s plan to substantially expand Ft. Carson’s training area in 
southeastern Colorado; see De Yoanna, “Targeting Paradise: Fort Carson Expansion Could Swallow History, 
Wildlife and a Way of Life,” Colorado Springs Independent, 10-16 August 2006, pp. 14-17; Louden, Tamara, 
“Army Expansion Plans Have Ranchers on Edge,” The Denver Post, 13 September 2006, p. 1-E. 
140 Leslie, Michele, Gary K. Meffe and Jeffrey L. Hardesty, Conserving Biodiversity on Military Lands:  A 
Handbook for Natural Resource Managers (Washington, D.C.: The Department of Defense Biodiversity 
Initiative, U.S. Department of Defense, and The Nature Conservancy, 1996), section 1.2, p. 6, viewed online at 
https://www.denix.osd.mil/denix/Public/ES-Programs/Conservation/Biodiv.… [30 March 2003]. 
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munitions, federal management of large tracts of land in a strictly-regulated manner has, at 
the same time, led to the production of high ecological values for many areas.  
 
Active Base Management 
 
Military activities and materiel are often designed specifically to destroy opposing 
human and environmental subjects. This contributes to a tension inherent to the 
environmental management of military lands. The direct management intentions for these 
spaces, as well their material and philosophical by-products, are often antithetical to 
environmental protection. More than 17,000 contaminated sites at U.S. military installations 
bear witness to the fact that environmental degradation has been chronic and systemic in 
these places for decades.141 
At the same time, some areas within many military reservations have also been spared 
from the common ecological hazards of logging, intensive agriculture, mining, road-building, 
or residential development. With these traditional sources of habitat fragmentation largely 
excluded, certain military lands have remained – or returned to – a physical condition 
unusual for its integrity. In a number of cases habitat remained largely intact even as it was 
being heavily contaminated by toxic chemicals or pounded by artillery. Often this occurs 
with a particular pattern, as the most intensive or dangerous uses take place in the core area 
of large bases, leaving the periphery relatively unscathed. 
 Contamination on military sites comes from an array of actions and materials ranging 
from the spectacular to the mundane. At the Naval Air Engineering Center near Lakehurst, 
 
141 Shulman, p. 14. 
67
New Jersey, for example, investigators determined that Navy personnel dumped 
approximately three million gallons of fuel, solvents, hydraulic fluid, and other chemicals 
directly into the ground, despite the Center’s location atop New Jersey’s primary water 
supply, the shallow Cohansey aquifer.142 
As citizens in the U.S. became increasingly informed of environmental hazards more 
generally during the 1960s, the condition of the environment on military lands began to 
receive some amount of interest. The suite of environmental laws that passed in the latter half 
of the twentieth century also subjected DOD lands to regulations that simply did not exist 
prior to the 1960s. Among these, the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) requires 
that significant federal actions include environmental analyses or impact statements, and 
opens subsequent decisions to a process of public participation. In order to fend off 
extinctions, the Endangered Species Act (ESA) prohibits takings – meaning direct mortality 
or less-directly, habitat destruction – of species that are severely imperiled. The Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) prescribes management protocols for hazardous 
materials and solid waste cleanups; CERCLA clarifies the chain of financial liability for 
hazardously polluted sites and created the Superfund to pay for remediation costs at dozens 
of the nation’s most contaminated locations. These and other laws now apply in most 
instances on military and other federal lands (the ESA also applies on private lands). 
 Even before Congress passed these wide-reaching pieces of legislation beginning in 
1969, it had acted to promote environmental stewardship on military lands. The Sikes Act of 
1960 required every installation managed by the DOD to create a plan that provided for the 
conservation of fish and wildlife, their habitats, and where necessary, rehabilitation 
 
142 Shulman, p. 66.  See Shulman, pp. 172-173 for a map of major contaminated military sites across the U.S. 
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measures.143 In many ways foreshadowing public lands legislation and executive orders that 
would come in the following decades, the Sikes Act also stipulated that threatened and 
endangered wildlife and plants be afforded protections, and that activities such as off-road 
vehicle use should be strictly controlled.144 
Depending upon the location, there is both a rather proud tradition of environmental 
management on military bases and an astounding degree of environmental abuse. The 
military has, in fact, invested substantially in programs that protect certain environmental 
components of its training sites. When compared to the entire DOD budget, however, 
millions of dollars represent just a fraction of a percent.145 Of some five million personnel 
and an annual budget that consumes approximately a fourth of all federal spending, the DOD 
dedicates 5,000 employees to work on environmental issues.146 
Beginning in 1997, following amendments to the Sikes Act, Congress required the 
Department of Defense to prepare and implement detailed natural resource management 
plans for each of its U.S. installations.147 The intent of these plans is to protect, improve, and 
restore natural resources on military bases, and they must be updated every five years, or 
sooner as dictated by significant changes in resources or mission requirements.148 The first 
 
143 Defense Environmental Quality Program Annual Report to Congress, FY 2001 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
General Printing Office), p. 107.   
144 Defense Environmental Quality Program Annual Report to Congress, FY 2001, p. 107.   
145 See Shulman, p. 121. 
146 Shulman, pp. 120-121. 
147 Defense Environmental Quality Program Annual Report to Congress, FY 2001, p. 107. 
148 Defense Environmental Quality Program Annual Report to Congress, FY 2001, p. 108. The natural resource 
plans are akin to management plans required of every national forest. 
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round of Integrated Natural Resource Management Plans was due for completion by 
November 2001 and by that date the Defense Department reported that 90 percent of its 425 
major installations had completed their documents;149 by fiscal 2005, the DOD had 
completed revised resource management plans at 93 percent of its installations.150 
The Department of Defense also must prepare cultural resource management plans 
for every installation with “significant cultural resources.” These cultural plans are updated 
annually and often link to the natural resource plans for their respective bases.151 In tandem, 
these documents represent a significant component of the Legacy Resource Management 
Program created by Congress in 1990 to balance military activities with a desire to protect 
natural and cultural resources on active sites.152 
The U.S. Army applies $35 million annually to its Integrated Training Area 
Management program, which includes among its goals the controlling of “undesirable” 
environmental impacts caused by training and testing activities, as well as maintaining 
military operations at a level that does not exceed the carrying capacity of the land.153 A two-
fold motive for this approach is clearly articulated in a 1996 document drafted jointly by the 
 
149 Defense Environmental Quality Program Annual Report to Congress, FY 2001, p. 109. 
150 Defense Environmental Programs, Fiscal Year 2005, Annual Report to Congress, p. 8. Viewed online at
https://www.denix.osd.mil/denix/Public/News/OSD/DEP2005/dep-body.pdf [15 September 2006].
151 Defense Environmental Quality Program Annual Report to Congress, FY 2001, p. 112. As of the DOD’s FY 
2005 report, only 68 percent of the integrated cultural management plans had been completed; see Defense 
Environmental Programs, FY 2005, p. 10. 
152 Defense Environmental Quality Program Annual Report to Congress, FY 2001, p. 113. 
153Army Regulation 350-4, Integrated Training Area Management (ITAM) (Washington, D.C.: Department of 
the Army, 8 May 1998), p. 1; Palka and Galgano, p. 374. Of course, whether or not the concept of carrying 
capacity is outdated may be open for debate by ecologists, as may its definitions. 
70
Department of Defense and The Nature Conservancy. Noting that “military lands include 
expanses of undeveloped coastline, native prairie, forests, and the great American deserts of 
the Southwest,”Conserving Biodiversity on Military Lands highlights that: 
Stewardship is not just a matter of altruism. As we all face the pressures 
of increasing demands and fewer resources to meet them, stewardship of 
the environment becomes a very practical issue. The lands available for 
military training and operations are limited. As our weaponry and tactics 
improve, we are challenged to meet new training and operations 
requirements with a declining land resource base. We must protect the 
condition of our ranges, so we can meet training needs in the future. We 
also must demonstrate that we are responsible stewards to continue to 
warrant the trust and support of the American people, who authorize 
our continued use of public lands.154 (emphasis added) 
 
Military planners’ acknowledgement that there is no longer an endless supply of lands 
may reveal the effects of the Engle Act, Wilderness Act, Federal Lands Policy Management 
Act, and other laws that now constrain military land appropriations. The frank admission that 
despite their restricted qualities military lands remain very much a part of the public domain, 
in turn, reflects not only the impacts of NEPA, but the perspective of a military establishment 
that has seen its lands turned over to other public and private uses in increasing measures in 
the past three decades. It remains to be seen whether the military will find the ability to apply 
the nation’s environmental regulations vigorously to itself, or if external pressure and 
enforcement will be sufficient to force policies that lead to meaningful change. 
 
Base Realignment and Closure 
 
154 Leslie et al., p. 1. 
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As I noted earlier in this chapter, during the past century domestic military holdings 
increased abruptly during two major periods of conflict (1917-1919 and 1942-1945), then 
shifted or diminished thereafter.155 Even during significant commitments to war in Southeast 
Asia and prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, DOD leaders 
and members of Congress recognized a need to close or “realign” defense holdings to 
streamline spending and respond more efficiently to modern military technologies, strategic 
alliances, and shifts in geopolitics.156 By the late 1970s, Defense Secretary Harold Brown 
estimated that unneeded military bases were costing his department $1 billion annually to 
maintain.157 
What started as a streamlining effort within the military in response to advances in 
technology and quick-strike capabilities, soon increased in scope as the end of the Cold War 
further altered geopolitical and strategic military considerations. Base closures proved 
problematic politically, however, as elected officials were loathe to see economic losses from 
closures in their districts attributed to votes they personally had cast.158 Indeed, for most of 
the 1970s and 1980s the call to close military bases was doomed to failure. In response, 
Representative Richard Armey (R-TX) devised what amounted to a protective shield for 
 
155 A number of dormant World War Two-era bases were reactivated during the Korean War and carried into 
the Cold War period. 
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Congress that displaced conversion decisions onto a non-legislative panel known as the Base 
Realignment and Closure Commission, or BRAC. 
 
Base Realignment and Closure Commission: The BRAC Process 
 
The first of five BRACs convened in 1988, with successive commissions in 1991, 
1993, 1995, and 2005. Though not fully immune to political persuasion, the BRAC 
essentially created a layer of insulation that freed base closures from what had been more 
than a decade-long Congressional stalemate. Largely as a result of the systematic approach 
and political buffering of the BRAC process, since 1988 the DOD has closed or reclassified 
more than 400 military bases, including approximately 130 major installations.159 
The first commission served in an ad hoc capacity, forming and disbanding rapidly on 
either side of its work. This made it relatively unaccountable to the public its decisions 
impacted. Later iterations of the commission stabilized its composition and accommodated 
public input. This in some ways made the BRAC a more overtly political body after 1988, 
but recommendations from the commission still had to be approved or rejected wholesale by 
both Congress and the President – a requirement that effectively freed individuals to vote for 
a broader public good without (as much of) the usual dedication to parochial interests.160 
Although base closures come as a clear expression of military design and decision-
making, the environmental condition of military lands has at times played an important role 
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in closure decisions, both procedurally and materially. When Congress passed legislation in 
1976 and 1982 that made base closures more difficult, it did so under a guise of concern for 
full environmental accountability.161 Despite a view highlighted by the Defense Department 
and others that military lands included important ecological reserves, some members of 
Congress sought to emphasize the dangerous, contaminated character of these lands. In 
effect, they claimed that military bases were simply impacted beyond remediation and too 
dangerous to convert to other more public uses.162 One result of such arguments was the 
passage of the O’Neill-Cohen Act in 1976, which stipulated that before closure, bases would 
first be subject to a full environmental analysis as directed by the National Environmental 
Policy Act (NEPA).  
While NEPA has proven itself a vital means by which the public can have a voice in 
federal actions, it can also be used simply to bog down the implementation of proposed 
projects.163 In the context of base closures, NEPA quickly began to serve precisely this role. 
As the Secretary of Defense at the time testified to Congress:  
NEPA is a mechanism that has been used by opponents of realignment or 
closure to gain lengthy delays in the closure process. For the Department to 
comply with NEPA, it must announce its intention to study the possible 
realignment or closure of a base, as well as similar alternatives, conduct public 
hearings in the local communities and perform environmental assessments and 
public impact analyses. These analyses by their very nature take an 
extraordinary amount of time and this offers the opportunity to join forces and 
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bring enormous political pressure, quite frankly, on the Congress and on the 
Department for the purpose of stopping a base realignment or closure.164 
In order for base closures to become practicable for the 1988 BRAC, Congress 
shuffled the NEPA process so that it came only after base closures were approved.165 
Environmental impact was one of nine criteria used to evaluate closures during the 1988 
BRAC, but the necessary subversion of a formal environmental (NEPA) review until after 
sites had been committed to the closure list helped ensure that highly contaminated military 
sites would indeed become subject to conversion. In part as a response to this fact, later 
BRAC legislation included a requirement for an Environmental Restoration Program 
designed to identify key sites for preservation or restoration.166 (This latter came nearly 
concurrently with a process of closure and remediation on Department of Energy lands that 
had been integral to nuclear production throughout the Cold War.167) By some estimates, the 
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conversion of military lands will require the largest environmental remediation project ever 
undertaken by the U.S. government.168 
Unfortunately, dating back to the 1980s the Department of Defense has struggled to 
demonstrate an active commitment to clean-up efforts at its thousands of contaminated sites. 
Ten years into the DOD’s first major remediation program, for instance, the Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for the Environment acknowledged that only seven “truly remedial 
actions” had been finished from a total of more than 4,500 sites.169 Although some suggest 
that a leave-it-alone approach to environmental recovery of contaminated areas is actually 
desirable,170 such inaction only saves money in the short-term and neither ensures that public 
lands remain in any real sense public – if, for instance, radiation or unexploded ordnance 
hazards remain – nor provides wildlife and plant communities any genuine form of refuge. 
A converse environmental casting has also been evident in recent years as groups and 
individuals rally around military conversions for conservation purposes. As I develop later in 
this chapter when I turn to logics of conversion, this process usually begins only after bases 
have been identified for closure. Environmental groups and boosters of local communities 
then highlight the environmental amenities of military sites. As I noted earlier, Williams’ 
study found that environmental activism, community cohesion, and public participation were 
closely associated with greater habitat protection (i.e. conversion to a national wildlife 
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refuge).171 This is consistent with the NEPA analysis of the Jefferson Proving Ground’s 
closure, where the record of public comments reveals local support for reclassifying the site 
as a national wildlife refuge.172 
Unlike military lands, national wildlife refuges are managed with a different set of 
principal values and an express primary purpose of conserving wildlife and plants; in the next 
section, I examine how early refuges emerged, what types of prior uses came with these new 
designations, and how Congress, the Fish and Wildlife Service, and others have worked over 
time to bring together a disparate network of refuges into a system dedicated to conservation. 
 
National Wildlife Refuges  
 
When President Theodore Roosevelt created the first National Wildlife Refuge in 
1903, he acted largely in response to citizen appeals against the devastation of bird 
populations along the Florida coast.173 Prior to Roosevelt’s executive order to establish the 
Pelican Island refuge in Florida, a local orange grower and part-time boat builder named Paul 
Kroegel for several years had rallied to protect the roseate spoonbills, egrets, ibises, and 
pelicans for which the island was known.174 Kroegel enlisted the support of the Florida 
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Audubon Society and Ornithologists’ Union, Inc., and in concert these non-governmental 
parties prevailed upon the President to make what would become a landmark stroke of his 
conservationist hand. 
This initial entry for what more than a half-century later would become a National 
Wildlife Refuge System was fitting in many respects. First, created as it was by presidential 
order, Pelican Island like many later refuges was brought forth by executive action rather 
than Congressional statute or protracted deliberations between agencies.175 Unlike most other 
federal land categories such as national parks and national forests, which since the early 
1900s have been promulgated exclusively from legislative action, to this day wildlife refuges 
may be established by executive authority. More than six times as many national wildlife 
refuges have been established this way either by Presidential decree or administrative actions 
that trace directly back to the executive branch, rather than declared by act of Congress.176 
This approach to designating national wildlife refuges has, from the outset, brought 
spontaneity and flexibility into the system at the expense of consistency and stability. In 
many respects, these different processes of creation have shaped the respective public land 
systems into their distinctive forms recognizable even today. When the first national parks 
were designated in the late 1800s, they came as stand-alone Congressional acts such as the 
1860 statute that set Yosemite aside as a park for the State of California (this later returned to 
federal ownership with national park legislation in 1890), and the seminal 1872 law that 
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created Yellowstone National Park. Though in many cases such designations were freighted 
with commercial aspirations and loaded with political self-interest, national parks from the 
outset have been renowned for and measured by standards of exceptional scenic quality, 
abundance of wildlife, and a subsequent marquee attraction for visitors from across the U.S. 
and beyond.177 
In fact, a handful of early national parks – such as Sully’s Hill in South Dakota – over 
time failed to meet such high standards and found themselves downgraded to other categories 
upon later Congressional reflection.178 Moving in the opposite direction, some sites that first 
came into prominence through executive action as national monuments or wildlife refuges 
have managed to progress to higher profile classifications as their scenic qualities, plant or 
wildlife habitats gained recognition – elevating, for example, the Grand Canyon, California 
Desert Lands (Joshua Tree and Death Valley), and Colorado’s Great Sand Dunes to national 
park status. 
National forests, meanwhile, relied upon executive action initially for their 
establishment across the western U.S., but after a decade of dramatic expansion Congress 
reined in such executive decrees and since 1907 the creation or elimination of national forests 
has been the sole right of Congress.179 
177 Park Service officials commonly refer to the “world class” aesthetic, historic, or ecological features present in
national park units.
178 Sully’s Hill is now a national wildlife refuge. 
179 By the time Congress made this move, Presidents Harrison, Cleveland, McKinley, and Roosevelt had already 
managed to designate 151 million acres of national forests – just 40 million acres shy of the system’s current 
extent. 
79
With both the national parks and national forests, then, Congress ensured from an 
early stage that these categories of federal lands would be designated and managed 
systematically. Even prior to the 1916 Organic Act that clarified the purpose of the National 
Parks as a system, the enabling legislation for individual national park units was typically 
modeled after the Yellowstone legislation that prescribed management for the conservation 
of scenery and wildlife, and for the enjoyment of the visiting public.  
Although the purposes and mission for the national forests are rather different from 
the national parks – focused on an array of uses including timber production, protection of 
water sources, recreation, wildlife, and grazing – these too have long been managed as a
system and directed, with increasing degrees of oversight, by statute. Despite the diversity of 
locations, habitats, and features of the various units of these two categories of federal land, 
there is a certain amount of consistency within each system. A visit to one of the United 
States’ scenic national parks reliably brings tourists to awe-inspiring vistas, scenes that fit our 
notions of what primeval America must have looked like, or living galleries of wildlife 
unlikely to be encountered in our daily lives.180 
Despite their many critics, national forests also are relatively reliable in what they 
offer. Most national forests offer some mix of the multiple uses they are pledged to provide, 
even if these are sometimes heavily segregated spatially, lack apparent balance, or are 
continually contested. As their name would suggest, the national forests typically include 
extensive tracts of forested lands, and visitors to most units can find opportunities to camp, 
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hike, or fish, even as they may also encounter commercial activities such as livestock 
grazing, mining, or logging. 
Compared to either of these relatively well-consolidated systems of federal land, the 
National Wildlife Refuge System is by most measures rather different. As noted above, most 
wildlife refuge units come from executive or administrative action rather than Congressional 
statute, but refuges may be created by any one of these methods. With many coming 
relatively late in the public land designation timeline, wildlife refuges also exhibit a more 
diverse array of prior ownership than most other federal lands: the majority of refuge acres 
have come as transfers from other federally reserved lands, but the majority of refuge units 
have been either purchased from private landowners or negotiated through cooperative 
agreements with states. Other refuge lands are donated by individuals or non-profit land 
trusts.181 
Described by one refuge scholar as a “crazy quilt” of different units,182 the hundreds 
of national wildlife refuges were not even recognized as a “system” until Congress passed 
legislation in 1966. With units by that time already scattered across the country in a variety 
of sizes and settings, including an extraordinarily complex set of prior land use histories and 
management directives, the National Wildlife Refuge System continues to struggle to achieve 
cohesiveness and meaning as a particular form of federal land. A brief look now at the types 
of units that comprise the system, and from what prior uses these have come to be 
designated, provides important context for the current task of understanding the implications 
of military-to-wildlife conversions within the federal refuge system. 
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Early Refuge Designations 
 
Following his 1903 declaration that protected Pelican Island as a bird refuge, 
President Roosevelt proceeded to create fifty-five more wildlife reserves in the next six years 
using similar executive decrees. Congress also followed suit to a lesser degree, enacting 
legislation for wildlife refuges at Oklahoma’s Wichita Mountain, the National Bison Range 
in Montana, and the National Elk Refuge near Jackson, Wyoming.183 In a move that surely 
had greater overall effect than any single refuge designation, Congress also affirmed the 
presidential power to make such executive orders for national monuments and wildlife 
refuges when it passed the Antiquities Act in 1906.184 This approbation of executive power 
for wildlife refuge designations seems particularly noteworthy considering Congress enacted 
a measure to remove the President’s authority to designate national forests at nearly the same 
time.  
The contrasting Congressional approach to executive authority over federal land 
designations is surprising considering that wildlife refuges represented a more protectionist 
approach to land management, while national forests from the outset advocated sustained use 
and utilitarian principles. Though environmental historians can now look back and identify 
two concurrent strains of thought toward federal land use during the early 1900s – 
preservation, and its spiritual and aesthetic values represented by John Muir and the national 
parks movement, compared against the more pragmatic conservation of Gifford Pinchot and 
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the national forests – wildlife refuge designations may have come as a quieter third way that 
responded with a crisis mentality to wildlife depredations and the shocking decline of bison 
and other large ungulates, passenger pigeons, waterfowl, and “plume birds” such as egrets, 
herons, and cranes. The particular historical contexts of early wildlife refuge designations 
may explain, in part, why the public perception to this day assumes a standard of purity and 
protection on these lands that rarely actually exists. 
These historical contexts and the fact that refuge designations have accreted over a 
span of decades also help explain why the current refuge system includes such a variety of 
units.185 There is, for one, the issue of size. Refuges range from the massive to the miniscule, 
with Alaskan giants such as the 22 million-acre Yukon Delta NWR stacked against the 
backyard-sized 0.6 acre Mille Lacs NWR in Minnesota.186 Locations vary from remote 
wilderness refuges in Montana or Alaska to urban refuges in New Orleans or San Francisco 
that sit almost wholly within the city limits. Wetlands and waterfowl areas may represent the 
quintessential wildlife refuge habitat – particularly in the form of Waterfowl Production Area 
refuges found across the northern plains and drawn exclusively from the Migratory Bird 
Hunting Stamp Act funds – but refuges can be found in an extremely wide range of climates 
and conditions. Arizona’s Cabeza Prieta NWR covers more than 860,000 acres of America’s 
hottest desert, the Sonoran, while the Arctic NWR sprawls across the muskeg and tundra of 
Alaska’s North Slope; many Pacific island refuges include vast marine holdings and are 
closed to public use, while dozens of refuges along the East Coast sit less than an hour’s 
drive from a hundred million people.  
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Long before the current National Wildlife Refuge System took shape, Congress 
recognized that certain kinds of wildlife needed more consolidated forms of protection. In 
1929, Congress passed the Migratory Bird Conservation Act, which provided the first 
overarching powers to acquire a system of refuges.187 The 1929 act also gave explicit federal 
authority to buy state lands for bird refuges, a condition that gained import five years later 
when Congress approved the Migratory Bird Hunting Stamp Act of 1934.  
More commonly known as the Duck Stamp Act, this 1934 legislation brought hunting 
interests more fully into both the funding and use of national wildlife refuges. The Act 
provided for the sale of a $1 annual duck hunting stamp – whose design has become a 
prestigious annual competition in its own right – from which the proceeds were dedicated to 
wildlife habitat purchases and refuge management in a 90-to-10 split. In the past seven 
decades, Duck Stamp prices have risen to $15 and sales have raised more than $670 million, 
making them the major source of reliable revenue for the acquisition and expansion of 
national wildlife refuge lands.188 (The Land and Water Conservation Act has generated 
another large pool of federal money through revenues garnered from off-shore oil and gas 
leasing, but these funds have become routinely bound up by political in-fighting and only 
sporadically lead to conservation land purchases.)  
As was the case with early national wildlife refuge designations, lands purchased 
using Duck Stamp funds typically came with complex land use histories that defied 
superficial notions of pristine or inviolate sanctuaries. For example, the majority of North 
Carolina’s 50,000-acre Mattamuskeet National Wildlife Refuge was purchased in 1934 using 
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$312,000 of Duck Stamp funds. The centerpiece of the refuge, a 40,000-acre rain-filled lake, 
is renowned today for providing habitat for tens of thousands of wintering ducks and 
geese.189 As a refuge biologist explained in one recent report, more than one thousand 
waterfowl hunters also make use of the refuge during hunting season: “What we try to do is 
to provide a quality hunting experience for a diversity of waterfowl. Just in the last couple 
days hunters brought in swan, a snow goose, teal, gadwall, widgeon, wood duck, pintail, 
black duck, mallard and ruddy duck.”190 
Visitors to Mattamuskeet in the 1800s could have encountered a somewhat similar 
scene, as private hunting clubs controlled access to the lake, but in the 1900s agricultural 
investors drained the lake to convert its bed to agricultural production.191 Although 13,000 
acres were subsequently converted, the project failed economically and by the time the Duck 
Stamp Act passed, the lakebed farming had been largely abandoned and water soon returned 
to the original site.  
Despite the hundreds of millions of dollars generated by Duck Stamp revenues and 
more than five million acres of refuge habitat purchased with these funds,192 the vast majority 
of national wildlife refuge acreage has come from designations from other federally reserved 
lands, or interagency transfers, not purchases or donations. Prior to the extensive Alaskan 
refuge additions established with the 1980 passage of the Alaska National Interest Lands 
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Conservation Act (ANILCA), this figure stood at 80 percent; since those additions that 
doubled the acreage of the refuge system, a whopping 97 percent of refuge lands have come 
from existing federal land sources.193 
Although waterfowl and big game hunters had long been linked to wildlife 
conservation efforts in the U.S. – a role perhaps most visibly associated with the gun-
wielding conservationist-President Theodore Roosevelt – early refuge set-asides often came 
with prohibitions against hunting. With hunters’ Duck Stamp contributions coming as a 
major source of funding for refuge acquisition and management following the 1934 Act, 
refuges increasingly began to open up to this type of “secondary use.” Congress, itself, took 
up hunters’ interests directly in both 1949 and 1966 by expanding the percentage of 
Migratory Bird Conservation Areas – one subcategory among wildlife refuges – that were to 
be open to waterfowl hunting. This change, from zero to 25 percent in 1949, then up to 40 
percent in 1966, essentially ensured that hunters would retain a secure presence in refuges. 
The increased access to hunters also corresponded to increases in Duck Stamp prices, one of 
several actions that some have linked to building an  economic orientation into refuge 
management.194 
This brings up a second point that would have lasting significance across the National 
Wildlife Refuge System and hold particular relevance for M2W conversions: as the number 
of wildlife refuges expanded throughout the second half of the twentieth century, so did the 
number and type of auxiliary uses that existed alongside the primary purpose of wildlife and 
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habitat conservation. Secondary uses of refuges such as mining, motorized recreation, 
military exercises, and livestock grazing raised concerns from many supporters of the refuge 
system, as well as from a majority of refuge managers, and eventually led to an important 
round of executive and legislative actions intended to reform and improve management of 
the refuge system as the twentieth century drew to a close.  
Before turning to the changes that came with President Clinton’s 1996 executive 
order and the National Wildlife Refuge Improvement Act it spawned in 1997, I first take a 
closer look at how secondary uses of refuges in various ways have been “grandfathered” into 
continuance, have been introduced after refuge designations, and may have expanded the 
federal government’s conception of what activities befit a national wildlife refuge even as the 
general public clings to notions of refuges as unsullied places of sanctuary. 
 
Secondary Uses of National Wildlife Refuges 
 
Considering the standard definition of the word “refuge,” the visiting public might 
well be forgiven for thinking that wildlife refuges at least offer “shelter from danger or 
trouble,” “protection,” or “a place of safety or security” for resident and visiting wildlife.195 
The conservation of wildlife, plants, and habitat is, in fact, the mandated primary purpose of 
the National Wildlife Refuge System and any additional uses of these lands are expressly 
prohibited from undermining this dominant objective. In wildlife laws and elsewhere, 
however, the terms of a statute and how it is implemented can lead to important gaps of 
difference. This explains, in part, why a 1989 GAO report determined that secondary or non-
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wildlife related uses occurred “on virtually every refuge and include all manner of public, 
economic, and military activities.”196 
Secondary uses take many forms and come from an array of historical and 
contemporary sources. Refuge lands in virtually every instance have been either designated 
or purchased from prior federal or private properties; in many cases, the uses that pre-dated 
refuge establishment are simply allowed to continue when the land managers change. BLM 
lands that gain refuge designation, for example, rarely strip away existing grazing or mining 
leases, as the social disruptions and local antagonisms such moves would engender can be 
counterproductive both to refuge workers fitting in with their communities and with the 
management objectives of the refuge itself (e.g. if such antipathy increases vandalism, 
poaching, or other actions). At the more formal level, many elected officials are savvy 
enough to realize that the economic and political clout of ranching or mining interests is 
often potent enough to keep such activities “grandfathered” into the statutory refuge 
purposes.  
 At times such accommodation of pre-existing uses can seem rather incongruous. Crab 
Orchard NWR, in Illinois, explicitly provides for continued industrial production of military 
munitions on refuge grounds, a condition that contributes to some FWS employees’ view that 
their agency “has been burned” by non-compatible uses being worked into refuge statutes.197 
This flexibility of individual refuge units adapting to local circumstances is also viewed by 
some as a strength of the system, however, and one that prevents the national wildlife refuges 
from positioning themselves outside of social processes in the way that, for example, the 
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National Wilderness Preservation System appears to and for which it has received some 
stinging critiques.198 
Of course, the determination of whether a secondary refuge use undermines or 
highlights the features of the National Wildlife Refuge System often depends both upon the 
standpoint of the observer and the type of use that is occurring. Such judgments also tend to 
vary with proximity to the refuge in question, as locals who have convenient access to 
recreational activities such as boating or driving off-road vehicles seem more likely to 
support such uses, even when refuge managers or the more distant public considers them 
harmful to primary refuge purposes. This effect of local pressures to keep secondary uses 
available was cited in the 1989 GAO report in a number of instances.199 
In other cases, the continuation of incompatible secondary uses is less a case of the 
FWS caving to local pressures as it is a lack of agency authority at higher levels. The DOD 
claims rights to the airspace above Arizona’s Cabeza Prieta NWR and conducts supersonic 
overflights at low altitude, as well as artillery tests on the adjacent Yuma Proving Grounds 
and Luke Air Force Bombing Gunnery Range, despite the FWS’s contention that such 
activity impairs efforts to recover the endangered desert bighorn sheep and Sonoran 
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pronghorn.200 Even with the legal hammer of Endangered Species Act protection for these 
populations, Cabeza Prieta’s wildlife managers have had limited success influencing the 
military’s operations. 
Mining claims, grazing and mineral leasing, and other legal permits for activities 
within national wildlife refuges can also be difficult to influence or dislodge. Even after the 
FWS issued a biological opinion that natural gas drilling on the D’Arbonne NWR in 
Louisiana would jeopardize endangered red cockaded woodpecker populations, a federal 
district court judge asserted that the agency could not enforce constraints on the permitted 
operations.201 In other cases, such as grazing leases, allotments can sometimes be reduced, 
fenced, or otherwise regulated, but even where reductions occur it may take years to restore 
damaged habitat and longer still to remove the activities entirely. 
Not all secondary uses of national wildlife refuges create equivalent impacts, of 
course, and among both land managers and legislators there is widespread consensus that 
some forms of public activity on wildlife refuges should continue, even if these do not 
contribute per se to the primary purposes of wildlife and habitat conservation. For instance, 
the majority of refuge managers surveyed by the GAO did not consider camping, picnicking, 
horseback riding, or non-motorized boating as “harmful” secondary uses.202 A number of 
other secondary uses that the general public might commonly view as having adverse 
impacts to refuge habitat and wildlife also find their way on most refuge managers’ lists of 
 
200 GAO, 1989, pp. 22-23. 
201 GAO, 1989, p. 23. 
202 GAO, 1989, p. 20. 
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activities that are not harmful. (See Table 3.1: Frequency of a Secondary Use Being 
Considered Harmful.) 
 
Table 3.1: Frequency of a Secondary Use Being Considered Harmful203 
Viewed as harmful by refuge manager  
Use    # of Refuges where use occurs  Number Percent 
 
Mining    26    22  85 
Off-road vehicles   37    26  76  
Airboats    36    25  69 
Military air exercises  55    36  65 
Waterskiing   53    31  58 
Large power boats  114    59  52 
Rights-of-way   211    101  48 
Beach use/swimming  96    39  41 
Small power boats  148    60  41 
Grazing    151    55  36 
Military ground exercises  29    10  34 
Commercial fishing  76    26  34 
Hunting dog field trials  56    18  32 
Camping   83    22  27 
Waterfowl hunting  163    41  25 
Haying    132    30  23 
Picnicking   192    36  20 
Farming    150    26  17 
Horseback riding   115    20  17 
Logging    79    13  16 
Recreational fishing  244    39  16 
Nonmotorized boats  193    26  13 
Small game hunting  162    18  11 
 
Hunting, fishing, and logging, for instance, each rated 75 percent or better as not 
harmful, and in some cases these extractive activities fared better in managers’ perspective 
than non-consumptive uses. By way of comparison, waterfowl hunting met with disapproval 
by 25 percent of refuge managers versus 27 percent who considered camping harmful; 
logging and fishing both came in at 16 percent disapproval, while 17 percent rated horseback 
riding harmful; and non-motorized boating was viewed by 13 percent as harmful, behind 
 
203 Modified from GAO, 1989, p. 20.
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small game hunting, which at 11 percent met with the lowest harmful rating of any use 
considered.204 
In response to the litany of problems highlighted by the 1989 GAO report and related 
documents, some measure of relief finally came in 1996 when President Clinton issued 
Executive Order 12996. Clinton moved to improve refuge management by creating a clear 
mission statement, guiding principles, and other directives for more systematic management 
of the nation’s wildlife refuges.205 While Clinton’s executive order staked out a new 
ecological mission for the refuge system, its significance was perhaps greatest for spurring 
Congress to formalize guidelines for the National Wildlife Refuge System into statute. This 
move came less than nineteen months later when Congress passed the National Wildlife 
Refuge System Improvement Act of 1997, which Clinton then signed into law. 
 
National Wildlife Refuge Improvement Act of 1997 
 
Hailed by members of Congress and refuge scholars as landmark legislation, the 
Refuge Improvement Act may in fact help move the National Wildlife Refuge System to 
become the nation’s “premier public land conservation network” and a role model for the rest 
of the world as its supporters suggest.206 The Refuge Improvement Act formally established a 
mission statement for the National Wildlife Refuge System (NWRS); identified hunting, 
fishing, wildlife observation, photography, and environmental education as “generally 
 
204 GAO, 1989, p. 20. 
205 Fischman, 2003, p. 62.
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compatible uses” of the refuges; sought to clarify more generally the conditions by which 
secondary uses of refuges could occur; and required that that by 2012 (and every fifteen 
years thereafter) every national wildlife refuge prepare a Comprehensive Conservation Plan 
to guide unit management.207 
This effort to provide more centralized guidance for the refuges emerged from 
concern over what law professor Robert Fischman calls the system’s “centrifugal” 
qualities;208 that is, the tendency of particular refuge units to translate their unique 
circumstances to management policies that do not necessarily mesh cleanly with other units 
in the system. The 1997 Act devotes considerable attention to questions of secondary uses in 
order to consolidate unit-by-unit management, but it remains to be seen how effectively this 
statutory push filters down to the unit level. In my interviews at the Rocky Mountain Arsenal 
NWR in 2004, for example, at least one upper-level staffmember seemed only dimly aware 
that new legislation had even been passed in 1997:  
DH: Subsequent to the 1997 reiteration under Clinton wasn’t there an 
updating of the refuges’ purpose?  
FWS Official: Oh, the [Arsenal] Refuge Act?  
DH: No, not specific to this base, but system wide. 
FWS: I don’t know, that could be. It seems like it was about ’96 or ’97 that 
was all coming out. 
DH: Clinton issued an Executive Order in ’96 and then Congress passed it in 
’97. 
FWS: That is ringing a bell. That sounds about right.  
DH: The National Wildlife Refuge Improvement Act or something like that.  
FWS: Oh, yeah yeah. Yeah that is about the time frame.209 
207 PL 105-57.
208 Fischman, 2003, p. 5.
209 Interview with Sherry James, Rocky Mountain Arsenal, Colorado, 21 July 2004.
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The Refuge Improvement Act’s provisions to strip away non-compatible secondary refuge 
activities also does not apply to military activities or other actions by federal agencies that 
retain jurisdiction in some areas – this despite the fact that the GAO’s 1989 report found 
military air and ground exercises ranked fourth and eleventh, respectively, among the uses 
considered most harmful by refuge managers (see Table 3.1).210 
Two other limitations continue to plague the NWRS, even after the 1997 legislation: 
science and money. The Refuge Improvement Act directs the FWS to use “available science 
and resources” to justify management decisions. As part of a broader multi-agency shuffle in 
1993, however, most FWS scientists were transferred to the National Biological Survey, and 
three years later to the U.S. Geological Survey. As a result, the agency no longer directly 
controls scientific studies at the same level it did prior to 1993.211 The 1997 Act also did not 
address severe funding shortages that have afflicted the FWS for years. In 2002, the agency 
estimated its maintenance backlog at more than $650 million, approximately twice the level 
of its annual appropriation for operations and maintenance. At current levels, the FWS 
receives by far the lowest funding in dollars per acre of any of the federal public land 
management agencies.212 
The pressure placed upon FWS land managers to maintain a premier conservation 
network grows all the more daunting when lands in need of major restoration or rigorous 
control of the visiting public come into their care. Both of these are serious concerns with the 
new M2W refuge additions and a number of FWS officials have expressed dismay over 
 
210 Fischman, 2003: 114; GAO, 1989, pp. 20-21.
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Congressional actions that so clearly increase management burdens without seeming to 
recognize any costs.213 Not only can these additions place a strain on the system overall, they 
also may displace funding from existing refuges to pay for more aggressive clean up 
activities at prominent, highly contaminated new refuge additions. The refuge manager at 
Rocky Mountain Arsenal NWR described this asymmetry of Congressional expectations, 
appropriations, and site-specific disbursements in my interview with him in July 2004: 
A lot of these little Camp Swampies out there, they got a little spill 
that has to be cleaned up, or they’ve got a range… we’re going in and they’re 
saying, ‘Look, you want the land you take it the way it is. When we get some 
money later, maybe we’ll be able to come back and clean up your forty 
microproblems.’ …But my concern is that … it’s going to take more to 
manage that 6,000 acres than if we bought 6,000 acres of shortgrass [prairie] 
out in Kiowa County. OK? At the same time that Congress, and the 
administration now, is telling the agency to curb your appetite for land, we 
don’t have enough money to manage what you have…and then on the other 
hand they’re turning around and giving us land that we didn’t ask for that’s 
going to cost more to manage. But no money with it. …So, FY ‘97, ‘98, ‘99, 
just about every new dollar – and those were good years for the refuge budget 
– just about every new dollar that came into Region 6 came to the Arsenal. So 
there were a lot of small working refuges out on the prairie that got jack 
diddly for those years. And there was a lot of hate directed here. They got 
screwed because of the Arsenal, which has no ducks. I mean really. So that 
stopped. And we haven’t gotten any new money – the refuge budget has 
actually declined over the last three years.214 
There is, of course, both a certain logic to military-to-wildlife conversions and a 
rather long history of such transitions. Though I do not intend to provide a comprehensive 
account of all of these, a brief historical overview of this phenomenon adds context to the 
systematic base closures and subsequent M2W redesignations that have occurred since 1988. 
In the sections that follow, I also turn to some of the logics of military-to-wildlife 
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conversions as well as how decisions are made to convert military lands to land uses that are 
not primarily dedicated to wildlife and habitat conservation. 
 
M2W Lands  
Military-to-wildlife conversions involve land use changes across the sweep of both a 
continent and more than two hundred years of inconsistently applied federal policy. With that 
in mind, it may still be useful to highlight certain differences between early transitions from 
military land management to designations as national wildlife refuges; even amidst these, we 
should find lessons for today’s more rapid, systematic conversions. 
 
Early Military-to-Wildlife Conversions 
The accelerated pace of military-to-wildlife conversions is one of the first historical 
differences that emerges from a deeper look at this phenomenon. Whereas many of today’s 
redesignations find active military bases sprouting new names and staffing as national 
wildlife refuges within a span of months, or in some cases essentially overnight, most M2W 
conversions in the previous two centuries occurred gradually, with considerable periods of 
down time between active military use and active management for wildlife.  
 Atsena Otie Key, for example, which is now part of Florida’s Cedar Keys NWR, 
served as a military depot from 1839-1842, then developed into a town with more than three 
hundred residents before it was wiped out in 1896 by a hurricane. The town was never rebuilt 
and more than thirty years later in 1929 President Hoover designated several nearby keys part 
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of a national wildlife refuge. Atsena Otie was added to this cluster, the Cedar Keys NWR, in 
1997.215 
As early forts and bases became geographically or technologically obsolete, they 
often were simply abandoned and returned to the federal or other public domain. In this way, 
for example, Sully’s Hill, North Dakota, went from an advance fort during the 19th century’s 
Indian wars and westward push, to a strategically insignificant knoll in the northern plains. 
After several decades of relative anonymity, Sully’s Hill gained new cachet in 1904 when 
President Roosevelt proclaimed it one of the nation’s early national parks. By 1921 it had 
become clear that Sully’s Hill did not harbor aesthetic or historic qualities sufficient to 
deserve such lofty title, and it was redesignated a national game preserve (it was later 
incorporated into the National Wildlife Refuge System).216 
A closer look at Harris Neck NWR, in Georgia, reveals a typically complex land use 
history that many of today’s refuge visitors might little encounter: the land was deeded to 
Scottish settlers in 1750 after millenia of residency and use by native Chickasaw; following 
the Civil War, liberated slaves settled the site until it was condemned for use as an air base in 
World War II. Following the war, the federal government gave the land to McIntosh County, 
only to take it back in 1962 with designation of 2,824 acres as a national wildlife refuge.217 
215
“Historical Highlights of Atsena Otie Key,” Cedar Keys National Wildlife Refuge website, viewed online at
http://www.fws.gov/cedarkeys/atsenaotie.html [15 September 2006].
216 Fischman, 2003, p. 247.
217 See “Refuge History,” Harris Neck NWR website, viewed online at
http://www.fws.gov/harrisneck/history.htm [15 September 2006]. Acreage figures come from Fischman, 2003,
p. 241.
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An accelerated  pace of conversion may have some benefits for today’s conversions. 
Where military records have been carefully maintained (a key caveat, as the lack of careful 
record-keeping at many military sites is one of the biggest challenges for restoration efforts at 
toxic disposal sites or jet fuel dumps), the land use record may be fresh and provide clearer 
guidance for remediation work. In cases such as the Rocky Mountain Arsenal, the Army or 
DOD may be retained as a primary responsible party for Superfund-related cleanup and 
therefore contribute a considerable amount of funds and personnel toward the prerequisite 
remediation needed for conversion. A more rapid conversion from military use to wildlife 
refuge status may also increase the likelihood that the military history of such places will be 
retained and kept visible for public education and interpretation – a feature that I turn to in 
later chapters as holding considerable importance. 
Of course, there are also problems that come with quick conversions. Toxic or 
explosive hazards often remain relatively potent at sites where recent military activities were 
conducted. With sophisticated military weapons and synthetic chemicals, the threat posed by 
the residues of modern bases can also far surpass the threats of buried Civil War-era 
munitions. At sites where interim land uses or periods of fallow occurred between military 
activity and wildlife refuge designation, hazards may also have been already treated, 
transported, buried, or otherwise rendered inert long before Fish and Wildlife Service staff 
arrive and assume management responsibilities. Whether such transport, assimilation, or 
neutralization occurs through biological or physical processes, the mitigating effect of time 
can provide considerable restoration value that the FWS otherwise has to assume.   
The sum effect, then, is often that contemporary military-to-wildlife lands come with 
dramatically different qualities than their earlier counterparts. The on-going process of 
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transferring lands from the DOD to the FWS may appear to be simply the continuation of a 
centuries-old pattern, but in fact today often comes with novel complications that justify its 
consideration as an entirely new kind of phenomenon. Applying a superficial historical logic 
to explain M2W conversions neither accounts adequately for the actual characteristics of 
today’s bases nor applies a useful rationale to explain why such changes ought to occur. 
 
Logics of Conversion 
 
If there is any single overriding message that emanates from military-to-wildlife 
conversions, it likely includes the phrase “win-win.” Nearly all the parties involved in M2W 
conversions will at some point resort to the characterization that such transitions are both 
good for local economies and good for the environment, or good for a DOD looking to 
unload lands and good for a FWS looking to expand its refuge system. Although many times 
such rhetoric builds directly from the perspectives of ecological militarization that I develop 
in more depth in Chapter Seven, in some cases the “win-win” construction works simply 
because a conversion can be highlighted as a success by both elected officials from both 
major political parties.  
In order to understand the processes of these conversions more genuinely – and to 
properly fathom their implications – we need to read the logics of change far more deeply 
than this. Running beneath the surface of the upbeat press releases of win-win conversions 
we commonly encounter at least three broad explanations why it “makes sense” to 
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redesignate military facilities to new uses as wildlife refuges.218 I describe these below as 
Biodiversity, Brownfields, and Serendipity. 
The first of these, the “Biodiversity” explanation, applies to places where certain 
wildlife or plant features were noted by scientists, military officials, or conservation 
advocates while the site was an active military base. Subsequent closures were broadly seen 
as an opportunity to shore up high quality environmental attributes. In order for the 
Biodiversity rationale to be effective, a conversion site must have drawn attention for its 
ecological characteristics before a BRAC determination or other closure plan was fully 
implemented – the environmental constituencies need to be present in advance in order to 
influence the conversion process toward the resolution they desire. The Biodiversity logic 
also applies primarily where conservation interests appeared to be actively threatened in the 
absence of military or similarly restrictive management.  
New Hampshire’s Pease Air Force base fit this logic as Williams’ 1999 study 
demonstrated. He found that local environmental activism and community interest in 
preserving the environmental amenities of doomed bases led to the eventual protection of 
these qualities in new national wildlife refuge designations. Where such habitat 
characteristics had not been identified or publicly valued in advance, such as Denver’s Lowry 
Air Force Base, closures tended to convert instead to commercial development.219 
In order for a Biodiversity explanation to prevail, however, a site does not need to be 
free of all hazards or military residues. At the Jefferson Proving Grounds, for example, local 
and national environmental groups that lobbied for a national wildlife refuge designation 
 
218 See pp. 24-26 for a more detailed explanation of methods used to identify these logics of conversion.
219 Williams, 1999.
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were aware that millions of tons of explosives had been tested on site, with many remaining 
buried and unexploded, but they deemed the 50,000-acres so ecologically valuable that the 
threat of subdividing it or converting it to commercial uses outweighed any qualms they may 
have held about its risks or public hazards. As we will see in Chapter Five, part of this 
calculation came from an assumption that risks could be geographically bounded and public 
access effectively managed. The privileged positioning of ecological sciences and 
biodiversity protection also looms large here, as concerns about public health or 
socioeconomic disruptions were largely left out of comments contributed by environmental 
advocates of M2W conversion at this site.220 
We can also see the Biodiversity rationale being mobilized in advance at places such 
as Florida’s vast Eglin Air Force Base, which may never come to the BRAC chopping block 
but has already drawn attention in conservation-oriented publications for its ecological 
attributes.221 In effect, environmental constituencies and conservation scientists work in 
advance to increase the chances that closures of such sites could be fast-tracked as M2W 
conversions. Examples of this effort paying off include redesignations at Alabama’s Fort 
McClellan (now Mountain Longleaf NWR) and Vieques, Puerto Rico. 
The second, or “Brownfields” explanation, harbors logics that are more multi-faceted, 
nuanced, and in many ways less stable than those of Biodiversity. The Brownfields rationale 
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is also less predictable in terms of its flow – a broad array of interests from the grassroots to 
political leaders may apply this logic to explain why it makes sense to turn military bases into 
refuges. The Brownfields response rests upon a view that military lands are highly 
contaminated, dangerous spaces destined to obsolescence in their current form. With closures 
imminent, the logic of Brownfields contends that nothing else redeeming will likely come of 
military lands so their highest, most practical “use” will be to dedicate these places to non-
human priorities. Put somewhat less charitably, military managers recognize that certain 
DOD lands are too contaminated to ever bear more economically productive commercial or 
residential activities, so a wildlife refuge designation can present a positive public façade to 
an otherwise blighted venue.  
This carries multiple benefits, as refuges with primary purposes dedicated to wildlife 
conservation (as opposed to more active human uses) often come with reduced remediation 
standards, thereby saving money and labor in the closure and clean-up process. The 
Brownfields logic also brings a compelling aesthetic case for residents of nearby towns: 
better to turn a contaminated base into a refuge for wildlife than to leave it as an eyesore, idle 
brownfield, or active Superfund site. Wildlife advocates can also be drawn in, if even post 
facto, to support M2W conversions regardless of contamination issues. Lacking other good 
options, the DOD may be more than happy to utilize Brownfields explanations to convert 
closing bases, as the administrative process to convey the land title to a sister federal agency 
is relatively simple and especially at small sites can be done with little fanfare.  
At many large bases the range of conditions extends from severely degraded to the 
virtually untouched, often in a pattern that holds the greatest hazards to the core of the base 
with increasingly little-used buffer areas toward the periphery. In these sites, conservationists 
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may promote the Biodiversity of the outer edges of the base, while military officials leverage 
the Brownfields logic to include higher-risk, higher-cost core areas in wholesale M2W 
conversions. In conversion locations such as the Rocky Mountain Arsenal, Fort McClellan, 
and Vieques, potentially irreconcilable differences at the agency level (FWS vs. DOD) have 
been side-stepped by Congressional action, effectively conflating the logics of Brownfields 
and Biodiversity into one statutory package.   
These categories, of course, are by no means exclusive or firm. A single site of 
conversion may be produced using some or all of these in concert, explanations may pulse 
and shift over time, and even within a single category there are inevitably shades of 
difference that vary how M2W conversions are negotiated and maintained. The structure 
provided by these broad logics of conversion, though, may help guide our understanding of 
these admittedly complex processes and spur us to probe beneath the neat wrapping that a 
“win-win” solution tries to present. 
Finally, there is the logic of “Serendipity,” which may be seen as the rarest and purest 
of explanations. It asserts that by happy twist of fate, nature dictates the trajectory of 
military-to-wildlife conversions. Rare and pure it may be, but this explanation is also the 
most problematic in many ways and will be the subject of a more thorough explication when 
I turn in the next chapter to the case of the Rocky Mountain Arsenal.  
The concept of serendipity hearkens back to the Horace Walpole fairly tale, Three 
Princes of Serendip. The tale’s heroes, like biologists at the Rocky Mountain Arsenal, 
evinced a happy talent for “making discoveries, by accidents and sagacity, of things they 
were not in quest of.”222 Guided naturally by fate and fortune, the logic of Serendipity is also 
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by far the most potent: to argue against it is tantamount to going against nature itself. Thus 
we encounter narratives of M2W conversion that begin with phrases such as, “In a way, it 
was the eagles that made it happen,”223 suggesting in clear terms that scientists, politicians, 
the U.S. Department of Defense, financial calculations, community leaders, FWS officials, 
and conservation advocates are merely bit players in the larger stage of what is 
fundamentally a natural occurrence.
Other Base Conversion “Destinations” (M2x lands) 
 
Of the more than four hundred military base closures undertaken since 1988, 
approximately five percent have converted to new designations as national wildlife refuges. 
By acreage, M2W conversions comprise a much larger share of the recent transitions, but the 
majority of military closures do not become wildlife refuges. The many other kinds of 
transitions rest largely beyond the scope of this study, but it is worth noting briefly what 
other kinds of landscapes emerge from military facilities and how some of these 
determinations are made. 
 Existing statutes and planning documents guide the reclassification of closed bases, 
but the Department of Defense retains a degree of flexibility in deciding how to convert 
military lands. A decision matrix guides the DOD to consider lands for conversion along a 
progression, turning first to other DOD uses, then to other federal non-DOD uses, then on to 
state and local agencies, and finally to private organizations or commercial development.224 
223 US FWS, 1999, p. 5.
224 Guide to Assessing Reuse 1996; Williams 1999, p. 21; Tierney, 2001.
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This places the FWS relatively high in the order as a potential recipient for DOD sites, but 
even if the agency passes over their early option to receive such lands they may end up with 
DOD holdings if Congress intervenes.  
 The presence of an active group of supporters for wildlife conservation can also tip 
the scales.225 At base closure sites such as New Hampshire’s Pease Air Force base, Savanna 
Depot in Illinois, and the Jefferson Proving Ground in Indiana, local citizens and 
conservation groups expressed both support for wildlife refuge designations and opposition 
to commercial or private developments.226 The desire to preserve existing open space, 
wildlife habitat, or potential parklands undergirds much of this kind of support, but 
depending upon the character of each military complex and the ability of local citizens to 
access information about the environmental conditions of a closing base, such amenities may 
not even be widely perceived to exist.  
 In some cases it is not so much the attractiveness of open space or habitat conditions 
at closing military facilities, but rather their severe contamination that pushes them toward 
national wildlife refuge designations. Since EPA clean-up regulations vary depending upon 
the anticipated future uses of a site, remediation of heavily degraded bases may be infeasible 
for residential or commercial standards, but can be reached successfully to meet targets 
considered safe (enough) for wildlife. At the Rocky Mountain Arsenal, the EPA has pegged 
the clean-up to health standards for refuge workers and the visiting public – with neither 
group considered a “residential” population – as well as wildlife. Even in the periphery of the 




Commerce City, the Refuge legislation specifically precludes residential developments and a 
range of commercial activities; the area is currently projected to become a community sports 
complex and soccer stadium for Denver’s professional team. 
 This bi-modal description of military lands that come to be reclassified as wildlife 
refuges – representing some of the DOD’s most desirable conservation lands as well as its 
most burdened – ably reflects the dual natures that often exist at large military bases 
themselves. Core areas of these sites are often heavily impacted by munitions tests, tank or 
troop maneuvers, chemical manufacturing, or other intensive activities, while large regions of 
the perimeter are kept relatively untouched and “clean” from even ordinary human impacts. 
Since 1949, the Federal Lands to Parks Program has made use of some of these 
qualities of military lands (and other federal holdings) by high-grading parcels slated for 
dispensation and giving them to local or state governments for parks and recreation 
facilities.227 Under this program, for example, the DOD transferred 130 acres of Ft. 
McClellan, Alabama, to the City of Anniston for public parks and recreation facilities 
including gymnasiums, running tracks, and baseball fields.228 Similar relatively small 
exchanges were granted in recent years at a Key West, Florida, naval site; the Broadneck 
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Nike missile site near Annapolis, Maryland; Denver’s Lowry AFB; and the Yellow Water 
Weapons Annex near Jacksonville, Florida.229 
Military decommissionings to non-wildlife designations come out of a milieu of 
historical contexts, political and economic priorities, discursive framings, and other 
conditions – much as M2W conversions do – but in military-to-commercial conversions or 
other M2x redesignations the social elements tend to be more visibly worked into the 
decisions made than they are in M2W changes where rhetorics of nature often rise to the 
fore. In this way, M2x conversions are in most cases no simpler than their M2W 
counterparts, but the latter provide a more significant series of changes when viewed through 
the lens of nature-society relations. Because of this they may offer more profound lessons of 
how we may work to understand the interconnections between science, technology, and 
society that must be accounted for as public wildlife refuges emerge from the restricted 
settings of military lands. 
In the following two chapters I bring these particular contexts into tighter focus as I 
turn to case studies of M2W conversions well underway at the Rocky Mountain Arsenal 
NWR and Big Oaks NWR. Looking more deeply at the processes taking place at these 
locations – which represent some of the most prominent and mature recent military-to-
wildlife conversions – helps illustrate more clearly just how such redesignations are produced 
and what kinds of effects they may then have as they formally (re)enter a more public sphere.  
 
229 See “Re-use of Closed Military Bases,” on Federal Lands to Parks website, online at
http://www.nps.gov/ncrc/programs/flp/brac.html [15 September 2006].
CHAPTER FOUR 
THE ROCKY MOUNTAIN ‘ARSENAL OF DEMOCRACY’ 
 
The Rocky Mountain Arsenal has long seemed a place of contrasts and paradoxes. In 
the course of a century, the lands of the Arsenal have been subjected to a shifting set of 
priorities from agriculture and rangeland to chemical weapons and pesticide production to 
wildlife refuge and tourist attraction. As a chemical weapons facility it was both highly 
secretive and widely publicized. Colorado newspapers announced the Army’s creation of the 
Arsenal in bold headlines and maps of the region often identified the Arsenal and its location 
adjacent to Denver, Colorado, but access to its 18,000 acres was carefully controlled and 
restricted. The details of some projects conducted at the Arsenal remain classified to this day, 
even as the place itself opens to school groups and weekend visitors. The actions taken at the 
Arsenal have ranged from the overt, such as the systematic removal (twice) of nearly all 
buildings on the Arsenal grounds, to covert events such as the construction and operation of 
the North Plants nerve gas facility during the Cold War. Of the compounds manufactured 
inside the Arsenal, some were revealed only years after production ceased and many never 
saw military application. Others were among the most widely used weapons and commercial 
pesticides in the twentieth century.  
The Arsenal’s service as an Army chemical weapons plant lasted forty years, 
beginning with the rapid expulsion of farm families and round-the-clock construction of 
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chemical laboratories. For much of its time as an active arsenal, when the Army was 
producing or storing chemical weapons, the site also served as a commercial pesticide and 
herbicide manufacturing facility. By the 1980s the Arsenal began another transformation, 
from chemical production to wildlife conservation. This transition was announced formally 
in 1992 when the U.S. Congress passed legislation to approve the site for designation as a 
national wildlife refuge. Although this latest transformation is often characterized as simply a 
natural act, one dictated by the arrival of nesting bald eagles to the Arsenal grounds, a deeper 
look at its production reveals many layers of human activity that have been variously 
asserted, contested, and negotiated during the past six decades and more.  
In this chapter I consider how the changes at the Arsenal were produced through a 
series of military and commercial activities, by executive and legislative decisions, promoted 
on the authoritative grounds of national security, supported by scientific studies, and 
introduced to the public in ways that encouraged local support and, in some cases, also 
sparked concern and opposition. Each of these actions has rested, ultimately, upon the control 
of certain spaces. 
 
Military Authority and the Control of Space 
 
Military power and its associated claims of protecting national security are founded 
upon a need to control different types of space.230 At its most immediate level, the initial 
conversion of these lands into a working Arsenal required the assertion of U.S. Army control 
 
230 See Barnett, Jon, The Meaning of Environmental Security: Ecological Politics and Policy in the New Security
Era (London: Zed Books, 2001), p. 31.
109
upon local, material space in the form of scattered farms and families that lived on the site in 
1942. More broadly, the creation of the Arsenal itself was framed as a means to protect the 
domestic spaces of the United States against foreign attack. Throughout the operating period 
of the Arsenal and, more recently, its dismantling and conversion to new uses, there has also 
been a concerted effort to control the discursive and political spaces of public opinion, 
legislation, and environmental regulations. As long as these less tangible realms could be 
managed by the Army, then the physical spaces of the Arsenal itself remained more fully 
under Army control. Many of these spaces remain important and actively contested as efforts 
continue to pry nearly twenty-seven square miles of Colorado prairie into the public domain 
as a new wildlife refuge. 
My focus here rests fundamentally upon questions of military control and how this 
control becomes visible, asserted, and contested in the particular instance of the Rocky 
Mountain Arsenal. Woodward contends that military control emerges from four distinct 
sources: physical presence, the control of information, governance and state/citizen relations, 
and the rhetoric of defense and national security.231 Each of these surface during my 
consideration of the Arsenal and its production, though my own approach is structured 
chronologically rather than directly around these four themes. My goal is to build a deeper 
understanding of what is occurring at this particular site of (de)militarization and explore 
how, in turn, the changes taking place at the Rocky Mountain Arsenal articulate with 
 
231 Woodward, Rachel, 2004, Military Geographies, (Oxford, England: Blackwell Publishing, RGS-IBG Book
Series), p. 153.
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conceptions of public lands dedicated to the conservation of nature (e.g. a national wildlife 
refuge).232 
As I investigate the historical production of the Rocky Mountain Arsenal in this 
chapter then, I will also highlight how throughout the various stages of activity the Rocky 
Mountain Arsenal has remained a public space. Even as the Army dedicated the Arsenal to 
restricted and tightly guarded activities of military weapons manufacturing, it also needed to 
manage the place as a site known to and accommodated by the public. The materials created 
on-site reached the public, both intentionally and inadvertently, and in its most recent decade 
the Arsenal’s clean-up and remediation have been managed according to laws designed to 
protect the public.  
The process of conversion itself, which now applies to more than one hundred major 
military sites across the U.S., plays no small part in making the Rocky Mountain Arsenal a 
more public space. As Foote describes more generally of places where violence or 
destructive activities have occurred, “The question of what to do with [a] site actually 
precipitates debate and forces competing interpretations into the open. Set in motion is a 
complex iterative process in which place spurs debate, debate leads to interpretation, and 
interpretation reshapes place over and over again.”233 
The longstanding tension between managing the Arsenal as a public as well as a 
highly restricted space continues with its addition to the National Wildlife Refuge System. 
The Arsenal now engages the public ever more actively, for educational and recreational 
 
232 Woodward, p. 153, describes a similar project of “unpicking and laying bare the mechanics and politics of
military control.”
233 Foote, Kenneth E., Shadowed Ground: America’s Landscapes of Violence and Tragedy (Austin, TX:
University of Texas Press, 1997, revised 2003), p. 6.
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outings, as a site of scientific research, as an open space amenity that contributes to the 
economic and social prosperity of surrounding communities, and increasingly as an attraction 
for visitors to the Denver area. It will never simply be an open stretch of prairie with no hint 
of military presence. As the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service refuge manager for the Arsenal 
frankly acknowledges: “The Army will always be here.”234 
As its name continues to reflect, the Rocky Mountain Arsenal National Wildlife 
Refuge first became widely known and delimited as a site for weapons production and 
storage. This chapter will focus primarily on that time period when the Rocky Mountain 
Arsenal developed as an arsenal and a distinct place managed and controlled by the U.S. 
Government, including, more recently, as an arsenal-turned-wildlife refuge. Before turning to 
the Army’s initial conversion of the site to a chemical manufacturing facility, in the next 
section I introduce one of the weapons developed at the site, then look briefly at the contexts 
and setting from which the Arsenal emerged. 
 
Prelude to the Rocky Mountain Arsenal 
 
In 1917, amid the horrors of World War I, the U.S. Army assembled a group of 
scientists to develop a chemical weapon potent enough to end the war. Both the Allies and 
the Axis powers had been using chlorine and mustard gases by the ton, but American leaders 
 
234 Interview with Rocky Mountain Arsenal National Wildlife Refuge manager Dean Rundle, U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service, Commerce City, Colorado, 23 July 2004.
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wanted a knock-out punch.235 By 1918, the same year that U.S. President Woodrow Wilson 
created a national Chemical Warfare Service, Winford Lee Lewis led his team of scientists 
into what seemed a winning potion: a mix of acetylene, chlorine, and arsenic that became 
known thereafter as Lewisite.236 The new concoction was hastily packed into warheads and 
shipped to the front in France, but never made it to the battlefield. Instead, arriving just after 
the Armistice was signed, the lot of it – more than 150 tons – was either dumped into the 
Atlantic Ocean or shuttled back to weapons depots for storage.237 The story of Lewisite 
nearly ends there, somewhere off the Normandy coast.  
Chemical warfare is designed to cripple enemies with fear as well as poison and 
Lewisite came with its requisite catalog of horrors. A blistering agent, Lewisite causes acute 
respiratory failure and death after doses as little as a teaspoonful.238 As a liquid it could 
penetrate protective clothing and rubber suits, while also remaining stable across an 
impressive temperature range (one of the glaring defects of mustard gas and chlorine was 
their high freezing points, which made them seasonally impractical in the European 
 
235 See Messenger, Janet G., “Local Chemist Invented Deadliest WWI Poison Gas,” Evanston Roundtable (IL),
23 April 2003, vol. 6(9).This desire would surface again with the next world war and lead to the production and
use of the world’s first nuclear weapons.
236 Vilensky, Joel A. and Pandy R. Sinish, “The Dew of Death,” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, March/April 2004,
vol. 60(2): 54-60. According to the South Plants Fact Sheet, p. 3, www.pmrma.army.mil/site/s-plants.html [3
November 2003], Lewisite is produced by reacting arsenic trichloride with acetylene “in the presence of a
hydrochloric acid solution of mercuric chloride.”
237 Messenger, 2003. Chemical weapons recovered from German storehouses at the end of World War Two were
similarly disposed by oceanic dumping and continue to cause injuries to fishermen; see Glasby, G.P., 1997,
“Disposal of Chemical Weapons in the Baltic Sea,” Science of the Total Environment 206(2-3): 267-273.
238 Vilensky and Sinish, 2004; Messenger, 2003.
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theater).239 Lewisite was relatively inexpensive and easy to manufacture, and its constituent 
parts were abundant and readily available in the U.S.240 In a macabre twist that even military 
chemists likely could not have foreseen, it also gave off the pleasantly familiar aroma of 
geraniums. By 1919, an article in Harper’s Magazine proclaimed Lewisite, “the most 
powerful weapon of war ever wielded.”241 
From the close of World War I to 1941, Lewisite played no visible role in U.S. 
military activities. When the U.S. drew itself into World War II, however, the Army once 
again determined that chemical weapon production should play a role as a deterrent against 
Germany and Japan. Having made the decision to begin full-scale production of chemical 
weapons, the U.S. Army turned to the question of where to locate such a facility. Much as we 
saw in the previous chapter with earlier military base sitings, geography was a matter of 
utmost concern.  
The ideal location would need access to transportation networks such as highways, 
railroads, and an airport, yet be far enough inland to sit beyond the reach of long-distance 
bombers from either Germany or Japan. The site needed to be large enough to accommodate 
chemical production facilities and a buffer of land to surround the chemical plants. Access to 
gas, water, and electricity was essential, along with a ready source of labor, yet the site also 
needed to be remote enough from population centers to reduce risk in case of accidents. In 
 
239 Vilensky and Sinish, 2004.
240 This continues to be the case, so while Lewisite no longer has much military value (an effective antidote was
developed by 1942) it remains a substance of considerable concern to anti-terrorism officials. See, for example,
“Homeland Security Planning Scenarios,” viewed online at www.globalsecurity.org/security/ops/hsc-scen-
5.htm, which portrays an aerial spraying of a football stadium with a Lewisite-mustard mix.
241 Quoted in Vilensky and Sinish, 2004.
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the event that the chemical weapons caches would face protracted storage, a stable geology 
with a dry climate was important. And, finally, the land needed to be inexpensive enough 
politically and economically to allow rapid transfer to federal ownership.242 Eight miles 
northeast (and downwind) of Colorado’s state capitol building the U.S. Army found just the 
place.  
 
Downstream from Denver 
 
The lands of the Rocky Mountain Arsenal were first traversed and at least seasonally 
occupied by Archaic Indians dating back to at least 3,500 B.C.E. From about 1500 A.D. until 
the mid-1800s, Apache, Comanche, Arapahoe, and Cheyenne people used the lands of 
today’s Arsenal site at various times for hunting, encampments, trading, and other activities, 
until they were successively pushed out, rounded up, or killed off by westward moving 
settlers and U.S. troops.243 
Along its northwestern boundary, today’s Arsenal sits less than two miles from the 
main channel of the South Platte River. (See Figure 4.1: Locator Map of Metro Denver and 
the Rocky Mountain Arsenal). From the earliest days of human occupation in the area, the 
river served as a travel corridor and critical source of water on the plains. This proved true 
for the first U.S.-sponsored explorations of the Great Plains and Rocky Mountains, as well as 
the trappers, miners, and other settlers who streamed west in ever-greater numbers through  
 
242 Hoffecker, John F. 2001. Twenty-Seven Square Miles. Colorado: U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Rocky
Mountain Arsenal National Wildlife Refuge, p. 54; Eagle Watch, vol. 4(8), August 1992, p. 6.
243 Eagle Watch, p. 4.
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Figure 4.1: Locator Map of Metro Denver and the Rocky Mountain Arsenal244 
244 From: Rocky Mountain Arsenal National Wildlife Refuge, Draft Environmental Impact Statement
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Department of the Interior, December 1995), p. S-2.
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the 1800s. Though today’s proponents of the Arsenal tend to emphasize the appeal of its 
acres of shortgrass prairie and abundant wildlife, early visitors to the area were not always so 
effusive in their praise.  
Botanist Edwin James, who chronicled the United States’ 1819-1820 expedition led 
by Major Stephen Long from Pittsburgh to the Rocky Mountains, expressed a common early 
view. He wrote on 19 June 1820, “The monotony of a vast unbroken plain, like that in which 
we now travelled, nearly one hundred and fifty miles, is little less tiresome to the eye, and 
fatiguing to the spirit, than the dreary solitude of the ocean.”245 His impression of the area of 
today’s Arsenal, which the expedition encountered around 1 July 1820, was equally 
unenthusiastic: “a tract differing in no respect but its greater barrenness from that passed on 
the preceding day… many acres of this plain had not vegetation enough to communicate to 
the surface the least shade of green; a few dwarfish sunflowers and grasses…being now 
entirely withered and brown.”246 As for the wildlife that today might offer such a draw for 
visitors? James’s sole mention of it that particular day was of, “innumerable ant heaps” 
scattered uniformly across the prairie.247 
By the mid-nineteenth century Denver had become established as the South Platte’s 
largest city and in 1865 it gained new status as the capital of Colorado Territory. Statehood 
 
245 James, Edwin, 1823, An Account of an Expedition from Pittsburgh to the Rocky Mountains, vol. I,
(Philadelphia: H.C. Carey and I. Lea, reprinted and copyrighted 1966 by University Microfilms, Ann Arbor,
MI), p. 460.
246 James, p. 493.
247 More generally James described abundant wildlife in his journey up the Platte, including “immense herds of
bisons, blackening the whole surface of the country” [23 June 1820, James, p. 470], as well as numerous
pronghorn, deer, elk, wolves, and small mammals.
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followed in 1876, and by the end of the century only San Francisco could boast a larger 
population for any city in the West. As the South Platte flowed north and east from the 
Rocky Mountains, its broad floodplain came to support a significant agricultural base for the 
miners, cattlemen, railroad tycoons, and thousands of other residents of Colorado’s major 
hub. With Denver’s growth into a modern, industrial city, the South Platte also provided a 
convenient, though seasonally lean, source of water – upstream as municipal water supply 
and downstream as an industrial coolant and for dispersal of residential and commercial 
effluent.  
The land and settlements along the South Platte River northeast of Denver developed 
their own character reflecting their position downwind and downstream from the capital city. 
A handful of communities north of Denver spread across more than fifty square miles and 
gradually distinguished themselves as dominated by industry, commerce, and agriculture. Oil 
refineries, railroads, switching yards, freeways, Denver’s major airports, chemical 
manufacturing plants, bulk mail sorting warehouses, and other space-extensive or noxious 
operations soon came to characterize the downstream region. Much of the landbase that 
remained free of heavy industry contained a sparse agricultural population. Eventually these 
plains communities would give themselves a collective label and incorporate as Commerce 
City.248 
Ten years before that came to pass, however, in May 1942, the United States’ War 
Board announced that it had selected a site for a new chemical weapons plant to be built on 
the plains downstream and north of Denver. The federal government planned to commit 
 
248 The five communities of Adams Heights, Derby, Dupont, Irondale, and Rose Hill incorporated as Commerce
City in 1952, see www.ci.commerce-city.co.us/other/demographics.html [23 August 2005].
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nearly 20,000 acres of land to the project. As the nation plunged itself quickly into the war 
effort, more than two hundred farm families in the area were given just thirty days’ notice of 
eviction as their land was condemned.249 Before the last families had even packed up or 
finished their early summer harvests, the Army was moving crews on site to begin building 
what would become the Rocky Mountain Arsenal.  
 
Preparing for War 
 
By 30 June 1942, the U.S. Army had begun construction of the Arsenal’s first 
chemical production facility.250 Within weeks, thousands of workers – primarily contracted 
by private firms from out-of-state – were working around-the-clock leveling cropland, 
pouring concrete, framing buildings and laying pipe. In just six months the weapons facility 
launched into production, churning out its first three chemical compounds for military 
 
249 Eagle Watch, pp. 5-6; according to Hoffecker, p. 54, families were notified by mail and given just 13 days to
move out. In fact, there may have been less than one week’s notice for some, as condemnation proceedings took
place on 15 June 1942 and, according to “Rocky Mountain Arsenal National Wildlife Refuge: A Place Like No
Other,” 1999 (Commerce City, CO: U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Department of the Interior), construction of
Arsenal facilities began on 19 June 1942.
250 There is some dispute over the date construction began at the Arsenal. The 30 June 1942 date is from Eagle
Watch, an “unofficial” publication of the U.S. Army’s Rocky Mountain Arsenal Public Affairs Office, p. 6. By
Hoffecker’s account, construction started on 22 June 1942. Both the Fish and Wildlife Service’s “A Place Like
No Other” and the RVO’s “South Plants Fact Sheet” (www.pmrma.army.mil/site/s-plants.html [3 November
2003]) claim the date was 19 June 1942. Regardless, it should be clear that families were given short notice
before eviction and that construction commenced almost immediately thereafter.
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application: mustard and chlorine gases, and the brown, geranium-scented liquid named 
Lewisite.  
In order for the Rocky Mountain Arsenal to become a central player in America’s 
military buildup during and following World War II, the Army first needed to clear the land 
of its existing practices and people. Framed according to Woodward’s typologies of military 
control, the Army needed to establish a physical presence at the site and summon the 
authority of national security in order to transform farmlands into an arsenal (essentially 
beating plowshares into swords). According to the stories shared by some who were residents 
of the area at the time, when the call went out from the U.S. Army in 1942 to vacate the 
Arsenal’s location, patriotism in most cases trumped generations of farming and agricultural 
life. As former resident Gunnar Herskind recalled in the Army’s informative, if also 
fundamentally “insider,” history of the Arsenal, “War feelings were such that there was no 
resistance to the vacate order. We loved the farm and the land. It was beautiful farmland, 
very rich and flat. But we all remembered what happened at Pearl Harbor. We just wanted 
the war over, and when Uncle Sam said he needed our land, we were willing to help in any 
way we could.”251 
The families responded cooperatively, but they also were given only two choices: 
move their homes off the Arsenal site at their own expense, or sell out to the U.S. 
Government. Photos and oral histories from the time give a sense of the despair that many 
families felt as they left only reluctantly and with the promise that they were contributing to a 
larger, national duty. Some families who lacked phone service, such as the Herskinds, only 
 
251 Herskind quoted in Eagle Watch, p. 5. As an “insider” history, Eagle Watch was prepared, edited, and
distributed as part of the Rocky Mountain Arsenal Army Program Manager’s public relations.
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learned of the eviction order indirectly from neighbors who shared the news after it was 
printed in the Denver papers. As Gunnar Herskind remembered, “I don’t think we really 
believed it then, but once we drove down to our south field and saw the Army trucks 
dumping lumber in the middle of a ripe wheat field across the street, we realized how fast 
things were moving.”252 
To be sure, the Rocky Mountain Arsenal was not built upon vacant lots; the land was 
evacuated on the authority of the U.S. government’s right of eminent domain. By the time the 
last family had fully departed from the Arsenal site, a new array of production facilities was 
already being constructed where only a season before fields had been readied for planting. In 
the place of pumpkins, wheat, and corn, what sprouted anew at the Rocky Mountain Arsenal 
were pipes and water towers, storage tanks and smokestacks, chemical labs, haul roads, and 
miles upon miles of security fencing. What had been part of the Denver area’s base of 
farmland and food production the Army quickly reconfigured to provide the nation with 
some of its most dangerous non-nuclear weapons ever constructed. 
 As a matter of foreign policy, the United States today claims to take a principled 
stand against chemical weapons production or the potential for other nations to develop such 
weapons of mass destruction. When the Rocky Mountain Arsenal began its own productions, 
however, the news was featured in headlines suffused with glee. “Denver to Get Huge 
Chemical War Plant,” broadcast the Denver Post in May 1942.253 The front page of the 
 
252 Herskind quoted in Eagle Watch, p. 5.
253 Quoted in Hoffecker, p. 51. I was unable to find the original article described by Hoffecker, but on September
4, 1942, the Rocky Mountain News reported a possible addition to the Arsenal with the headline, “Colorado to
Get Huge War Plant.” See Rocky Mountain Arsenal Joint Administrative Records and Document Facility
(JARDF) document # G9521350.
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Rocky Mountain News later trumpeted, “Nerve Gas Made Here!”254 Framed as the ultimate 
deterrent to chemical attacks from foreign enemies, the Arsenal’s build-up was portrayed as a 
strictly defensive action, accommodated by a mix of patriotism and fear, and catalyzed by the 
threat of America’s vulnerability to foreign aggression. It was the literal part of what 
President Franklin Roosevelt called for in making America, the “great arsenal of 
democracy.”255 
Chemical warfare also came with its open defenders at the time, a fact that can be lost 
in contemporary characterizations of its horrors. As the chief of the Army’s Chemical 
Warfare Service proclaimed in a 1943 Rocky Mountain News interview:  
Oh, gas warfare isn’t anything to dread so very much. Gas warfare is a 
lot more humane than explosive warfare, if you can talk about humanity in 
war… People keep saying, look at this man and that man – he was gassed in 
the war and his life is wrecked. It isn’t true. This man and that man would 
have gone around coughing if he had never been in a war. Those are not the 
effects of gas. There are no permanent effects of gas, no permanent effects, 
except death… It’s cheaper and easier to manufacture than explosives, 
especially for a highly industrialized nation, cheaper to transport, and cheaper 
to use.256 
This belief in the relative beneficence of chemical products no doubt also played a 
role in the way materials were handled at the Arsenal during its early decades of 
production. 
 With the specter of the next Pearl Harbor firmly planted in the shadows of 
Americans’ consciousness, the Army sought to produce great quantities of chemical and 
incendiary weapons. Lewisite, mustard and chlorine gas were but the first course in what 
 
254 Rocky Mountain News, 20 March 1954, p. A1.
255 Quoted in Hoffecker, p. 48.
256 Stephenson, John, “Gas Warfare Near; Says Chemical Chief,” Rocky Mountain News, 7 January 1943, see
Rocky Mountain Arsenal JARDF document # G9521354.
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would prove to be a rather long menu of weapons and other compounds produced, cached, or 
dismantled at the Arsenal. By the time it finished its forty-year manufacturing run, the 
Arsenal’s products included napalm, sarin and VX nerve agent, white phosphorus grenades, 
the TX wheat rust pathogen, rice blast spores, the rocket fuels hydrazine and Aerozine 50, 
and a vast assortment of button bombs, cluster bombs, and other explosives.257 
Keeping the Peace? 
 
Although military production continued in various forms at the Arsenal for another 
four decades, after World War II the Army also began to lease part of its South Plants 
manufacturing center to private industry. In all, nine companies used the facilities for 
chemical manufacturing or other processing operations, but two lessees dominated the 
private sector’s use of the Arsenal: Julius Hyman and Company, and Shell Chemical 
Company (later Shell Oil Corporation).258 These private operators manufactured products 
dedicated to their own form of warfare as they developed a suite of pesticides and herbicides 
that would grow infamous with the publication of Rachel Carson’s book Silent Spring in 
1962. Carson, in fact, devoted several pages of her influential work to a description of the 
Arsenal’s groundwater contamination problems.259 Decades later, when Shell, the U.S. 
Army, concerned citizens, and government regulators and wildlife officials clashed over 
 
257 Rocky Mountain Arsenal Federal Facilities Agreement, Foster Wheeler Environmental Corporation, February
1989, pp. 2-1 – 2-2; Hoffecker, pp. 77-78
258 RMA FFA, pp. 2-2.
259 Carson, Rachel, Silent Spring (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1962), pp. 42-44.
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chronic contamination problems emanating from the Arsenal’s chemical sites, chemical 
compounds carried in hidden waterways would again rise into public view. 
 Revisited today, the products generated by the Arsenal’s private lessees read like a 
Who’s Who of pesticides. Between 1947 and 1952, Hyman manufactured aldrin, dieldrin, 
and chlordane, Lewisite’s familiar components of acetylene and chlorine, as well as a 
number of other chlorinated chemicals for application to livestock feed.260 From 1946 to 
1948 a smaller lessee, named Colorado Fuel and Iron, made chlorinated benzenes, 
naphthalene, and dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane, which remains far better known today by 
its initials, DDT.261 
Shell Chemical bought Hyman in 1952 and continued for the next three decades as 
the primary private lessee of the Arsenal manufacturing plants. During this time Shell made 
an array of chlorinated hydrocarbon and organophosphate insecticides, herbicides, and soil 
fumigants including aldrin, ethyl and methyl parathion, dieldrin, endrin, and ravap.262 It 
remains a point of some debate to this day whether the most serious problems of 
contamination at the Arsenal trace back not to the Army’s chemical weapons production but 
to the private lessees’ manufacturing of pesticides and other commercial products.  
In many respects it does not much matter. As Wendell Berry pointedly suggests, there 
is often only a trifling distinction to be made between commercial production of chemical 
pesticides and military production of chemical weapons: “The difference is diminished to the 
point of insignificance. How would you describe the difference between modern war and 
 
260 RMA FFA, pp. 2-2.
261 RMA FFA, pp. 2-2; according to the South Plants Fact Sheet, p. 6, Colorado Fuel and Iron never successfully
produced or marketed significant amounts of DDT.
262 RMA FFA, 2-2 to 2-3.
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modern industry – between, say, strip mining and bombing, or between chemical warfare and 
chemical manufacturing?”263 
Indeed, the overlapping production of military and non-military chemical products at 
the Arsenal blurred the distinction between the two spheres in a number of ways. Even the 
workers at times moved seamlessly from producing chemical pesticides for Shell to making 
sarin nerve gas for the U.S. Department of Defense – in some cases without even needing to 
change to a different building at the Arsenal.264 Although Shell and Army chemical 
production was usually conducted in separate buildings, from 1952-1954 Shell produced 
dichlor – an intermediate step in making sarin (GB) nerve gas – until the Army was able to 
get its own production facility operational.265 This relatively porous membrane between 
Shell’s and the Army’s manufacturing contrasts markedly from the separation these entities 
sought to maintain from the public at the Arsenal site. In effect, the Army invited Shell to 
occupy a privileged enclosed space inside the Arsenal’s borders where military and corporate 
authority could be little challenged or scrutinized – a glistening example of what President 
Eisenhower called the military-industrial complex.266 
263 Wendell Berry, “Word and Flesh,” in Helping Nature Heal, Richard Nilsen, ed., (Berkeley, CA: Ten Speed
Press, 1991), p. 17.
264 Hoffecker, p. 75.
265 South Plants Fact Sheet, p. 7.
266 Kirsch describes a similar creation of social and physical space for military and scientific “insiders.” See
Kirsch, Scott, Proving Grounds: Project Plowshare and the Unrealized Dream of Nuclear Earthmoving (New
Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2005), pp. 13-16. And as Shaw points out, quoting E.P. Thompson in
1982, “The USA and USSR do not have military-industrial complexes: they are such complexes. The ‘leading
sector’ [weapons systems and their supports] does not occupy a vast societal space, and official secrecy
encourages low visibility; but it stamps its priorities on the society as a whole;” see Shaw, Martin. Post-Military
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Questions of Responsibility 
 
There were, of course, other ways in which it became resoundingly important to 
determine whether Shell or the U.S. Army bore the major share of responsibility for the 
Arsenal’s contamination problems. When it came time to pay for the costs of remediation, 
neither party was interested in having the work of the military and commercial spheres 
conflated to a single strand of culpability. Perhaps not surprisingly, this point led to one of 
the most costly legal settlements ever pursued by the U.S. Government against a private 
corporation.267 
Though Shell was ultimately found responsible to the tune of hundreds of millions of 
dollars, the Army staked at least an even claim to the toxic hazards that remain present today. 
Army activities continued at the Arsenal throughout the three and a half decades of private 
leasing, and production and disposal standards were often not maintained with public or 
environmental safety as a foremost concern. In some instances the hazards may simply have 
not been fully understood, but manufacturers of deadly chemical weapons ought to be 
granted only a metered dose of innocence on this count. However culpable individual actors 
and agencies may have been, the problems that surfaced at the Rocky Mountain Arsenal fit 
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neatly into what Beck has described as “risk society.”268 As I explain more fully in Chapter 
Six, risk societies develop when individuals and institutions systematically take risks or 
introduce technologies whose consequences cannot fully be fathomed during their “first 
phase,” during which they invariably produce hazards. In Beck’s second phase, which can be 
seen today at the Arsenal, the earlier risks and hazardous outcomes surface to dominate 
public and political considerations.269 
The U.S. Department of Defense, for its part, has one of the worst records for 
environmental degradation of any institution on the planet. The DOD reported to Congress in 
1994 that it controlled more than 10,000 sites with active contamination problems, thirty 
percent of which held hazardous toxic wastes,270 though by other accounts more than two 
times that number of DOD sites are in need of cleanup.271 At least twenty-five DOD bases 
are included in the National Priorities List for Superfund cleanup.272 Measured slightly 
differently, the DOD’s demand on the environment is similarly impressive: the military uses 
2-3 percent of all the energy consumed in the United States, approximately one-fourth of all 
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jet fuel worldwide, and generates more than 10 percent of the United States’ CO2 emissions 
– an amount equivalent to 2-3 percent of the global total.273 
The Rocky Mountain Arsenal is sadly representative in this respect. Lewisite was 
stored in bulk 55-gallon drums, which workers then drained into unlined storage yards 
scattered across three square miles of the Arsenal.274 Until 1969, open burning and 
“controlled detonation” were a common Army practice to dispose of chemical and incendiary 
products. In the years from 1957 to 1959, alone, the Army detonated and burned more than 
22,000 500-pound incendiary bombs at the Arsenal with no outside regulations or perimeter 
monitoring systems in place.275 
Burn trenches at the Arsenal ran eight to ten feet deep and one hundred to two 
hundred feet long. Standard protocol found workers loading several tons of lumber along the 
bottom of each pit, then dumping contaminated materials – including obsolete chemicals and 
munitions, bomb casings, waste containers, contaminated tools, and other combustibles – on 
top of it before igniting the lot with rejected batches of napalm or hundreds of gallons of fuel 
oil.276 
The Army also tried to consolidate contaminants in evaporation basins, which were 
unlined natural depressions found on site. The Army labeled these basins alphabetically and 
filled them sequentially moving generally from southeast to northwest from the Arsenal’s 
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main production facilities.  By 1956 the capacity of these natural basins was overwhelmed, 
however, so the Army scraped out a “leakproof” asphalt-lined reservoir large enough to hold 
243 million gallons of toxic sludge and named it Basin F (see Figure 4.2: Site Map of the 
Rocky Mountain Arsenal Including Access Areas).277 This site, after being filled with the 
offal from nerve agent, rocket fuel, and a host of other chemicals, would ultimately leach 
toxins into underlying groundwater and earn a reputation as the most contaminated square 
mile on Earth. (See Figure 4.3: Rocky Mountain Arsenal Groundwater Contamination 
Areas.) Its aftermath and cleanup continue to stir controversy to this day.  
As military needs changed over time so did the focus of the DOD’s manufacturing 
efforts at the Arsenal. The character of the chemical weapons produced on-site shifted from 
relatively simple respiratory agents (such as the easily-counteracted Lewisite) to more 
complex and lethal nerve agents after World War Two. By the late 1960s as the U.S. moved 
toward abandoning its chemical weapons program, the Arsenal shifted its focus to making 
incendiaries such as napalm and experimenting with quieter Cold War tactics such as wheat 
and rice pathogens.  
The Rocky Mountain Arsenal added further to its array of projects when in its latter 
decades the site was refurbished to manufacture fuels for intercontinental ballistic missiles 
and rockets for the space program.278 During an era when the military applications of the 
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Arsenal were attracting increasingly hostile responses from a concerned public, the Arsenal’s 
contributions to the space program garnered a welcome dose of favorable press. Particularly 
as the Apollo launches brought Americans successfully to the moon and back, local news 
reports were keen to acknowledge the Arsenal’s role. An article in the 28 July 1969 Rocky 
Mountain News highlighted, for example, that the Arsenal labs had “mixed the liquid 
propellants which lifted the landing module, Eagle, off the moon, and returned the command 
module, Columbia, back to earth.”279 This came, no doubt, as a needed salve to Arsenal 
supporters who in the previous four months had endured a major protest at the gates of the 




Such glowing accounts of the Arsenal’s contributions became increasingly rare as 
new environmental regulations and a heightened ecological awareness took hold in the 
1970s. Reports that the Arsenal harbored enough nerve gas “to kill every man, woman and 
child in the world”281 no longer sounded like a glowing statement of defense capability as 
much as  
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Figure 4.2: Site Map of the Rocky Mountain Arsenal Including Access Areas282 
282 Source: Rocky Mountain Arsenal Remediation Venture Office, Commerce City, CO.
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Figure 4.3: Rocky Mountain Arsenal Groundwater Contamination Areas283 
they did a threat to residents of an increasingly apprehensive Front Range populace. Even in 
the first decade of the Arsenal’s chemical operations, local farmers began to complain of 
sickened livestock and dying crops.284 Well water testing conducted near the Arsenal’s 
boundaries in 1959 turned up concentrations of chemicals known to have been manufactured 
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at the site’s South Plants facility, including chlorates, fluorides, and arsenic.285 Groundwater 
contamination along the west and north perimeter of the Arsenal spurred a number of local 
residents to file claims for damages, which ultimately led to the widespread, permanent 
replacement of well water with water from Denver’s municipal supply.  
In addition to groundwater contamination, the Arsenal’s lakes also proved to be laced 
with toxic chemicals. Thousands of waterfowl and other birds died in and around these lakes 
in the 1950s and 1960s, prompting the Colorado Game, Fish and Parks Commission in April 
1964 to file objections with the U.S. Secretary of Defense and Shell Chemical.286 Within 
months of the State’s complaint, the Army had drained and dredged the lakes and replaced 
more than a foot of contaminated mud with clean soil.287 
In the 1960s, public concern over air pollution from the Arsenal’s open burning, and 
groundwater contamination from landfilling toxic chemicals in evaporation basins, moved 
the Army to explore new approaches to chemical and incendiary disposal. By this time, 
particularly after the U.S. agreed to a chemical weapons ban in 1972, the demilitarization of 
chemical and incendiary weapons had become a major effort at the Arsenal.288 In many cases 
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this deconstituting or relocating of chemical armaments proved more difficult to contain 
geographically or politically than chemical weapon production itself.289 
A few numbers illustrate the size of the chemical demilitarization projects: from 1955 
to 1970, more than 204,000 sarin-filled munitions were neutralized or recovered for possible 
reuse; VX nerve agent, which like the sarin had been stored in ton-sized containers located 
on-site, was also deconstituted; in just six months between 1965 and 1966, more than 33,000 
500-pound phosgene/adamsite bombs were dismantled (or detonated); during another period, 
more than 850 tons of small arms were incinerated after they returned from Vietnam 
contaminated with DDT.290 As the luster of the Arsenal’s mission to defend national security 
faded to the more mundane tasks of storing and destroying munitions, the ability of the Army 
to control the reputation and territory of the place itself also began to wane. 
 
Deep Well Injection 
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When landfilled chemicals from the Arsenal’s Basin F and other locations were 
shown to be contaminating groundwater off-site, the Army sought alternative strategies to 
disposing its wastes. One solution the Army devised in this effort to was a Pressure Injection 
Disposal Well – a system that would inject some 175 million gallons of liquid waste to a 
depth of more than 12,000 feet into bedrock.291 The well was drilled and pumped full of 
waste, but shortly thereafter the Denver area was hit by its first earthquakes since 1882, 
including its strongest tremors ever recorded (two in 1965 registered 4.0 on the Richter 
Scale).292 In November 1965 an independent Denver geologist named David Evans 
publicized a theory that the quakes were caused by the Arsenal’s deep well activity.293 
Though Army officials initially scoffed at the idea that seismic activity could be induced in 
such a manner, the Denver Post responded to Evans’ theory with an editorial calling for a 
thorough, independent investigation and an immediate halt to all deep well pumping.294 
Denver’s Congressman, Representative Roy McVicker, promptly called for scientists from 
the U.S. Geological Survey, Colorado School of Mines, and other area universities to 
investigate. By March 1966, McVicker was able to report that data, “tends to confirm [the 
earthquakes] were caused by a waste disposal well at the Arsenal.”295 
291 Eagle Watch, p. 10; Larsen, Leonard, “Study Supports Arsenal Well Quake Theory,” Denver Post, 17 March
1966, pp. A1, A3.
292
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According to geologists who studied the rash of tremors, the deep well injection had 
likely, in essence, lubricated an underlying fault – or at least large blocks of stone – and 
caused the quakes.296 Although the Army initially denied responsibility for what they deemed 
natural geologic activity, it also stopped the injections within three months of Evans’ 
study.297 It remains impossible to prove a direct correlation between the deep well injection 
and the earthquakes, but most Denver area residents at the time were convinced that the 
Army’s subterranean waste disposal was to blame.298 For very obvious reasons the Denver 
quakes attracted public attention (for the first time in generations the ground beneath them 
was shaking), but the effective interventions of an independent scientist and an elected 
official demonstrated that even at the Rocky Mountain Arsenal it was impossible to maintain 
a space entirely closed to public oversight. The Denver earthquakes stopped within a few 
years after the deep well injections ceased, though only after quakes as large as 5.5 on the 
Richter scale prompted fears of a devastating major quake akin to the 1964 jolt that ripped 
Anchorage, Alaska. The deep well-earthquake problem eventually reached all the way to 
President Lyndon Johnson, who weighed in on the final disposition of the well.299 Army 
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publications now acknowledge the “possibility that the fluid injection was triggering 
earthquakes in the area.”300 
Litigation and Cleanup 
 
In 1974, Colorado Health Department tests turned up dangerous levels of 
diisopropylmethlyphosphanate (DIMP) – a known by-product of sarin nerve gas 
manufacturing – and dicyclopentadiene (DCPD) in off-post groundwater north of the 
Arsenal. To press for a thorough response, the State turned to legal action. Colorado ordered 
Shell and the Army “to stop polluting ground and surface waters north of RMA with 
unauthorized discharges…”301 With the 1972 Federal Water Pollution Control Act (Clean 
Water Act) and similar state-level regulations in place, the primary actors at the Arsenal had 
to sit up and take notice. The Arsenal site that for years had been virtually opaque to outside 
observers grew gradually more transparent with every leak and regulatory intervention.  
By the time Shell and the U.S. Army each called a halt to their operations at the 
Rocky Mountain Arsenal, in 1982, the facility was already the focus of legal battles that 
would range as high as the U.S. Supreme Court. Shell and the Army, after working side-by-
side at the Arsenal for decades, joined as co-defendants against the State of Colorado and the 
U.S. EPA, but fought each other bitterly in other cases that sought to determine who would 
bear the costs of a massive environmental cleanup. 
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The designation of the Rocky Mountain Arsenal as a national wildlife refuge 
triggered a flurry of public documents and hearings. As I noted earlier, the base conversion 
process often carries this very useful function of leveraging formerly hidden military 
practices and spaces into a more open purview.302 In some instances, the form that public 
exposure takes is not necessarily limited to the usual array of environmental impact 
statements associated with base closure and reuse. At the Arsenal, a series of major lawsuits 
between several of the principal parties thrust many of the site’s past practices and ongoing 
contamination problems into a more public forum than most military bases ever experience. 
When the Army filed suit against Shell on 3 October 1983, it marked the first time a 
federal agency had tried to compel a private corporation to cover cleanup costs on federally 
owned public lands.303 Not only that, the amount of money that the parties eventually agreed 
would be required to clean the site adequately – approximately $1.9 billion – set a new high 
mark for a settlement on damages to natural resources.304 This vast sum was not exactly what 
either party originally had in mind for the cleanup. After the Army filed its claim, Shell 
recognized that it had contributed to some of the contamination problems at the Arsenal, but 
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it vowed to “vigorously oppose” the price tag set by the Army for cleanup. As a Shell official 
commented, “We are surprised that the Army would propose a number of this magnitude 
since, realistically, cost-effective remedial measures and damages, if any, should cost only a 
small fraction of the Army's estimate.”305 
On behalf of the Army, the U.S. Department of Justice spelled out in grim detail a list 
of contaminants and actions by Shell that called for remedy. Chemicals found at the site 
included aldrin and dieldrin, pesticides that had been banned in 1974 due to their 
carcinogenic qualities, along with vinyl chloride, benzene, toluene, and chloroform.306 
According to the government, these chemicals, “are extremely toxic and hazardous to human, 
plant and animal life” and had been “spilled, leaked, pumped, poured . . . , dumped and 
released into the environment, including the air, land, ground water and surface waters, on 
and off Shell's leased property on the arsenal.”307 The government claimed that in addition to 
the risks to human health, which included leukemia, genetic damage, sterility, and central 
nervous system maladies, Shell’s actions had damaged or destroyed land, air, and water at 
the Arsenal, as well as birds, fish, and other wildlife. 
Only hours after the U.S. Government sued Shell to share the cost of cleaning up the 
Arsenal, the State of Colorado filed its own suit against both the Army and Shell in order to 
stake its own claim to ensure proper cleanup of the environment at the Arsenal.308 When the 
legal dust had finally settled, more than four years and dozens of scientific reports later, Shell 
was required to share the costs of the Arsenal cleanup and the State had prevailed in retaining 
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a say in how clean the site needed to be. Shell’s financial obligation was set on a sliding 
scale: the first $500 million of the costs would be split evenly, for the next $200 million the 
Army would pay 65 percent and Shell 35 percent, and for any amount beyond $700 million 
the Army would cover 80 percent and Shell the remaining 20 percent.309 
Shell officials today are rather circumspect about the situation that led to their 
ongoing financial responsibilities at the Arsenal. As Shell’s Rocky Mountain Arsenal project 
manager told me, “I kind of term the ‘80s the decade of litigation where, you know the State 
sued – that was just after CERCLA was passed – and the State sued the Army and Shell, and 
the Army sued Shell, and Shell sued the insurance companies and the Army, you know it was 
a … it was quite a list of litigation and things that went on.”310 
The point I wish to emphasize here is not who the winners and losers were from the 
rounds of litigation, but rather how the character of the space within the Arsenal grounds 
changed as a result of the lawsuits. Incrementally, brief by brief, the Rocky Mountain 
Arsenal moved in a direction from invisible and military/private space to one that 
increasingly has become visible and public. This was one intangible yet very important 
consequence of the lawsuits, beyond the more material determinations of who was going to 
have to pay how much.  
 
Co-Productions of the Rocky Mountain Arsenal 
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While chemical weapons, incendiaries, rocket fuel, and pesticides were the 
intentional products of the Rocky Mountain Arsenal during its forty years of service, a 
number of other products – some intentional and some inadvertent – continue to emerge from 
it. One of the most recent of these is the new national wildlife refuge whose acreage is 
steadily increasing as the FWS assumes title to the land as the Army and Shell advance their 
remediation work. But the Arsenal has also managed to produce a suite of conditions along 
other lines: groundwater, soil, and air pollution; habitat for fish, wildlife, and new 
assemblages of native and introduced plants; a sizable tract of open space at the edge of a 
metropolitan area; and a landscape that inspires responses from society that range from scorn 
and fear to pride, pleasure, or profit-making.  
Though some of these might be considered tangential to the primary project of 
creating a national wildlife refuge out of a chemical weapons plant, by turning to some of 
these co-productions of the Rocky Mountain Arsenal here, at least briefly, we can gain a 
deeper appreciation of the wide-ranging implications of the site as an arsenal, as a wildlife 
refuge, and as new type of place that is both of these at once. In short, we can gain important 
insights about the new geographies being produced at M2W sites such as the Rocky 
Mountain Arsenal NWR. 
Habitat Production 
 
Military bases today routinely employ environmental specialists to manage 
endangered species habitat, conduct research, direct cleanup operations, or ensure 
compliance with environmental regulations. This attention to the environmental management 
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of military lands continues even as the George W. Bush administration has worked to exempt 
the military from some of the constraints of bedrock wildlife protection laws such as the 
Endangered Species Act, Migratory Bird Treaty Act, and Marine Mammal Protection Act.311 
These laws have proven essential in the past to advance conservation on military lands and 
have played an important role in a number of M2W conversions. At the Rocky Mountain 
Arsenal it was the legal mandate of the Endangered Species Act that first brought the U.S. 
Fish and Wildlife Service on site in 1986 after an Army biologist discovered a population of 
endangered bald eagles roosting on site. The question still remains, of course: what 
circumstances led to there being suitable habitat for eagles at the Arsenal in the first place?  
 Congresswoman Patricia Schroeder, one of the key Colorado sponsors of the 
successful refuge legislation, described the process as follows, “Rocky Mountain Arsenal, 
because so much buffer land was required for its dangerous mission, became home to an 
astonishingly diverse and healthy ecosystem of indigenous wildlife. Deer, bald eagle, hawk, 
coyote, badger, rabbit, fish, waterfowl all thrive within a major metropolitan area.”312 The 
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service promotes a very similar explanation for how such a seeming 
paradox could develop, “While the industrial core of the site was contaminated, deer, prairie 
dogs, coyotes, and many species of hawks, owls, and other birds thrived in the abandoned 
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fields, grasslands and wood lots that had been protected from forty years of urban sprawl and 
development.”313 
A critical examination of this typecasting of the military’s compatibility with the 
environment raises several questions. There is, for one, a considerable degree of subjectivity 
in terms such as “healthy ecosystem” or “thrive” in this particular context. Deer grow to 
impressive stature within the Arsenal’s fences and face few natural predators (coyotes take a 
number of fawns each year), but does this isolation and longevity truly point to ecosystem 
health? If the fatty tissue of kestrels at the Arsenal contains elevated levels of heavy metals, 
should we consider them to be thriving? 
Examining the portrayal of military-environmental compatibility more systemically, 
we encounter a fundamental clash between the violence and destructiveness to which 
militaries intentionally dedicate themselves and the refuges for nature that military buffer 
zones seem to offer. As Woodward points out, military landscapes are not simply collections 
of physical attributes (e.g. a shortgrass prairie that sprouts around the edges of a chemical 
weapons plant), “they have a politics [and] the task of landscape interpretation means a 
reading of these landscapes guided explicitly by questions about power, domination and 
control.”314 I explore this type of critique in depth in Chapter Seven. For now, the task at 
hand is more descriptive.  
Assuming that we read the landscape from a perspective informed by ecological 
studies and scientific monitoring of wildlife populations, there is clearly a sizable community 
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of wildlife now at the Arsenal. This material presence remains an important feature as we 
seek to understand how conservation and militarism fit together in this place and at other 
M2W sites.  
 The deer population at the Arsenal now numbers more than seven hundred 
individuals (approximately 500 mule deer and 200 white-tailed).315 Protected by a fenced 
enclosure, a number of the Arsenal’s deer have also grown in stature to trophy-sized animals. 
The lakes at the Arsenal are open to limited catch-and-release fishing and these now support 
a warmwater fishery abundant in bluegill and catfish, and renowned for some of the largest 
bass and northern pike in Colorado. Black-tailed prairie dogs, a keystone species of the plains 
now in serious decline thanks to the combined threats of systematic poisoning, habitat loss, 
recreational shooting, and sylvatic plague, enjoy some of the most secure habitat at the 
Arsenal of any found along the entire Front Range of the Rocky Mountains. Though the 
Arsenal’s prairie dogs have endured several large die-offs attributed to the plague, they 
currently range freely across more than 3,500 acres.316 
At times, the array of fauna at the Arsenal has been impressive enough to prompt 
comparisons to some of North America’s most treasured national parks. When U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife Service biologist Mike Lockhart first came to the site to check on the early reports 
of roosting bald eagles, he was astonished at what he found, “I’ll never forget that day. It 
rivaled going to Denali National Park [in Alaska] for the first time.”317 Another early visitor 
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to the Arsenal, wildlife photographer Wendy Shattil, likened the place to the nation’s first 
national park, “When I first came here, I half expected to find birds that glowed in the dark. 
For public viewing and diversity and quantity of wildlife, I don’t think there is anything that 
compares to this, outside of Yellowstone National Park.”318 
Exaggerated though these claims may seem to some, even a short tour can present 
refuge visitors with a sizable array of plains fauna. On a 90-minute tram ride I joined in July 
2004 (see Figure 4.4: Rocky Mountain Arsenal Tram) we saw dozens of burrowing owls and 
prairie dogs, mule and white-tailed deer (some with five-point antlers still in velvet), coyotes, 
jackrabbits, and a host of birds including northern harrier, red-tailed hawks, white pelicans, 
blue heron, and various songbirds. By official counts, there are more than 330 vertebrate 
species that reside either yearlong or seasonally at the Arsenal.319 
The fact that visitors to the refuge must take a tram ride to interact with most of these 
Arsenal residents has a backstory of its own that helps illuminate the continued extent of 
military control at the site. At the 1991 Congressional hearings on the proposal to convert the 
Arsenal to become a national wildlife refuge, Colorado Governor Roy Romer was adamant 
that he did not want refuge visitors restricted to meeting wildlife from the remove of a bus. 
To limit interactions in this way would, in Romer’s view:  
…squander our opportunity at the arsenal. The arsenal’s proximity to 
millions of people is what makes it unique. We should push to guarantee the 
arsenal is managed in a way that recognizes its tremendous outdoor recreation 
opportunities. The refuge should focus equally on wildlife and people; it 
should be restored with both these uses in mind. I don’t mean we should build 
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volleyball courts and soccer fields – in fact, I think these uses should be 
specifically prohibited at the site. What I mean is managing the open space 
there in a way that provides the greatest enjoyment of wildlife and access to 
the site – while, of course, protecting the health of wildlife and wildlife 
habitat. 
Not only do we want our children who visit this refuge to be safe, but 
we want them to enjoy themselves and learn something. My vision of this 
recreation and wildlife area is not of school children peering through chain 
link fences or riding around on school buses. It’s of children hiking near deer 
and pronghorn antelope, learning the names of insects and flowers they may 
encounter, and watching eagles roost. This vision means we push for a 
thorough cleanup, don’t allow the site to be fenced off except where 
absolutely essential, and permit and encourage access throughout the entire 
site through bike paths, hiking trails, picnic tables, and interpretive facilities. 
We shouldn’t be vague and take chances about how we want this refuge 
managed – not with some Federal agencies already conceding that bus tours 
are the best we can do.320 
The tram ride itself is pleasant and informative; to some, no doubt, it’s vastly superior 
than having to walk. The fact that visitors can only see much of the interior of the refuge 
from the windows of a tram, however, suggests that the Governor of the State of Colorado 
wields little authority in this place. Compared to the assembled voices of the U.S. Army, 
Shell, the Fish and Wildlife Service, federal and state regulators, scientists, and lawyers 
advising the principal parties on their potential liabilities, the Governor’s instructions to keep 
the refuge a wide open public place carried little weight.  
 
Scientific Authority and Wildlife Health 
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Figure 4.4: Rocky Mountain Arsenal Tram 
Whether the public’s safety would actually be jeopardized by interacting more 
intimately with the Arsenal’s denizens seems unlikely, but the qualitative condition of the 
wildlife there remains a matter of some dispute. Dozens of studies have been conducted on 
Arsenal wildlife and their habitats, measuring details ranging from the dieldrin (pesticide) 
content of badgers to soil and water contamination levels to population effects on the 
Arsenal’s deer.321 
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164 pp; Bricke, R. Mark and Michael G. Channell, 1995, Evaluation of Solidification/Stabilization for Treating
Contaminated Soils from the Rocky Mountain Arsenal, (Vicksburg, MS: U.S. Army Engineer Waterways
Experiment Station), 435 pp.; Creekmore, T.E., D.G. Whittaker, R.R. Roy, J.C. Franson, and D.L. Baker, 1999,
“Health Status and Relative Exposure of Mule Deer and White-Tailed Deer to Soil Contaminants at Rocky
Mountain Arsenal,” Environmental Toxicology and Chemistry 18(2): 272-278.
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Much of this research indicates that Arsenal biota generally do not suffer chronic 
health problems simply by virtue of their residency.322 Studies have at times come up with 
unexpected results. For example, populations of bald eagles, coyotes, and badgers that feed 
heavily on prairie dogs have shown little accumulation of toxins in their tissues, contrary to 
expectations, while kestrels that rely upon a staple of smaller mammals have shown very 
high levels of bioaccumulation.323 Small mammal communities have shown the most 
dramatic responses to contamination, as the percentage of deer mice increased and other 
species such as grasshopper mice, pocket mice, and ground squirrels dropped away.324 
It is worth making a distinction here between chronic effects on wildlife and acute 
events that have been quite deadly. There have been many episodes of acute mortality among 
Arsenal wildlife. In 1959, one official estimated that at least 20,000 ducks had died in the 
previous decade on the Arsenal’s lakes from “unknown causes.”325 A 1973 event virtually 
scoured the lower lakes of all aquatic life.326 Tissue analyses of dead animals at the Arsenal 
have found high levels of pesticides in many of the victims, from coyotes and amphibians to 
 
322 For example, Creekmore et al., 1999; see also Rocky Mountain Arsenal Record of Decision; Rocky Mountain
Arsenal Final Environmental Impact Statement, December 1995.
323 Cohn, Jeffrey P., “A Makeover for the Rocky Mountain Arsenal,” BioScience 49(4): 273-277.
324 Allen, D.L. and D.L. Otis, “Relationship Between Deer Mouse Population Parameters and Dieldrin
Contamination in the Rocky Mountain Arsenal National Wildlife Refuge,” Canadian Journal of Zoology
76(1998): 243-250.
325 Quoted in Shattil, Wendy and Bob Rozinski (photos), Chris Madson (essay), When Nature Heals: The 
Greening of the Rocky Mountain Arsenal (Boulder, CO: Roberts Rinehard Inc., in cooperation with the National 
Fish and Wildlife Foundation, 1990), p. 43. 
326 Shattil et al., pp. 43-45. 
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songbirds and raptors.327 Eruptions of sylvatic plague in the Arsenal’s prairie dogs have also 
periodically decimated the resident population, but as one National Wildlife Federation-
sponsored publication optimistically reported, “if these dogs follow the pattern of the breed 
in other parts of the West, it's unlikely that the losses will have any long-term effect on their 
numbers.”328 
While some of the more dramatic events earn media coverage and have at times 
affirmed in a suspicious public the dangerous nature of the Arsenal, they have rarely 
endangered entire populations of organisms.329 Much more common are incidents of 
burrowing mammals or migratory birds making their way into sites that were far too toxic to 
survive even briefly. As one EPA official commented wryly, “A duck that lands on Basin F 
does not fly away.”330 
This leads to one critique of the science conducted at the Arsenal: it privileges broad 
scale effects at the expense of finer scale responses. This can be seen as a characteristic of 
wildlife management and endangered species policy generally, where the sacrifice of 
individuals or certain habitat areas has become routine. Applying such standard approaches 
to the unique conditions of the Rocky Mountain Arsenal, however, may be ill-advised. Moral 
philosophers highlight the lack of attention to individual suffering that such an approach 
 
327 Shattil, et al., pp. 43-45. 
328 Shattil et al., pp. 18-19; see also Comprehensive Management Plan, passim. The comment is ironic 
considering that prairie dog numbers across the West have fallen to just 1-2 percent of their historic levels. 
329 The aquatic die-offs are an exception here, such as the 1964 events described earlier. Sylvatic plague has 
also drastically reduced prairie dog numbers at the Arsenal on several occasions, but never to the point of 
extirpation.  
330 Bunker, Nick, “War of Words Over the Wasteland,” London Financial Times, 12 October 1987, sec. 1, p. 23.
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entails – an argument popularized by animal rights groups – but there is also the pragmatic 
question of whether traditional wildlife management approaches can account for the 
complexity of the Arsenal’s contamination.331 Since the field of wildlife biology was founded 
upon work with populations living in relatively clean settings, scientists trained in this 
tradition have rarely needed to attend to the physiological or chemical changes that toxic 
environments can effect. Investigators at the Arsenal who pose questions that do not (or 
cannot) accommodate the effects of synergistic chemical reactions or multi-level changes 
simply generate data as a positive feedback loop that affirms the Arsenal’s clean bill of 
health as wildlife habitat.   
This type of critique challenges the view of science as an objective form of 
knowledge production and instead casts it as a process intimately (and often inadvertently) 
linked to the standpoint of the researcher. My intent here is not to examine debates of 
scientific construction versus realism, but to look at how the privileging of scientific realism 
influences the ongoing management of places such as the Rocky Mountain Arsenal.332 With 
 
331 Two classic works on animal rights are Peter Singer’s Animal Liberation, (NY: HarperCollins, 1975); and
also Tom Regan’s The Case for Animal Rights (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1985); see also
advocacy groups’ position statements, for example, People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals,
www.peta.org.
332 For more direct treatments of the epistemological debate itself, see for example: Castree, Noel, “Nature is
Dead! Long Live Nature!” Environment and Planning A 36, 4(2004a): 191-194; Crist, Eileen, “Against the
Social Construction of Nature and Wilderness,” Environmental Ethics 26 (Spring 2004): 5-24; Demeritt, David,
“Social Theory and the Reconstruction of Science and Geography,” Transactions of the Institute of British
Geographers 21(1996): 484-503; Eden, Sally, “Environmental Issues: Nature Versus the Environment?”
Progress in Human Geography 25, 1(2001): 79-85; and Proctor, James D., “The Social Construction of Nature:
Relativist Accusations, Pragmatist and Critical Realist Responses,” Annals of the Association of American
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the authority of a certain kind of science firmly in place at the Arsenal, dissenting views are 
easily marginalized and kept out of the decision-making process. One of the risks of this 
approach is akin to the proverbial fox guarding the henhouse: the institutions and 
epistemologies that created the Rocky Mountain Arsenal and its immense problems of 
contamination are now vested with the authority to study, design and implement its 
restitution. In some cases, such as the central involvement of the U.S. Army and Shell, they 
are the exact same parties that produced the chemicals in the first place.333 At times the irony 
of this relationship is unmistakable, such as when Fish and Wildlife Service literature 
describes how organochloride pesticides were manufactured at the same Rocky Mountain 
Arsenal site which later provided important habitat for bald eagles that had become 
endangered in large measure due to exposure to these pesticides.334 In part, the unblinking 
presentation of this type of information may be attributed to that fact that even such “outside” 
authorities as the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and Environmental Protection Agency come 




The creation of the Remediation Venture Office (RVO) at the Rocky Mountain 
Arsenal has drawn the Fish and Wildlife Service into even closer association with the Army 
 
Geographers 88, 3(1998): 352-376. See also Kuletz, 1998, on the development of contemporary theories of
ecosystems science.
333 This resembles what Beck calls, “the hazard technocracy” that relies upon experts’ decisions made beyond
public perception; see Beck, World Risk Society, 1999, p. 55.
334 RMA Comprehensive Management Plan, p. 33.
151
and Shell. These three parties work together under the auspices of the RVO as the guiding 
authorities charged most directly with the responsibility to convert the site from arsenal to 
wildlife refuge. Even here, however, each party is not of equal standing. The Fish and 
Wildlife Service has been almost entirely dependent upon Army funding to maintain its staff 
at the Arsenal, a fact that grows increasingly apparent as the Army’s obligation to the FWS 
diminishes. The Arsenal’s refuge manager has had to reduce his workforce from 60 to just 14 
in the past six years, though his long-term plan is to keep a staff of twenty-six at the Arsenal 
refuge.335 From its court-apportioned payment plan, Shell now covers just twenty percent of 
the costs of remediation, down from an initial 50-50 split with the Army.336 
One simple illustration of the ultimate authority that the Army still wields even within 
the ostensibly collaborative RVO comes from my own efforts to access documents from the 
Arsenal’s primary archive, the Joint Administrative Records and Document Facility 
(JARDF). When I sought a fee waiver for documents, the JARDF’s librarian instructed me to 
seek permission from one of the three principal managers of the RVO. However, when I 
contacted the Arsenal’s Refuge Manager, the highest authority on-site for the Fish and 
Wildlife Service, he informed me that my request could only be granted by the Army’s top 
manager at the Arsenal. In this way, the Army exerts control not just over the Arsenal’s 
cleanup operations but also, at least for those of limited financial means, to the vast archive 
of information about the Arsenal that is held for purposes of public accessibility in the 
 
335 Interview with Rocky Mountain Arsenal National Wildlife Refuge Manager Dean Rundle, Commerce City,
Colorado, 23 July 2004.
336 Interview with Roger Shakely, Shell Oil Company, Rocky Mountain Arsenal Project Manager, 21 July 2004,
Commerce City, Colorado.
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JARDF.337 To be clear, my point here is not that anyone sought to obstruct my right to access 
to Arsenal’s documents, but rather to note where the authority lay to grant free (i.e. without 
charge) access to these materials.338 
Institutional proximity of course does not guarantee unanimity of perspective. 
Lawsuits pitting the U.S. Department of Justice (on behalf of the EPA) against the 
Department of Defense give ample evidence of acrimony even between sibling federal 
departments in the case of the Rocky Mountain Arsenal. But such tightly knit institutional 
arrangements as that found with the RVO, or even with the EPA, point to a consolidation of 




Within this hierarchy, elected representatives and state and local health officials 
occupy an interesting, and at times very potent, middle stratum. The State of Colorado has 
played an active role in the conversion of the Rocky Mountain Arsenal, but not always in 
concert with the other responsible parties. In 1989, the state refused to sign the Federal 
Facility Agreement that established the terms of remediation at the Arsenal.339 The state 
 
337 The JARDF was created to meet the requirements for public disclosure included in CERCLA.
338 As it turned out, the JARDF librarian and both FWS and Army managers were, in fact, quite gracious and
accommodating of my various requests. Had they been otherwise, both CERCLA and the Freedom of
Information Act include provisions for public access and fee waivers.
339 See “Federal Facility Agreement,” U.S. Army Materiel Command, Program Manager Rocky Mountain
Arsenal, 2 pp, n/d; also from interview with Barbara Nabors, Rocky Mountain Arsenal Project Manager,
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continues to point to two related areas of disagreement. In the first of these, the state asserts 
its rights according to the Resource Conservation Recovery Act (RCRA) to maintain 
jurisdiction over the Army’s Basin F cleanup. According to this view, the Army must abide 
by all state hazardous waste laws as it remedies the severe contamination problems at the 
site. Although the Army initially submitted a RCRA closure plan to the state, it later 
withdrew the plan and informed the Colorado Department of Health (now Colorado 
Department of Public Health and Environment) that Basin F was not subject to state rules. 
The state contested this in court and the subsequent lawsuit carried all the way to the U.S. 
Supreme Court, which upheld the state’s authority to enforce its hazardous waste laws at 
Basin F. As a result, the Army must continue to submit closure and cleanup plans to the state 
for approval.340 
The second significant point of disagreement between the state and other players in 
the Rocky Mountain Arsenal cleanup hinges upon what public health standards to apply for 
DIMP levels in Adams County’s groundwater. In a case that again highlights how science 
often does not simply exist or reveal objective facts, but rather must be interpreted and 
contested, the state and Army have failed to agree upon what the appropriate standard should 
be in limiting public exposure to DIMP. As I described in brief earlier in this chapter, 
diisopropylmethlyphosphanate, or DIMP, is a known carcinogen associated with the 
production of sarin nerve gas. For more than thirty years Colorado health officials have 
monitored DIMP levels in groundwater plumes downgradient of the Arsenal and there has 
 
Federal Facilities Program, Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment, 22 July 2004, Denver,
Colorado.
340 Nabors interview; see also “History of Basin F” photocopied fact sheet, n/d, no author, provided by Barbara
Nabors, Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment, 28 July 2004.
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been little dispute over the broad dangers the substance poses to public health. This explains, 
in part, why area residents have had their groundwater supplies replaced with treated 
municipal water at Shell and the Army’s expense. 
The disagreement over DIMP rides specifically upon what levels of risk are 
acceptable for the public to bear. Although the Army initially agreed with the state on a level 
of eight parts per billion for DIMP in groundwater, after signing the conversion plan’s 
Record of Decision the Army tried to soften the DIMP standards by pointing to a new study 
that suggested that 400 parts per billion was an acceptable standard to ensure public safety.341 
As a Colorado health department official who works on the Rocky Mountain Arsenal project 
told me, “Issues relating to DIMP groundwater standards have created some hard feelings 
between the Army, Shell, and the state.”342 Not only are there differences of interpretation for 
the toxicological data, the various parties also disagree over how DIMP studies have been 
conducted and what types of assumptions are built into the risk models.  
The State of Colorado has not been the only body willing at times to try to lift the 
customary veil covering military (and corporate) practices at the Arsenal. The Tri-County 
Health Department (serving Adams, Arapahoe, and Douglas Counties) first got involved in 
health issues relating to the Rocky Mountain Arsenal in the 1950s when farmers reported that 
their irrigation water (pumped to the surface from groundwater) was killing their crops. For 
more than thirty years the county health department has worked as the lead agency to 
monitor the residential and agricultural water quality adjacent to the Arsenal.343 These data 
 
341 Rocky Mountain Arsenal Record of Decision, p. D-7; Interview with Major Wesley Erickson, U.S. Army
Chief Counsel, Rocky Mountain Arsenal, 22 July 2004, Commerce City, Colorado.
342 Nabors interview.
343 Dan Collins interview.
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have increased public understanding of what flows, often invisibly, from the Arsenal grounds 
and spurred closer scrutiny of other forms of drift, including airborne dust and odors, that 
now are monitored routinely. 
Perhaps the most dramatic intervention into the RVO’s triumvirate came in 1992 
when Congress passed the Rocky Mountain Arsenal National Wildlife Refuge Act. Although 
this was far from a hostile power grab – Shell and the Army worked actively in advance to 
highlight the Arsenal’s wildlife and open space amenities – it served as an example of how a 
public process could enter a very restricted military space.344 Through Congressional 
committee investigations, hearings, public meetings, comment periods, extensive media 
coverage, and not least the Arsenal’s Congressionally-directed shift from closed military base 
to national wildlife refuge, the actions of elected officials ultimately launched thousands of 
pages of information into the public purview. 
These actions and the subsequent body of information have, however marginally, 
opened spaces for citizen participation in decisions being made at the Arsenal. This uneasy 
transition of military sites such as the Rocky Mountain Arsenal to a more public state will be 
the major focus of Chapter Six, but in this chapter’s treatment of science and authority it is 
worth mentioning here that some long-time observers of the Arsenal simply believe that the 
wrong kind of science is being done. On this (more constructivist) view, if other kinds of 
questions were researched then the suite of relatively benign scientific assessments might 
pale in light of studies that accounted for synergistic effects of chemicals on the body, 
 
344 Some citizen activists contend that the conversion to a wildlife refuge was orchestrated from the outset by
Shell as a means of reducing the corporation’s cleanup costs and long-term liability at the site; see “Rocky
Mountain Arsenal Wildlife Refuge Communication Audit for Shell Oil Company,” [marked “Confidential”],
MGA Communications, December 1991.
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multiple chemical sensitivity responses, or suppressed immune systems due to chemical 
exposure that then led to secondary causes of death. As one citizen activist explained of the 
research being done at the Arsenal: 
It’s warped science I think. They’ll look at a dead body and if the 
animal has microbes in its stomach or parasites, that’s the cause of death. 
They never do any sort of tissue analysis or any sort of analysis to see what 
the problem is. If the animals hit an electric wire and die, that’s the cause of 
death. It isn’t because they’re disoriented by exposure to pesticides… I don’t 
know how many times all the prairie dogs out there have died off due to 
bubonic [sic] plague, and of course everybody else has bubonic plague so it’s 
not something that’s specific, it’s not weakened immune systems… 
I would have liked to have seen increased cleanup technology and 
testing for pollutants in the soil and air. I’m not sure that they have furthered 
the science of soil cleanup and air pollution analysis in this process. They’ve 
just gone with what is out there. They haven’t put forth an effort to really 
change the technology. Now if this were a bomber that they were doing out 
there, we would have lots of money spent in advancing the science and 
research. I would have liked to have seen that out there…  It isn’t a double-
blind, triple-replicated, statistically significant science that we need, it’s more 
an individualized science. Why is this animal dying? Why is this so 
susceptible to parasites? Why are their immune systems so susceptible to 
bubonic plague? Is the testicular atrophy in the deer out there really 
insignificant, or could it be related to the pesticides?345 
Such critiques notwithstanding, the scientific studies completed at the Rocky 
Mountain Arsenal have succeeded in assuaging the concerns of many of the local officials 
charged with public health and safety. Groundwater plumes and airborne particulates 
migrating off the Arsenal are tracked meticulously, longitudinal studies of cancer and other 
illnesses in nearby residential populations have not found any spikes of incidence, and 
contaminated wells have been systematically supplanted by Denver’s municipal water 
supply. In some cases, the contaminated plumes of groundwater flowing from the Arsenal 
seem to have been effectively corralled by the Army’s groundwater intercept-and-treat 
 
345 Interview with Angela Medberry, Pesticides Chair, Sierra Club, 27 July 2004, Boulder, Colorado.
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systems, which trap groundwater with subterranean dams, pump it to the surface where it is 
chemically treated, then return it below ground.346 (See Figure 4.3: Rocky Mountain Arsenal 
Groundwater Contamination Areas.) 
The fact that most county and state-level full-time positions dedicated to monitoring 
the Arsenal are contracted and paid for by the U.S. Army has led to accusations by some of 
conflicts of interest, but those involved see themselves as better positioned players in the 
process.347 By working more on the inside of the Arsenal project, the Tri-County Health 
Department’s Rocky Mountain Arsenal team leader considers his heightened access a benefit 
to the populace whose health he is chartered to protect: “Working with the Rocky Mountain 
Arsenal got people off of contaminated water much faster than it would have otherwise. 
We’ve made the cleanup better than it would have been without us.”348 
The vast majority of research conducted at the Arsenal in the past forty years has 
been contracted and managed by the Army. All studies that rely upon Arsenal-based research 
need to get the permission of the Army for access to research sites. In this way the DOD acts 
quite literally as the gatekeeper of scientific knowledge production at the site. Even if the 
Army never directly interferes with the information coming out of this research, the types of 
questions posed by scientists at the Arsenal can be routinely shaped by the institutions 
controlling the physical grounds. As one citizen activist recalled, “They take a wonderful 
dioxin study (because we insisted that they do dioxins), and so spent gobs and gobs of money 
and showed essentially less dioxin in the upper one or two inches of soil out there than in 
 
346 Comprehensive Management Plan, p. 18. See also, U.S. EPA website on successful remediation actions at
Rocky Mountain Arsenal, viewed online at www.epa.gov/superfund/accomp/success/rma.htm [5 October 2005].
347 Dan Collins interview.
348 Dan Colllins interview.
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other parks and covered lands in the metro area. But they would only go one or two inches, 
they wouldn’t go any deeper.”349 
Open Space 
 
The growing perception that the Arsenal no longer poses a public health hazard has 
no doubt been an essential component to the site’s refurbished reputation more broadly. 
Rather than earning national headlines as it did throughout the 1970s and 1980s for leaking 
canisters of nerve gas, ailing workers, or dying wildlife, the Rocky Mountain Arsenal as a 
wildlife refuge now gains acclaim for creating open space for human enjoyment as well as 
habitat for wildlife or a site for research. The turn in fortunes promises to expand beyond the 
fenced boundaries of the refuge/arsenal itself, at least if local civic boosters and developers 




One year before the Rocky Mountain Arsenal National Wildlife Refuge Act was 
signed into law, the City and County of Denver prepared its “Gateway Plan” for 
 
349 Angela Medberry Interview; see Denver Front Range Study, Dioxins in Surface Soil,  Study 2: 
Characterization of Dioxins, Furans and PCBs In Random Soil Samples Collected from the Rocky Mountain 
Arsenal (Prepared for and jointly by U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Region 8, Denver, Colorado, 
working in cooperation with: 
Remediation Venture Office of the Rocky Mountain Arsenal and Colorado Department of Public Health and 
Environment, July 2001). 
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developments lying immediately east of the Arsenal and adjacent to the new Denver 
International Airport.350 (See Figure 4.5: The Rocky Mountain Arsenal and Vicinity.) The 
long-suffering industrial burg of Commerce City prepared similarly for the opportunities that 
a recasting of the Arsenal might bring. While the Arsenal has had relatively dense 
development along its southern and western boundaries for decades, open agricultural lands 
have long characterized its northern and eastern sides. That is about to change. The same 
year that the Arsenal legislation was passed by Congress, Commerce City released a 
comprehensive plan for what it calls the “New Lands,” which includes extensive annexations 
around the perimeter of the Arsenal and tens of thousands of new homes.351 For its part, the 
U.S. EPA signaled its approval of the residential boom, noting on its Rocky Mountain 
Arsenal cleanup “success stories” website, “Since the cleanup began, 43,000 new households 
have either been planned or constructed immediately north of the site. These are the first 
housing developments planned by Commerce City in 40 years.”352 
Commerce City also successfully brokered a deal, included in the Rocky Mountain 
Arsenal National Wildlife Refuge Act, to purchase and annex 815 acres of relatively 
uncontaminated land in the southwest corner of the Arsenal property from the Army. The 
proceeds from this purchase were earmarked for the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service to fund  
 
350 City and County of Denver, The Gateway Plan, October 1991, prepared by the Gateway/Stapleton Office,
Denver, CO.
351 Commerce City, New Lands Comprehensive Management Plan, April 1992, prepared by BRW, Inc. (Denver,
CO).
352 U.S. EPA Rocky Mountain Arsenal cleanup website, viewed online at
www.epa.gov/superfund/accomp/success/rma.htm [5 October 2005].
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Figure 4.5: Rocky Mountain Arsenal and Vicinity353 
construction of a visitor and education center for its new refuge.354 As a front-page story in 
The Denver Post touted: 
It is Commerce City's big leap. This city of nearly 30,000, stereotyped 
as the industrial black hole of metro Denver, is about to embark on its biggest 
development project ever. The plan is to take about 1,000 acres of former 
Rocky Mountain Arsenal land and create a municipal treasure chest called 
Prairie Gateway. It will have a new 20,000-seat soccer stadium for the 
Colorado Rapids. It will have a new city hall, youth ball fields and acres of 
park space. It will have attractive shops, restaurants and hotels. And if all goes 
to plan, city officials say, Prairie Gateway will bring reinvestment and a 
different attitude. A redeveloped piece of former Superfund land will 
transform the city long known for its oil refineries and gritty image.355 
353 Final Technical Memorandum, figure 1.0-1.
354 PL 102-402, sec. 5(a). The actual purchase, completed in 2004, was 917 acres.
355 Ingold, John, “Commerce City Pins Hopes on Developing Arsenal Land,” The Denver Post, 21 September
2004, p. A1.
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Once fully realized, Denver’s Gateway project and Commerce City’s New Lands and 
Prairie Gateway will nearly encircle the existing Arsenal site with residential and commercial 
developments. Not only will these projects transform the character of the Arsenal as they 
isolate the site from the less developed agricultural lands and plains to the north, but they 
also promise to reshape the character of Commerce City and north Denver’s Montbello 
neighborhood. As Commerce City’s city manager noted of the development plan, “It changes 
the image of Commerce City.”356 
In my interview with the Rocky Mountain Arsenal’s refuge manager, he was a bit 
more colorful in his assessment of how the Prairie Gateway and New Lands projects could 
transform Commerce City: 
The Prairie Gateway project, I think the city council here at Commerce 
City understands that’s their one, their last opportunity to really keep 
Commerce City from having a literal definition of the wrong side of the 
tracks. You know, the core city, the old Commerce City, which saw the 
Arsenal as this big black cloud of pollution next to them that kept all their 
property values low and everything like that, the developers to the north are 
marketing this 17,000[-acre] open space wildlife refuge as an amenity to the 
community. [And does that work, in terms of selling that land up there?]
They sold them like hotcakes. [I mean, that’s the historical, the (toxic 
groundwater) plume was sort of heading that direction historically.] Yeah, 
yeah. It’s under them. It doesn’t seem to bother those folks. They can buy a 
new house for less money than they can get one in other parts of town. 
They’ve already approved, I think, 26,000 single-family homes in that north 
portion. And this is a city that only has 17,000 people in it [sic].357 It’s going 
to drastically change the political, I mean, Commerce City is the industrious, 
it’s what National City was in San Diego. Heavy industry. It’s the illegal 
immigrant community. High, I don’t know what the percentages are, but if 
 
356 Ingold, John, “Commerce City's Oasis Takes Shape,” The Denver Post, 27 March 2005, p. C1, quoting Perry
VanDeventer.
357 According to the 2000 U.S. Census, the population of Commerce City was 21,000.
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you want a fake Green Card, Commerce City is where you get it. So, yeah, it’s 
changing a lot.358 
Shell Oil Company’s Rocky Mountain Arsenal manager also highlighted the shift in 
public perception that conversion to a wildlife refuge has wrought:  
And then, you know, it’s one of those things where it is a refuge now, 
and there’s still some cleanup that needs to go on. But it really has changed 
the perspective of not living beside a hazardous waste site anymore, you’re 
living beside a wildlife refuge. It has some real benefits, I think, not only to 
property values, but also to the mindset.359 
Commerce City’s effort to distance itself from an industrial past seems particularly 
bold, if also rather transparent. Visitors arriving at Denver’s old Stapleton International 
Airport and bound for points northwestward (e.g. Rocky Mountain National Park, Fort 
Collins, or Boulder) had to drive through Commerce City and for years could recognize it by 
day from the smell of its oil refineries and chemical plants and by night from the sight of 
natural gas flares. Commerce City and its overarching jurisdiction, Adams County, now 
claim at least six Superfund sites listed on the national priorities list.360 Much as Hong Kong 
once highlighted its rural “New Territories” in contrast to the squalor of its burgeoning 
cardboard and tin slums, Commerce City’s New Lands now hold out the promise of a 
different kind of place for a different type of resident. 
 
The Arsenal as Amenity? 
 
358 Interview with Dean Rundle.
359 Interview with Roger Shakely.
360 Interview with Dan Collins, Tri-County Health Department, 23 July 2004, Commerce City, Colorado, listed
seven sites. According to the EPA, there are six sites in Adams County on the National Priorities List.
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Residential complexes slated to rim the Arsenal come with enticing names such as 
“Eagle Creek” and “Aspen Hills,” but at prices that are scarcely affordable to Commerce 
City’s current residents. Eagle Creek homes are priced from $194,00-$213,000, nearly 
double the $113,000 median value of Commerce City’s existing homes and a risky stretch of 
the purchasing power for the average Commerce City household’s median income of less 
than $34,000.361 At the slightly more affordable Aspen Hills ($150,000-$160,000 list price), 
the developer’s promotional materials emphasize that residents will find themselves “located 
in a beautiful country setting in the NEW Commerce City”362 (emphasis in original)  
The fact that new developments highlight the amenity of the Arsenal’s Refuge status 
while longtime residents of lower income areas of Montbello and Commerce City remain 
either left behind or simply uninvolved in the place also invites a number of questions of 
environmental and racial injustices. The traditionally African-American neighborhood of 
Montbello and predominantly Hispanic east side of Commerce City have long been subjected 
to contaminated dust, odors, and a diminished reputation from the Arsenal when it was 
actively producing chemical weapons and pesticides.363 One troubling study of Commerce 
 
361 Commerce City data from 2000 U.S. Census fact sheet, http://factfinder.census.gov [20 September 2005];
Eagle Creek home prices from www.amberhomes.com/ah_info/shtml [9 September 2005].
362
www.amberhomes.com/ah_info/shtml [9 September 2005].
363 See, Reid, T.R., “Coloradans Ask: Is Toxic-Waste Cleanup Dangerous to Our Health?” The Washington
Post, 24 December 1988, p. A5; Zaslowsky, Dyan, “Toxic Issue at Arsenal Stirs Furor in Colorado,” New York
Times, 5 January 1989, p. A16; Coates, James, Arsenal Cleanup Creates Hazards, Residents Say,” Journal of
Commerce, 11 January 1989, p. 9B.
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City residents, for example, found that Hispanics and non-whites were disproportionately 
more likely to have elevated blood arsenic levels from Arsenal pollutants than whites.364 
With the exception of groundwater contamination, health effects were little quantified 
or studied by county, state, or Army officials until chemical production at the site had ceased. 
The cleanup activities themselves have raised concerns among nearby residents, as on several 
occasions noxious fumes drifted off-base into residential areas. One episode during the Basin 
F cleanup in 1988 lasted for several months and spurred residents of a nearby trailer park to 
form a group they named PANIC, for Poisoned Arsenal Neighbors of Irondale 
Community.365 In addition to complaining of ammonia-like smells and burning sensations in 
their mucous membranes, a number of Arsenal neighbors reported symptoms that included 
coughing spells, chronic headaches, chest pains, and nausea.366 When PANIC members 
asked to be evacuated to safer locations, their request was denied by Colorado Governor Roy 
Romer, but Shell subsequently agreed to cover the costs of health exams for affected 
residents.367 The Army denied the presence of any dangerous pollutants drifting beyond the 
 
364 Reif, J.S., T.A. Tsongas, J. Mitchell, T.J. Keefe, J.D. Tessari, L. Metzger, and R. Amler, 1993, “Risk Factors
for Exposure to Arsenic at a Hazardous-Waste Site,” Journal of Exposure Analysis and Environmental
Epidemiology 3: 73-86, Suppl. 1.
365 See Reid, 1988; “Fact Sheet on Basin F Odor,” 27 September 1988 (photocopied document, no author),
JARDF # G9720684.
366 Letter to Colorado Governor Roy Romer from Poisoned Arsenal Neighbors of Irondale Community
(PANIC), dated 19 December 1988, JARDF # G8800136; Zaslowsky, 1989.
367 Letter from PANIC to Governor Romer, 1988; response from Governor Romer to Beth Gallegos,
Chairperson Citizens Against Contamination, dated 23 December 1988, JARDF # G9720927.
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Arsenal boundaries, yet acknowledged that workers at Basin F had, on occasion, been 
evacuated due to the acrid fumes.368 
In addition to the serious questions surrounding public health impacts, it is easy to 
imagine the suppressing effect on land values that bordering an active chemical munitions 
plant might generate. Most families with the means enough to move did so rather than live 
just blocks from a site that was incinerating napalm shells, mustard gas, and other chemical 
compounds. Army records now show that such materials were commonly burned in open 
trenches with little heed to wind direction or other aggravating atmospheric conditions that 
could put nearby populations at risk.369 Meanwhile, a number of Montbello and Commerce 
City residents seemed little aware even of the presence of their near-neighbor.  
One teacher with whom I spoke taught at a Montbello grade school in the mid-1980s, 
barely one mile from the Arsenal’s south boundary. She recounted that she knew that the 
Rocky Mountain Arsenal “was up there somewhere,” but that she never visited or even once 
remembered discussing the site with either her students or colleagues.370 
With more rigorous monitoring of groundwater conditions and air quality now in 
place, and no more chemical production on site, the actual danger of the Arsenal is likely 
diminishing for neighboring residents. As Commerce City works to renovate itself with 
developments such as the New Lands and Prairie Gateway, both of which make use of the 
Arsenal-turned-refuge as an amenity, it would be cruelly ironic however if people long 
subjected to the hazards of the Arsenal could no longer afford to maintain their same 
 
368 Reid, 1988.
369 See RMA FFA.
370 Personal communication with Jenny Havlick-Platt, 25 July 2004, Boulder, Colorado.
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residences due to escalating land values, property taxes, or other more aggressive effects of 
gentrification. 
 
Representations of the Rocky Mountain Arsenal 
 
The New Lands residential developments platted and under construction along the 
north and west of the Arsenal boundaries tout the cleaner air, wildlife amenities, and open 
spaces of the wildlife refuge as selling points for new subdivisions – a shift that promises to 
change the demographics, tax base, and, perhaps, reputation of Commerce City in the years 
ahead. Commerce City publications now describe its location, “amid some of Colorado’s 
greatest natural resources, including the Rocky Mountain National Wildlife Refuge [sic], 
Barr Lake State Park, the Prairie Gateway area, and numerous trails, open spaces and wildlife 
preserves.”371 
Commerce City officials are not alone in omitting the “Arsenal” from the new 
refuge’s name. Amber Homes, one of the primary developers of residential construction 
surrounding the Rocky Mountain Arsenal, consistently drops any mention of the “Arsenal” in 
describing its neighbor. A locator map accompanying Amber Homes’ Commerce City 
developments shows principal roads and a large blank space labeled simply, “National 
Wildlife Refuge.” (Figure 4.6: Amber Homes’ Website Map of Eagle Creek Development 
and Vicinity.) 
Capitalizing upon some of the Arsenal’s most lauded part-time residents, Amber Homes 
describes one of its new developments as follows, “Eagle Creek is a covenant controlled, 
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www.ci.commerce-city.co.us/other/demographics.html [23 August 2005].
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master-planned community located in the New Lands. This newly developed area of 
Commerce City is located directly north of one of the nations’ [sic] largest designated 
wildlife refuges with views of both the mountains and open range.” Included in a list of parks 
and recreation amenities for Eagle Creek and its sister development, Aspen Hills, one finds, 
“Rocky Mountain National Wildlife Refuge… Over 27 square miles of acreage devoted to 
preserving local and migrating wildlife. Hiking trails, fishing, and seasonal tours are 
available through the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service.”372 
Figure 4.6: Amber Homes’ Website Map of Eagle Creek Development and Vicinity373 
The representations of place provided by Amber Homes differ sharply here from 
those made by the principal agents responsible for the Arsenal’s cleanup and management. A 
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www.amberhomes.com/ec_info.shtml [9 September 2005].
373 http://www.amberhomes.com/ec_info.html#location [15 September 2006]
168
fact sheet produced by the EPA, Shell, Army, Fish and Wildlife Service, and State of 
Colorado, for example, states that, “The Arsenal’s only mission is environmental cleanup.”374 
The Rocky Mountain Arsenal National Wildlife Refuge Act of 1992, for its part, offers a list 
of eight purposes for the refuge centering upon environmental conservation, education, and 
research, but predicates the formal creation of the refuge itself upon compliance with the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 
(CERCLA, the law that established the Superfund), and other necessary cleanup 
responsibilities.375 In other words, until the Army and Shell clean the Arsenal to an 
acceptable standard, the bulk of the national wildlife refuge exists in name alone – with the 
prescription that the Fish and Wildlife Service manage that “real property as if it were a unit 
of the National Wildlife Refuge System”376 (emphasis added). 
The materiality of the Arsenal as national wildlife refuge seems in these cases rather 
contested and unstable. Legally, the Rocky Mountain Arsenal National Wildlife Refuge 
includes approximately nineteen square miles (slightly more than 12,000 acres) at present 
until additional areas are approved by the state and EPA as remediated.377 Even including its 
entire acreage, the Arsenal property is nowhere near the nation’s largest, standing at only 
about 0.1 percent the size of Alaska’s 22 million-acre Yukon Delta National Wildlife Refuge. 
 
374
“Onpost Contamination,” RMA Fact Sheet, MDG 0795, p. 13.
375 PL 102-402, Secs. 2(a), 4(c) and 5(a).
376 PL 102-402, Sec. 2(a).
377 See “EPA Removes Rocky Mountain Arsenal’s Internal Parcel from Superfund List,” U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency press release, 31 July 2006, viewed online at
http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/7c02ca8c86062a0f85257018004118a6/9ae33b724fceb89f852571bc0
0705551!OpenDocument [15 September 2006].
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But for the proud new owner of an Eagle Creek home, it is perhaps easy enough to gaze 
across 96th Avenue at the full 18,000 acres of open space within the Arsenal’s chainlink 
fence and feel assured that a vast refuge does, in fact, exist.  
Others, such as members of the Arsenal’s Site Specific Advisory Board, commonly 
dispute the site’s safety, whether it is designated as a refuge or not. As one member 
commented, “We really don't believe enough testing has been done on the soil there. We're 
really concerned about unexploded ordnance.”378 As the discovery in 2000 of live sarin 
bomblets revealed (discussed in more detail below), some added caution may well be 
justified. 
 
Reframing and Renaming Military Sites 
 
The discursive framing of places such as the Rocky Mountain Arsenal can 
dramatically shape both public opinion and lasting perceptions of what actually exists.379 The 
dropping of the “Arsenal” from the Rocky Mountain Arsenal’s title may at times be 
accidental, of course, but its consistent elision by boosters, developers, and other parties who 
could benefit from its omission in their publications warrants a deeper suspicion.  
Colorado Congressman (now Senator) Wayne Allard’s early refuge proposal also 
sought to drop “Arsenal” from the converted base’s name. In 1991, Allard introduced a bill 
calling for “legislation which will establish the Colorado Metropolitan National Wildlife 
 
378 Sandra Jaquith quoted in Ingold, 2004.
379 See for example, Havlick, David and Scott Kirsch, November 2004, “A Production Utopia? RTP and the
North Carolina Research Triangle,” Southeastern Geographer 44(2): 263-277.
170
Refuge.”380 This was also the name used in the version of the bill introduced in the U.S. 
Senate by Colorado’s Hank Brown (and co-sponsored by Sen. Tim Wirth), but Colorado 
Congresswoman Patricia Schroeder consistently included “Rocky Mountain Arsenal” in a 
parallel bill she introduced and pushed through Congress.381 In the end, Schroeder’s version 
prevailed and the refuge name continues to reflect the site’s historical mission.  
Renaming sites is more the rule than the exception in M2W conversions. Former 
DOD facilities such as the Jefferson Proving Ground, Fort McClellan, Loring Air Force 
Base, Longhorn Army Ammunition Plant, Pease Air Force Base, and others have each been 
relegated to appear only on maps as historical locations, if at all (see Table 4.1; see also 
Figures 1.4 and 1.5 of military-to-wildlife conversion locations).  
 In this way, the military histories of these places may be rather easily overwritten and 
quickly forgotten (or never known) for a visiting public. The discursive reframing of these 
sites may serve to assuage public fears about hazards at military sites that have been closed 
and redesignated, but will never fully be rid of contamination. As Lowenthal noted in 1975, 
the ways people choose to remember landscapes are often fraught with meaning, “features  
Table 4.1: Renaming of Selected M2W Sites 
 
Name as Military Site Name as National Wildlife Refuge 
Loring Air Force Base Aroostook NWR 
Woodbridge Research Facility/Harry Occoquan Bay NWR 
380
“Introduction of Legislation Establishing Colorado Metropolitan Wildlife Refuge (House of Representatives
– July 15, 1991),” p. H5436.
381 On 14 March 1991, four months before Allard first introduced his Colorado Metropolitan Refuge bill,
Schroeder submitted legislation for a Rocky Mountain Arsenal National Urban Wildlife Refuge; see




Fort Devens (North Post) Oxbox NWR 
South Weymouth Naval Air Station Nomans Land Island NWR 
Jefferson Proving Ground Big Oaks NWR 
Driver Naval Radio Transmission Facility Nansemond NWR 
Barbers Point Achyranthes Recovery Site Pearl Harbor NWR 
Sudbury Training Annex, Ft. Devens Assabet River NWR 
Pease Air Force Base Great Bay NWR 
Fort McClellan  Mountain Longleaf NWR 
Savanna Army Depot Upper Mississippi River NW & Fish 
Refuge 
Galeville Airport Shawangunk Grasslands NWR 
Longhorn Army Ammunition Plant Caddo Lake NWR 
Vieques Naval Training Range  Vieques NWR 
recalled with pride are apt to be safeguarded against erosion and vandalism; those that reflect 
shame may be ignored or expunged from the landscape.”382 Foote studied this phenomenon 
further, as I discuss in my final two chapters, and identified four categories of representation: 
sanctification, designation, rectification, and obliteration.383 The last of these, obliteration, 
was reserved for sites where shameful events took place that society would prefer to forget. 
The transitory nature of military base names also suggests the degree to which 
military spaces are liminal public places. Beyond a handful of high-profile or local bases, 
most Americans are hard-pressed to name domestic military bases. As I have already noted, 
this is, by some accounts, one of the important features of military base closures and 
conversions: for brief periods, at least, military spaces become visible, public, and explicitly 
politicized.384 
382 Lowenthal, David, 1975, “Past Time, Present Place: Landscape and Memory,” Geographical Review 65, p.
31.
383 Foote, pp. 7-8.
384 See Woodward, p. 54.
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To some, such as one woman I met who was visiting the Rocky Mountain Arsenal 
and expressed surprise that the site even had a military history, the site’s recasting as a 
national wildlife refuge may be sufficient to allow for a glossing of the former condition and 
use of the place. What we see here is that even with the military reference retained in the 
site’s name, the “national wildlife refuge” suffix may be sufficient to obscure past practices 
from public view. A similar phenomenon is evident at places such as the “Arsenal Mall” in 
Watertown, Massachusetts, where a shopping mall now fills a sprawling brick complex 
formerly dedicated to national weapons development. As shopping or wildlife viewing 
replaces weapons production, the term “arsenal” becomes naturalized as a place name rather 
than a description of relevant daily practices that occurred at the site.  
 
Rocky Mountain Arsenal National Wildlife Refuge 
 
A visit today to the Rocky Mountain Arsenal National Wildlife Refuge can hold any 
number of surprises. Though the perimeter of the site is still rimmed by a formidable 
chainlink fence, the entrance itself is unimposing, even welcoming. A small guardhouse sits 
in the entrance boulevard. During public visiting hours – weekends from 8 am to 4:30 pm – 
cars that approach are greeted by a uniformed representative of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife 
Service who directs traffic to the nearby visitor’s center amid the scenic backdrop of Lakes 
Mary, Ladora, and Lower Derby. Visitors or researchers who arrive during the weekdays, 
when the Arsenal is closed to the public, need only report to an entrance station in order to 
post a visitor’s pass in the windshield, then may proceed to their destination (the 
administrative headquarters for refuge staff, employees of Shell, the U.S. Army, and EPA are 
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all located centrally near the former South Plants production facility, about one mile north of 
the current visitors’ center – see Figure 4.2).  
 Such apparent casualness belies the fact that once inside the Arsenal grounds only a 
small portion of the lands are actually open to public activity and some lands remain actively 
dangerous due to hazardous materials, contaminated soils, or ongoing remediation work. 
Most of the Arsenal is still managed as a hardhat area any time one sets foot outside a 
vehicle, and vehicles themselves must be sprayed clean of any dirt residues before leaving 
zones of active remediation (see Figure 4.7: Worker at the Rocky Mountain Arsenal NWR). 
 
Sarin and Public Safety 
 
Few episodes have illustrated the Arsenal’s status as a place in transition more dramatically 
than the discovery in 2000 and 2001 of ten small sarin nerve gas bombs that were unearthed 
near a former scrap metal yard (sarin is also known as German Brown, or GB). The 
discovery led to a temporary cancellation of all public visitation, which was then reinstated 
only partially to a weekends-only policy. Not surprisingly, the accidental find of “grapefruit-
sized bomblets” containing one of the nation’s most deadly military poisons triggered a 
flurry of critical attention by regulators, local politicians and media questioning the safety of 
public use at the Arsenal.385 
385 Local media coverage of the sarin bomblets was nearly daily at times and national publications also featured
the ongoing problems at the Arsenal. See, for example, Guy, Jr., Andrew, “’Bomblet’ at Arsenal Cancels All
Tours,” 21 October 2000, Denver Post, p. A1; Guy, Jr., Andrew, “Chemicals to Dissolve Sarin-filled Bomblet,”
29 October 2000, Denver Post, p. B-3; “Army Bombs Again,” 1 November 2000, Denver Post editorial, p. B10;
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Figure 4.7: Worker at the Rocky Mountain Arsenal NWR 
The EPA, for example, expressed serious concern over the Army’s ability to control 
such lethal artifacts: “While one such bomblet in a non-suspected area could be considered 
an anomaly; discovery of several more of these bomblets causes us to reconsider as to how 
much is really known about the disposal and destruction practices for these chemical 
munitions, and how many more are waiting to be found.”386 As the EPA proceeded to 
document in this case, the Army itself was unable to present a consistent voice of assurance 
 
Janofsky, Michael, “Cleanup of ‘Bomblets’ in Colorado Refuge Expected,” 1 December 2000, New York Times,
pp. A23, A34.
386 Dodson, Max H., “EPA Letter to Army About Sarin Bomblets,” letter dated 21 November 2000, from
Assistant Regional Administrator, U.S. EPA, to Charles Scharmann, U.S. Army Rocky Mountain Arsenal
Program Manager, viewed online at www.epa.gov/region8/superfund/sites/rma/rmasarinblt.html [23 September
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that it could control either the flow of information regarding the sarin bomblet discovery or 
the actual hazards at Arsenal site. In successive days, the Army seemed if anything to grow 
less confident on this latter, crucial point. The Army’s statement of 26 October 2000 calmly 
asserted, “At no time during this discovery [of the first sarin bomblet] and subsequent 
evaluation was employee, visitor, or neighborhood safety jeopardized.” Just one day later this 
message was modified substantially, “National and local munitions and explosive experts 
have advised us that this bomblet is unstable and therefore, unsafe.” By 1 November 2000, 
the message from the Army came, “While discoveries like this bomblet are rare, there is 
potential for more devices to be found.”387 
This latter comment proved to be prophetic. The Army came upon six sarin-filled 
bombs in the week after the initial discovery. A thorough dismantling of the metal scrapyard 
where the first bombs were uncovered, a task the EPA insisted on despite initial resistance by 
the Army, led searchers to find four additional sarin bomblets the following summer.388 
Although the sarin was ultimately disposed in what seems to have been a safe 
manner, the entire episode provided an unsettling glimpse into how ill-prepared the Army 
was to handle dangerous substances under the light of public scrutiny. The Army’s very 
public bungling of sarin disposal in this case becomes all the more alarming when one recalls 
that between 1955-1970 the Army destroyed more than 200,000 sarin-filled munitions. 
Lacking public scrutiny at the time, there is perhaps little wonder that the Arsenal site and its 
groundwater remains contaminated with sarin-related toxins such as DIMP.  
 
387 All quotes from Army taken from Dodson letter to Scharmann.
388 See Purdy, Penelope, “What is Really Buried at the Arsenal?” 14 January 2001, Denver Post, p. I1;
“Bomblets Contain Sarin, Tests Show,” 24 June 2001, Denver Post, p. B6; Edmonson, Valerie, “Weapons
Debris Found at Arsenal,” 28 June 2002, Denver Post, p. B1.
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During the first two months after the initial sarin discovery in 2000, the Army 
presented an unconvincing and inconsistent plan to respond to the hazard. While this 
uncertainty in the face of the Arsenal’s long history of chemical production might be 
understandable, the Army’s first public response hardly seemed weighted toward public 
safety as it considered what to do with a bomb containing 1.3 pounds of a nerve gas toxic 
enough to kill a human with a single drop. Honest, albeit far from reassuring, the Army’s 
chief public affairs officer commented of the sarin bomblet, “'Well, there could be more. You 
just never know. We're getting the arsenal cleaned up, and we don't know what else we could 
discover.”389 
Adding to the growing sense that the Army had incomplete control over the Arsenal 
site, at least with respect to contaminants and their remediation, the spokesperson first 
described a plan for open-air detonation of the nerve gas bomb right on the Arsenal grounds: 
“Sarin is not a persistent chemical. It is very short-lived. Once it's detonated, it's an 
immediate 'poof' and the sarin is gone. That's how we're going to handle this.”390 
State health department officials immediately challenged the Army’s authority and 
researched sarin disposal techniques. They quickly announced that open detonation was 
neither the only nor the most cautious method available and the Army modified its plan the 
following week to instead dissolve the sarin bomb in an enclosed vat of chemicals.391 Less 
than three weeks later, amid the discovery of additional sarin-filled bomblets at the Arsenal, 
Army officials conducted a test explosion in a Tuff Shed then tried to pass the results off as a 
 
389 Guy Jr., 21 October 2000, quoting Ruth Meacham, U.S. Army Rocky Mountain Arsenal chief of public
affairs.
390 Guy Jr., 21 October 2000, quoting Ruth Meacham.
391 Guy Jr., 29 October 2000, “Chemicals to Dissolve Sarin-filled Bomblet;” and “Army Bombs Again.”
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success. State health department officials, who had insisted on observing the test, called the 
Army’s bluff noting, “It is perfectly obvious that this structure did not contain the effects of 
the explosion,” which blew the building's doors open, lifted the roof, knocked off the filters 
and blew several holes in the structure.392 As a derisive editorial in The Denver Post then 
observed, “Tuff Sheds are great places to store lawn mowers, but lousy places to blow up 
nerve gas bombs.”393 
Press coverage  and public alarm finally grew heavy enough to draw the attention of 
elected officials. After receiving sharply-worded notices from both Colorado’s Governor and 
Senator Wayne Allard, who had sponsored the Arsenal’s wildlife refuge legislation in 1992 
and happened to serve on the Senate Armed Services Committee that controlled the Army’s 
appropriations, the U.S. Secretary of Defense sent a four-star general to the Arsenal to 
convene a task force and devise a range of alternatives for destroying the sarin bomblets 
safely.394 Five alternatives, including open-air detonation and a leave-in-place option, were 
then presented to the state, which selected a fully-enclosed drain-and-detonate system that 
had proven effective in England but existed only as a prototype at the Army’s Aberdeen 
Proving Ground in Maryland.395 The Army also acceded to the state’s and EPA’s demands to 
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conduct a meticulous cleanup of the scrapyard where the first six sarin bombs were found, a 
search that later yielded four more of the nerve gas munitions.396 
Public debacles as dramatic and well documented as the sarin bomblet discoveries 
have been rare in the six decades since the Arsenal was established, but reports of missing or 
leaking nerve gas canisters, Arsenal workers falling ill, toxic soils, poisoned wildlife, unusual 
earthquakes, and contaminated groundwater periodically surfaced and, over time, generated a 
broad sense of public distrust about the safety of the site and its practices.397 Despite the 
Army’s routine assurances that everything was under control – and as we have seen it sought 
to maintain control through a variety of means – often when public oversight took place, the 
conditions at the Arsenal provoked alarm. Indeed, the extreme toxicity of the materials being 
produced at the site would seem to warrant an extraordinary standard of precaution.  
Sarin, the nerve agent contained in the Army’s “unstable” bomblets, was known as 
one of the deadliest toxins ever produced by the U.S. military, yet the Army did not cancel 
public visits to the Arsenal for nearly a week after the first sarin bomb was uncovered.398 The 
fact that school groups once again visit the Arsenal as part of regular environmental 
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education fieldtrips (the Comprehensive Management Plan shows schoolkids digging holes 
for treeplanting and other hands-on activities)399 suggests that the Arsenal’s managers have 
been adept at containing public anxieties about the site’s safety. 
 Such messaging has been accompanied by an active attempt to separate visitors both 
in time and space from the site’s remediation: the Arsenal is open to visitors only on 
weekends and predominantly in the site’s southern tier; remediation work occurs during the 
weekdays and primarily in the site’s north-central area. As a further restriction, pedestrian 
and bicycle travel is prohibited outside of guided tours even in the southern tier of land where 
the Army has now met its CERCLA cleanup requirements. Even so, the Arsenal as an area 
for public use is not without its detractors. The local chapter of the Sierra Club periodically 
circulates a letter to all the schools in the Denver metropolitan area asking teachers not to 
take their students to the Arsenal for field trips.400 This sentiment to keep visitors away from 
the Rocky Mountain Arsenal National Wildlife Refuge was also supported in a number of the 
public comments submitted during hearings on the site’s conversion and remediation.401 
Rocky Mountain Arsenal as Role Model 
 
399 CMP, p. 6, 64.
400 Personal communication with Angela Medberry, 27 July 2004 interview.
401 See, for example, “Rocky Mountain Arsenal National Wildlife Refuge Act of 1991,” 9 September 1991, Joint
Hearing Before the Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation and the Environment Subcommittees of the Committee
on Merchant Marine and Fisheries [serial No. 102-61] and the Military Installations and Facilities
Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, 102nd Congress, 1st Session.
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One of the reasons it is so important to understand what has happened at the Rocky 
Mountain Arsenal and how its current conversion to national wildlife refuge is being 
produced is because, despite its unique characteristics, the Arsenal’s M2W conversion is 
being projected as a model for base closures and redesignations in other locations. Looking 
beyond the realm of military lands, the Arsenal’s material remediation and discursive 
rehabilitation is attractive to many as a model of what to do with contaminated sites more 
generally. As the executive director of the National Fish and Wildlife Foundation proclaimed 
in 1990, “The arsenal's challenges embody society's most pressing problems and needs – to 
clean up our toxic waste and manage development pressures brought on by our ever-
burgeoning population while protecting our sensitive natural resources. The arsenal can serve 
as a model – a model for the State of Colorado and the rest of our nation.”402 
In the most proximate sense, we need to understand what comes wrapped into this 
model before we continue to export it to dozens of other sites facing their own unique, but 
broadly familiar contours of contamination. Beyond the particular cases of the Rocky 
Mountain Arsenal or other sites currently in the midst of their own M2W conversions, we 
should understand as fully as we can how questions of authority, control, contamination, and 
justice are being resolved in these places. However much we support wildlife protection or 
may feel gladdened by the apparent greening of the military, there are political and moral 
ramifications when military activities are framed as compatible with conservation and when 
militarized spaces are presented as suitable for public recreation and environmental 
education.  
 
402 Charles H. Collins quoted in Shattil et al., 1990, p. 11.
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If we take at face value, for example, statements in glossy publications that describe 
how the “Rocky Mountain Arsenal has emerged as a significant habitat island for wildlife; 
with proper care not to unbalance the ecosystem, it can develop as a refuge for a human 
population seeking escape from the artificial world we've created. We envision the arsenal as 
a place to renew our relationship with nature and to observe and learn from a harmonious 
working ecosystem,”403 we embrace a world where even the nation’s most toxic sites can be 
reconfigured as beautifully balanced ecosystems. In this vision, a longtime chemical 
production facility becomes normalized as pristine nature itself and an escape from what 
must now be an exceedingly marginalized artificial world. 
In the next chapter I turn to my second case example of M2W conversions, which 
involves the redesignation of the Jefferson Proving Ground in southeastern Indiana to 
become the Big Oaks National Wildlife Refuge. This case offers the chance to examine one 
of the nation’s largest base closures effected through the Base Realignment and Closure 
Commission (BRAC), and includes a different suite of contamination and management issues 
than those discussed in this chapter on the Rocky Mountain Arsenal. Among these, Big 
Oaks’ policies toward hunting, prescribed burning, and cleanup of unexploded ordnance – 
including depleted uranium – merit particular attention.  
 
403 Shattil et al., from a preface by the photographers, p. 7.
CHAPTER FIVE 
CUM SCIENTIA DEFENDIMUS404 
At the July 2000 dedication of the Big Oaks National Wildlife Refuge, the director of 
the U.S Fish and Wildlife Service noted that she was not surprised that a former military 
range also featured “an amazing array of wildlife.”405 Although its conversion and 
designation apparently did not come as a surprise to the agency’s director, the new refuge site 
had long been managed by the U.S. Army as the Jefferson Proving Ground and for many in 
attendance that day its new name surely sounded like a change of fortune.406 During more 
than fifty years of operation, the Jefferson Proving Ground (JPG) bore up to 85 percent of all 
the Army’s munitions testing, including weapons that ranged from small-caliber cannons to 
 
404 Taken from the insignia posted at the former Jefferson Proving Ground, this slogan is part of the distinctive
unit insignia of the Army Soldier and Biological Chemical Command. Translation: With Science, We Defend.
405 Quoting Jamie Rappaport Clark, “Former Bombing Range Becomes National Wildlife Refuge,” U.S. Fish 
and Wildlife Service, reprint from July/August 2000 issue of Fish and Wildlife News, online at 
http://news.fws.gov/articles/FormerBombing.html [3 December 2002]. I quote her more fully in Chapter One, p. 
21. 
406 Jefferson Proving Ground took its name from Jefferson County, IN, in which it sits. The range/refuge also
covers portions of Jennings and Ripley Counties. See Figure 5.1.
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one-ton bombs.407 Starting in 1984, the Army also fired more than 220,000 pounds of 
depleted uranium projectiles at the JPG’s testing range, only about 25 percent of which have 
since been recovered.408 (Figure 5.1: Location of Jefferson Proving Ground/Big Oaks NWR.)  
While few would now deny that wildlife is flourishing at Big Oaks, serious questions 
remain about what role the Army will play in the ultimate cleanup of the site, or how the 
work of wildlife biologists and other scientists has been used to facilitate the conversion, 
management, and public acceptance of a military-to-wildlife conversions in southeastern 
Indiana. In this chapter, I focus on the environmental politics of military-to-wildlife 
conversions, examining in particular how environmental analysis and management priorities 
are shaped by scientific perspectives, and vice versa.  As with the previous chapter, I turn to a 
case study to illuminate the processes of conversion and reclassification, this time at the Big 
Oaks National Wildlife Refuge.  
To begin, I examine the historical geography of what is now the Big Oaks National 
Wildlife Refuge (BONWR). Here in southeastern Indiana, like the Rocky Mountain Arsenal, 
we find a landscape that doesn’t simply exist, but rather has been produced and re-produced 
into farmland, a bombing range, and a wildlife refuge, with each iteration carrying with it a 
suite of moral, political, and economic commitments. From this historical footing, I turn to 
the recent politics of conversion at the Jefferson Proving Ground, including the BRAC 
process that has systematically downsized the domestic military infrastructure and 
accelerated the pace of military-to-wildlife conversions. Extending from the BRAC process, I  
 
407 Disposal and Reuse of the Jefferson Proving Ground, Madison, Indiana, Final Environmental Impact 
Statement (U.S. Department of the Army: September 1995), p. 4-38; Shulman, Seth, The Threat at Home: 
Confronting the Toxic Legacy of the U.S. Military (Boston: Beacon Press, 1992). 
408 Disposal and Reuse, p.  4-41. 
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Figure 5.1: Location of Jefferson Proving Ground/Big Oaks NWR409 
address the “overlay” status that currently governs the Big Oaks National Wildlife Refuge 
and consider the variety of uses that this condition accommodates. With this, I examine three 
of the activities – hunting, bird watching, and fire management – that illustrate in practical 
 
409 Map credit: Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Cleanup Plan, Jefferson Proving Ground, Madison,
Indiana, version I (Alexandria, VA: The Earth Tech. Corporation for U.S. Army Environmental Center,
Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, April 1994), p. 1-5, figure 1-1, accessed from Archives of Hanover 
College, Duggan Library.
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terms what this M2W conversion means on the ground as a bombing range is rendered into a 
public wildlife sanctuary. 
 
Six Decades of Intensive Use: A Historical Geography of the JPG/BONWR  
 
One year and a day before the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor, a bomb of a different 
sort landed amid the rural communities of southeastern Indiana. On 6 December 1940, a 
cluster of local, state, and federal officials announced from the Jefferson County courthouse 
that a 55,000-acre tract of land was to be turned over to the federal government for use as a 
national defense site. On that day, hundreds of families were given thirty days’ notice that 
their homes and farms, stores, churches and cemeteries would be condemned – either 
relocated, sold, or abandoned in order to make way for a new facility to test Army munitions. 
Just five months later the Jefferson Proving Ground felt its first rounds, as a 75-millimeter 
cannon struck the opening volley of more than four decades of weapons testing at the Indiana 
site.410 
Although the United States was not yet at war when it created the Jefferson Proving 
Ground (JPG), the advance of Hitler’s forces across Europe and Japanese troops into the 
North China Plain gave ample warning to the nation’s military leaders that demands for 
advanced weaponry might soon escalate. As early as 1938 southeastern Indiana residents 
reported seeing Army vehicles cruising local roads.411 By 1940 it had become clear that the 
 
410 For a patriotic history of the early days of the Jefferson Proving Ground see Baker, Sue, Echoes of Jefferson 
Proving Ground: For Defense of Our Country (Indianapolis, IN: Guild Literary Service, 1990). 
411 Baker, p. 1-2. 
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U.S. War Department was actively scouting to augment its primary ammunition testing 
facility at Aberdeen, Maryland.  
 As with the Rocky Mountain Arsenal, not just any place would do for a major 
weapons testing facility. The military sought a particular geography for its new proving 
ground. The site should be relatively sparsely settled, yet not so remote as to make rail, 
highway, or water transportation inconvenient. The base also needed to be large enough to 
test anti-aircraft guns, howitzers, mines, air-to-ground artillery,412 and other large munitions 
in relative safety and security. What the Army’s scouts found in southeastern Indiana met all 
of these standards and held a few added amenities as well: the site was within easy reach of 
the major manufacturing centers of the Midwest, sat just a few miles from the Ohio River, 
and was only thirty miles upstream from another new military project (operated by Dupont 
Chemical) in Charlestown, Indiana, that would become the world’s largest smokeless powder 
factory.413 The southeastern Indiana land in question, though occupied by about 2,000 rural 
residents, was described at the time by Army scouts as “uninhabited” and was not expected 
to fetch premium rates if the Army chose to buy it.414 Indeed, this proved to be the case: of 
 
412 The Air Force was not designated as a branch of the military separate from the Army until 1947, so aircraft 
were an important part of Army munitions tests at the time of the JPG’s creation. 
413 Baker, pp. 1-2; interview with Ken Knouf, U.S. Army, Big Oaks National Wildlife Refuge, Madison, 
Indiana, 14 December 2005. 
414 Quote is from a video on the history of the Jefferson Proving Ground (title to be determined), produced by 
Elizabeth Winters and previewed 14 December 2005 at Big Oaks NWR. 
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the JPG’s total initial costs of nearly $13 million, acquisition of the 55,000 acres of land 
amounted to just $3.3 million, or roughly $60 per acre.415 
While this transition from rural homesteads to Army proving ground could be seen as 
simply a necessary precursor to the later military-to-wildlife conversion at the center of my 
research, the lives that were disrupted so dramatically in December 1940, like the anonymous 
thousands whose lives were eventually taken (or protected) by the weapons tested at the JPG, 
are also a part of the ongoing story of landscape production that I seek to illuminate.416 The 
social impact of this first farmland-to-military conversion does in fact continue to weigh 
upon local views of the site even after more than six decades. 
As base closures have become increasingly common in recent years, they have gained 
a largely negative reputation for their political costs, short-term economic fallout, and social 
upheaval to communities whose very existence seems to center upon military activities.417 A 
 
415 Baker, p. 104. Many of the displaced residents found that they were not able to buy land as cheaply as they 
had sold it to the U.S Government. See Baker, pp. 75-79. 
416 The farmland-to-proving ground transition was itself predicated upon earlier transitions that I will not 
address in depth here, such as the area’s longstanding and shifting uses by indigenous peoples; the steady purge 
of Native Americans as white settlers from Virginia, the Carolinas, and Kentucky pressed westward; and Civil 
War-era skirmishes between Union and Confederate militias. Baker, 1990, covers some of these in greater 
detail.   
417 For example, see Lyons, Stephen J., “Leavin’ on a Jet Plane,” 22 August 2005, High Country News, p. A-1. 
What often gets overlooked amid the doomsday scenarios of base closures is that many, if not most 
communities actually end up with more vibrant, diversified economies after the military leaves. See 
“Renaissance: New Jobs, New Uses of Space and Resources, New Life for Former Military Bases,” 2002, Base 
Realignment and Closure Commission, viewed online at www.defenselink.mil/brac/docs/oeabro02.pdf [22 
October 2005]; and Woodward, pp. 60-61. 
188
look at some of the personal accounts of base designation and its accompanying 
displacements shows that this earlier transition is often at least as difficult, if also pursued by 
local boosters. As Baker describes the displacement of local residents in her chronicle of the 
JPG, “It was a sacrifice to the gods of war… for defense of our country, and it was done with 
such ruthless, inexorable haste that the lives of hundreds of families were changed forever in 
less time that it takes to grow a crop of corn”418 (ellipses in original).  
In many cases, the sacrifice was not borne easily. Many recalled the pain of the 
upheaval decades later. In 1990, Elizabeth Curran Keller offered the following memories: 
Some people seem to think house-to-house moving does not bother 
little children, as long as they are with their parents. But I still have painful 
memories of how upset our two small sons were when we were forced to 
move from the farm in Monroe Township in Jefferson County in 1941. Bill 
and Bob were only four and six years, but they were unable to rest night or 
day, for weeks and weeks. It was such a strain on their little bodies and minds. 
So very nervous. It hurts a mother to see her children’s agonizing 
nightmares… We finally learned to like our home in Lovett Township, in 
Jennings County, but it took a long time to adjust. This is where our Mary 
Ann was born, and we have stayed in this big, old house ever since that 
dreadful move in 1941.419 
Although officials in Washington, D.C. had determined by 8 October 1940 that the 
southeastern Indiana location would be the site for the new Army proving ground, no public 
notice was given until two months later – and then residents were given a mere thirty days to 
make plans, pack up, and move out. (Ultimately this 30-day deadline proved to be unrealistic 
and many families did not vacate the area until February 1941.) In several cases, families 
were actually constructing new homes within the eventual JPG boundaries during the fall of 
1940, a misfortune of timing that perhaps crystallized memories even more sharply:  
 
418 Baker, pp. 2-3. 
419 Elizabeth Curran Keller, quoted in Baker, pp. 87-89, from her 7 April 1990 transcript. 
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In the summer of 1940 my parents began work on a new house facing 
the Paper Mill Road. My father and a neighbor, Norman Boggs, dug a 
basement using horses and a hand-guided scoop. As the hole got deeper I 
remember being afraid the horse and scoop would fall backward onto the 
operator, but there were no accidents. The large fieldstone fireplace and 
chimney were done by local master stonemason Paul Hilbert. Although the 
house was not finished (plumbing, etc.), we moved into it in the fall before the 
weather got bad, and before tobacco was ready to be stripped, tobacco being 
the principal ‘money crop.’ Just two weeks after we moved in, a 
representative of the U.S. Government came and announced that this property 
was a part of what would become the Jefferson Proving Ground, and must be 
vacated in 30 days. The Thanksgiving and Christmas holidays were sad 
celebrations, since the entire community was being displaced. So when a farm 
south of Wirt on Sawmill Road (now 400 north) was offered for sale, my 
parents bought it and we moved there in January of 1941, after only six weeks 
in the new house. The Jefferson Proving Ground House, among others, was 
later moved to ‘The Circle,’ designated as Quarters 15, and used as a 
residence for officers and civilian personnel of Jefferson Proving Ground.420 
In some instances there is no need to dig through historical accounts to capture the 
lingering effect and living memory of the 1940-1941 community displacements from the JPG 
site. I met with former resident Louis Munier in 2005, and he generously shared a five-pound 
binder of photos, newsclippings, and other memorabilia he has assembled to document his 
family’s farmstead on the JPG near Big Creek. Though wistful about his family’s loss, “It’s 
kind of sad in a way to see what’s left,” Munier remains clear-eyed about what happened at 
the JPG. When asked if he harbored any interest in returning to his family land when news 
came of base closure in the late 1980s (Munier’s house was heavily bombed), he said no, 
“Our farm – they had all that unexploded [ordnance] out there, plus the depleted uranium. 
Our farm is right there in that hot area.”421 (See Figure 5.2: Former JPG Resident Louis 
Munier.) 
 
420 Nancy P. Raiser, quoted in Baker, pp 82-87, from her 30 May 1990 transcript. 
421 Interview with Louis Munier, Big Oaks National Wildlife Refuge, Madison, Indiana, 14 December 2005. 
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Figure 5.2: Former JPG Resident Louis Munier  
Former JPG resident Louis Munier holding a photo album of his family farmstead that was 
condemned during the creation of the Army’s base. Also pictured: Judy and Ed Schaefer, 
Big Oaks Conservation Society. 14 December 2005. 
 
To this day, the former residents of Marble Corner, a community subsumed by the 
Army’s JPG designation, hold an annual reunion of all families formerly residing on the 
proving ground site. Former members and friends of the vacated Monroe Presbyterian 
Church still get together every August for a visit and reading of the church minutes.422 
The fact that so many families willingly acceded to the Army’s relocation directives 
begs attention to several points. First, there seems to have been a clear perception at the time 
of a national interest that superseded community, family, or individual priorities. Even as 
 
422 Baker, p. 120. 
191
former residents remember the anguish that accompanied their departure from family farms 
and rural communities, there is little in the way of the bitter anti-government backlash that 
often greets even relatively minor federal actions today such as designating critical habitat 
for endangered species habitat, regulating pollution, or limiting motorized access. Indeed, 
even when the United States was not yet at war in Europe or the Pacific in 1940, there was 
little active resistance to the decree to abandon farms, homes, churches, and cemeteries.  
 Admittedly, most residents may also have felt they had no choice but to comply with 
the government’s plans, but such quiet acceptance of profound personal disruptions at the 
hands of government seem difficult to imagine today.423 Whether attributed to changes 
wrought by the civil rights movement, Vietnam-era protests, legislation such as NEPA or the 
Freedom of Information Act, other examples of citizen access or empowerment, or steady 
calls for “small government,” we need to look no further than the reaction to base closure 
proposals to see that a different dynamic now exists between federal authority and public 
action. The application of challenges to federal authority remains inconsistent, however, and 
an invocation of “national security” can still carry a great deal of weight in suppressing 
public objections. Similar appeals to national security emerge when environmental 
conservation goals periodically conflict with military programs. 
Pragmatically, at least, we need to understand how Congress and the Department of 
Defense have managed to close hundreds of military installations since 1988 despite the clear 
opposition, in most cases, of the local populace and elected officials. As I described in 
Chapter Two, the Base Realignment and Closure Commission (BRAC) has played an 
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important role in facilitating many recent base closures through a systematic, (somewhat) 
depoliticized process. How a BRAC closure in Indiana came to be designated a national 
wildlife refuges is the focus of this next section.  
 
The Wildlife Refuge Alternative 
 
In 1988 the BRAC selected the Jefferson Proving Ground for closure, shifting its 
mission to the one million-acre Yuma Proving Ground in Arizona “in response to changing 
global security requirements,” reductions in force structure, and military consolidations “to 
optimize readiness and cost effectiveness.”424 This fits a long-term trend to move military 
activities to ever larger, more remote locations to accommodate changing weapons 
technologies and security concerns. On September 30, 1994, the Army fired its last round at 
the JPG. The environmental impact statement to assess the Jefferson Proving Ground’s 
closure was released that same month and described three primary alternatives: 1) 
encumbered disposal, where new land owners would face restrictions on possible uses due to 
conditions at the site including unexploded ordnance (UXO), depleted uranium, and an active 
air gunnery range; 2) unencumbered disposal, which would identify encumbrances and 
evaluate what could be done to remove them (and thereby lift restrictions on land uses); and 
3) Army retention in “caretaker status,” the equivalent of no action being taken after closure, 
 
423 In fact, where military expansions are currently proposed, such as the Pinon Canyon extension of Fort Carson
in southeastern Colorado, the DOD is meeting with considerable resistance even from long-time military
supporters.
424 Disposal and Reuse, 1995, p. 1-1 and ES-1.  
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with no cleanup and no land transfer out of Army control.425 The environmental analysis also 
highlighted differences between the 50,000 acres north of the historic firing line, which 
received the vast majority of all weapons tests, and 4,000-acre cantonment area south of the 
line, which held the administrative, residential, and manufacturing buildings for the Army’s 
operations.426 (Figure 5.3: Jefferson Proving Ground North and South of Historic Firing 
Line). 
 
Figure 5.3: Jefferson Proving Ground North and South of Historic Firing Line427 
425 Jefferson Proving Ground Final Environmental Impact Statement, September 1995, pp. ES-2 to ES-3. 
426 The area south of the firing line also contained ordnance, but most rounds fired south of the line did not 
contain live charges; interview with Ken Knouf, U.S. Army site manager, Big Oaks National Wildlife Refuge, 
Madison, Indiana, 14 December 2005.  
427 Image from Jefferson Proving Ground Installation Support Management agency website, 
http://www.jpgbrac.com/history/site_description.htm [6 April 2006]. 
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Of the three options presented in its analysis, the Army effectively rendered 
unencumbered disposal north of the firing line impractical as it ruled out a thorough cleanup 
of the lands north of the firing line. A genuine cleanup promised to be excessively costly in 
multiple ways. Simply pinpointing the location of unexploded ordnance promised to cost 
more than $50 million;428 actual cleanup costs would extend far beyond that. As Shulman 
noted in his chronicle of contaminated military sites, “To remove all the bombs, most of 
JPG’s wooded and bombed-out land would have to be stripped down to the level of buried 
ordnance – as deep as thirty feet below the surface – using special armored bulldozers. Aside 
from the issue of where to put the contaminated earth, the job is environmentally devastating 
and almost unthinkable in magnitude.”429 The Army’s own assessment was scarcely more 
optimistic. It described:  
…up to 1.5 million rounds of UXO and up to 7.0 million inert 
projectiles with live fuses or spotting charges scattered across the impact areas 
north of the firing line at JPG. The presence of UXO constitutes a hazard to 
numerous kinds of activities that might occur in the area such as construction, 
intrusive investigation of hazardous waste site contamination, cross-country 
vehicular travel, and most agricultural and silvicultural operations. Removal 
technology to eliminate potential hazards is inadequate for the extent of the 
UXO contamination.430 
Army and FWS managers currently working at the Big Oaks refuge generally agree 
that a complete cleanup of the site remains unrealistic and would effectively require a “strip 
 
428 According to the Jefferson Proving Ground Reuse Plan, August 1994 (Madison, IN: Jefferson Proving
Ground Regional Development Board), p. 73, the Army spent $1,000/acre at the Umatilla Proving Ground for
such locational work.
429 Shulman, p. 6. 
430 FEIS, p. 4-44. 
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mining” operation to remove all contaminated soils and explosive materials.431 A more 
limited restoration effort, however, using magnetometers that identified objects down to two 
feet below the surface proved successful on the southern, less-contaminated portion of the 
JPG, which has now been sold into private ownership (i.e.unencumbered disposal). Some 
FWS officials expressed interest in taking a similar approach of limited cleanup across the 
Big Oaks refuge lands, but the Army has been unresponsive to most non-emergency requests 
for remediation.432 The Memorandum of Agreement between the FWS and Army does not 
bind the DOD to any specific cleanup, stating simply that, “The Army retains liability for all 
unexploded ordnance, environmental remediation and monitoring, and all other 
consequences as a result of Army operations.”433 
With most commercial uses of the JPG ruled out due to the irremediable condition of 
the site, the last thing Indiana officials and local boosters wanted to see was for the bulk of 
the former bombing range to turn into a 50,000-acre patch of off-limits Army blight. Since 
1977, the Indiana Air National Guard has also operated a 1,033-acre air gunnery range in the 
north-central portion of the JPG, which precluded human occupancy across broad safety fans 
 
431 Interviews with Ken Knouf, U.S. Army, and Joe Robb, USFWS Refuge Manager, Big Oaks National 
Wildlife Refuge, 14 December 2005. 
432 Interviews with Joe Robb and Dan Matiotis, Big Oaks National Wildlife Refuge, 14 December 2005. 
433 Memorandum of Agreement between U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Command and Region 3, U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service for Natural Resource Management of the Firing Range of the Jefferson Proving Ground,”
dated 5 May 1997, photocopied from Big Oaks National Wildlife Refuge files. The subsequent permit to lease
the Army’s JPG property to the FWS defers to the terms of the 1997 memorandum; see Department of Army
Permit No. DACA27-4-00-087 for the National Wildlife Refuge at Jefferson Proving Ground, Indiana, signed 5 
July 2000 by Robert J. Krupp, BRAC Team Leader; photocopy from Big Oaks National Wildlife Refuge files, 
Madison, Indiana. 
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within the area at least while active sorties were being flown (the range receives 
approximately 2,100 flights per year). Finally, the Army had a keen interest in diminishing 
its management duties and obligations to the JPG. Streamlining infrastructure and reducing 
installation costs was, after all, the fundamental purpose of the BRAC process. As the 
Army’s current site manager at Big Oaks put it, “BRAC did not mean caretaker [status].”434 
In effect, then, the Army’s analysis of alternatives for the future uses of the majority 
of the Jefferson Proving Ground had but one viable option: encumbered disposal. Several 
environmental groups voiced support for the site’s conversion to a national wildlife refuge, as 
both the public and Army recognized that four decades of military shelling left few other 
appealing choices. The director of the statewide Hoosier Environmental Council raised a 
number of concerns about the site, but ultimately was succinct in his appraisal, “all of the 
lands North of the firing line should become a National Wildlife Refuge.”435 
The president of a local group, Save the Valley, testified at a public hearing, “The 
preservation of JPG as a wildlife refuge offers a unique opportunity for this part of the 
country. By the very nature of past use, much of JPG is actually unsuitable for other uses.”436 
This view was also made apparent in my conversations with citizen volunteers and members 
of the refuge “friends” group, the Big Oaks Conservation Society. When I asked why they 
thought the JPG had become a wildlife refuge they responded, “What else could they do with 
it? There’s no way they could have cleaned it all up.”437 
434 Interview with Ken Knouf, 14 December 2005. 
435 Tim Maloney, quoted in JPG EIS, Appendix H, 1995. 
436 Richard Hill, quoted in JPG EIS, Appendix H, 1995. This fits with the Brownfield logic of conversion 
described earlier in Chapter Three. 
437 Interview with Ed and Judy Schaefer, Big Oaks Conservation Society, Madison, IN, 14 December 2005. 
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The Army did receive public comments advocating for a more traditional 
economic mission for the JPG lands, though none of these effectively addressed the 
actual condition of the place. The three counties whose jurisdiction included the JPG 
developed a more sophisticated plan for economic development that was funded by 
the DOD’s Office of Economic Adjustment. Under the auspices of the Jefferson 
Proving Ground Regional Development Board, the counties generated a proposal that 
combined a wide array of uses for the 50,000 acres north of the firing line. These 
included a large egg production facility and agribusiness park, conference center, 
private ordnance testing, wildlife refuge, veterans cemetery, solid waste landfill, 
prison complex, golf course, telecommunications center, hog production and meat 
packing plant, and solar energy park.438 The International Union of Operating 
Engineers expressed serious interest in a 5,500-acre research and training facility, 
which the redevelopment board pitched as “a unique opportunity to establish [the 
JPG] as the ‘UXO research center’ where most of the nation’s research in this area is 
conducted.”439 The ample supply of UXO on-site may have promised “a source of 
jobs and benefits for years to come,”440 but the redevelopment board’s vision stalled 
as their business plan remained dependent upon federal subsidies that the Army was 
 
438 Jefferson Proving Ground Reuse Plan, (Madison, IN: Jefferson Proving Ground Regional Development 
Board, August 1994), accessed from Archives of Hanover College, Duggan Library. 
439 Jefferson Proving Ground Reuse Plan, p. 7. 
440 Jefferson Proving Ground Reuse Plan, p. 7. 
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not willing to grant, due in part to the lasting liability of developing commercial uses 
on land littered with live munitions.441 
In the end, for many residents of Jefferson, Jennings, and Ripley counties who feared 
economic decline with the closure of the Jefferson Proving Ground, redesignating the site as 
a national wildlife refuge seemed to offer at least an environmentally attractive option for a 
place that might otherwise languish as a brownfield or in the purgatory of federal “caretaker” 
status.  
Comments from the Army and U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service actually echoed this 
uncertainty about how things were going to work out at the Jefferson Proving Ground. With 
commercially intensive uses of the site largely precluded by the prohibitive costs and 
challenges of a thorough cleanup, the future condition of the place seemed relegated to more 
marginal uses. Faced with a diminished Army presence and a suite of major contamination 
problems, the Jefferson Proving Ground seemed destined to become rather peripheral social 
and economic space. The designation of the site as a national wildlife refuge offered a chance 
to restore the site ecologically, as well as an opportunity to recast its reputation and role in 
society. 
 It was thus a very charged ecological setting that the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 
entered when it began to consider the prospects of a military-to-wildlife conversion at the 
JPG. The agency’s cautious public testimony at a 1995 Disposal and Reuse hearing reflected 
some awareness of this: 
The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service continues to be interested in 
protecting the natural resource values of the Jefferson Proving Ground. Over 
 
441 Interview with Ken Knouf, U.S. Army, Big Oaks National Wildlife Refuge, Madison, Indiana, 14 December 
2005. 
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the past two years, federal and state biologists have conducted on-site 
investigations which have reaffirmed our interest. Preliminary findings show 
the proving ground contains several high quality wetlands, woods and streams 
supporting healthy and diverse wildlife populations. The large expanse of 
Eastern deciduous forest habitat and its inherent biological diversity warrants 
consideration as a national wildlife refuge. The Fish and Wildlife Service 
biologists know good habitat when they see it, but until recently we have 
failed to recognize the magnitude of problems associated with unexploded 
ordnance hidden in this landscape.442 
Working with the most ecologically-oriented mandate of any manager of the federal 
public lands,443 the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service to many observers seemed a natural fit to 
take custody of the closing JPG lands and tend to the thousands of acres of forest, prairie, and 
wildlife that were flourishing there. The agency employs only a handful of contaminants 
biologists, however, so it was understandably wary of adding a unit to the National Wildlife 
Refuge System that would simply drain its chronically underfunded coffers with cleanup 
liabilities – a situation that it already knew too well from the Crab Orchard NWR’s lingering 
military hazards and ongoing industrial impacts (see Chapter One).444 
442 Mike Marxen, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service Upper Midwest Region representative, quoted in JPG EIS, 
Appendix H, 1995. 
443 Fischman, Robert L., The National Wildlife Refuges: Coordinating a System Through Law (Washington, 
D.C.: Island Press, 2003), p. 9; see also Meretsky, Vicky J., Robert L. Fischman, James R. Karr, Daniel M. 
Ashe, J. Michael Scott, Reed F. Noss, and Richard L. Schroeder, “New Directions in Conservation for the 
National Wildlife Refuge System,” BioScience 56(2)(February 2006): 135-143. 
444 Interview with Mark Sattelberg, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service contaminants biologist, 20 July 2004, Rocky 
Flats, Colorado. See also Memorandum Regarding Proposed Draft Legislation and Transfer of Jefferson 
Proving Ground, from Thomas C. Jacobs, U.S. Department of the Interior, Office of the Solicitor to William F. 
Hartwig, Regional Director, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, 4 March 1998, which references legal problems 
related to remediation of military contaminants at Crab Orchard. Similar concerns were raised by several 
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Science Steps In 
 
Although economic, safety, and aesthetic reasons for military-to-wildlife conversions 
are often those most salable to elected officials and a skeptical public, scientific claims of 
protecting ecological attributes and biological diversity often carry the day in behind-the-
scenes legal maneuvering (such as invoking the Endangered Species Act) and winning 
acceptance from the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service. When M2W conversions are framed as a 
means to conserve rare natural resources such as wildlife or threatened habitat, as they 
typically are, the Fish and Wildlife Service is usually the first ally summoned from the ranks 
of the federal government – and in fact has a legal charge to recover threatened and 
endangered species. We saw this in the previous chapter when bald eagles were discovered 
roosting at the Rocky Mountain Arsenal. Here at the Jefferson Proving Ground, as well, the 
call to protect biodiversity brought the agency’s wildlife biologists on site at an early stage to 
assess its potential as a national wildlife refuge.  
Science plays multiple roles in military reclassifications generally as these rely upon 
scientific expertise to evaluate the hazards present at conversion locations, as well as for 
guidance on any subsequent mitigation or restoration activities. Depending upon their 
interests or expertise, the scientists involved in evaluating a site for its future uses may 
highlight one set of qualities above several others. This comes out in the comment quoted 
 
officials at the FWS’s 1998 meeting to consider the impacts of military acquisitions, see “Minutes of FWS 
National Meeting On Military Base Closure Acquisition Issues,” Denver, CO, 17 April 1998, photocopy from 
Big Oaks National Wildlife Refuge files. 
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above where the Fish and Wildlife Service spokesman acknowledges that his agency’s 
biologists can identify good habitat at a glance but may fail to recognize the hazards of 
unexploded ordnance. A contaminants biologist or ecotoxicologist might see quite the 
reverse: tons of contamination in stark relief against a dim matrix of habitat. As Beck 
demonstrates with his theory of the “risk society,” there is also, invariably, incomplete 
scientific knowledge and uncertainty when dealing with complex military settings and their 
re-productions.445 
Two studies completed in the early 1990s increased the Fish and Wildlife Service’s 
interest in assuming control over the JPG site. A 1993 biological inventory highlighted the 
array of rare plants and habitats that existed at the Proving Ground and was described by one 
Army manager as the document that kick-started serious thinking about converting the base 
into a national wildlife refuge.446 In 1994, FWS biologists published a fish and wildlife 
management plan that detailed “a diverse wildlife community” on site, but also cautioned 
that the agency still had limited knowledge of the JPG’s unexploded ordnance and other 
safety concerns.447 
445 See Beck, Ulrich, “Risk Society and the Provident State,” pp. 27-43, In: Lash, Scott, Bronislaw Szerszynski 
and Brian Wynne, eds., Risk, Environment and Modernity: Towards a New Ecology (London: Sage 
Publications, 1996). I engage ideas of risk society more fully later in Chapter Five. 
446 See Hedge, Cloyce L., Michael A. Homoya, Rodger L. Hedge, and Colleen Baker, An Inventory of Special 
Plants and Natural Areas within the U.S. Army Jefferson Proving Ground in Southeastern Indiana, March 
1993, noted for its importance by Ken Knouf, U.S. Army, author interview at Big Oaks National Wildlife 
Refuge, Madison, Indiana, 14 December 2005. 
447 Pruitt, Lori, Scott Pruitt, and Michael Litwin, under supervision of David C. Hudak, Jefferson Proving 
Ground Fish and Wildlife Management Plan, (Bloomington, IN: U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, September 
1994); quote is from p. 19. 
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By March 1994, the Fish and Wildlife Service approved a Preliminary Project 
Proposal to accept a no-cost land transfer from the Army and create a national wildlife refuge 
at the Jefferson Proving Ground. The proposal envisioned a 53,000-acre refuge for which the 
Army retained “permanent liability for all contaminants or hazardous wastes and unexploded 
ordnance, and any remediation costs required would be borne by the Army.”448 The agency’s 
subsequent concerns surrounding the extent of these hazards and the Army’s long-term 
liability nearly scuttled the JPG’s conversion to a refuge. As a 1995 FWS memo to the Army 
explained,  
The Service has spent the last month examining the situation at JPG, 
talking with solicitors, getting comments on the Draft Concept Plan from the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), tracking base closure trends 
nationwide, and contacting others involved in base closures. We have 
concluded that we cannot proceed with an interagency agreement on the terms 
and conditions of the transfer. Based on advice from the Department of the 
Interior Field Solicitor’s Office, we do not believe that an interagency 
agreement would be an adequate document to define a long-term relationship 
involving significant financial and liability commitments.449 
The memo went on to detail four points of concern: 1) long-term liability for UXO should 
remain with the Army; 2) the Army’s cleanup plan for UXO was vague and insufficient; 3) 
there was no comprehensive data on UXO and contaminants at the JPG; and 4) the Army 
 
448 Memorandum from Deputy Director, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service to U.S. FWS Regional Director for 
Region 3, “Preliminary Project Proposal to Establish the Jefferson Proving Ground National Wildlife Refuge,” 
3 March 1994. 
449 Hartwig, William F., Regional Director, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, memo to Paul W. Johnson, Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of the Army, 19 April 1995; photocopy from Big Oaks National Wildlife Refuge files. 
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needed to commit to funding and staffing for FWS transition teams and for long-term safety 
costs.450 
The Army acknowledged some of these concerns and in 1997 the two agencies signed 
a three-year Memorandum of Agreement by which the Army retained liability and 
responsibility for the JPG in a “caretaker” status, while the FWS managed the property in an 
“ecosystem-based manner.”451 The three-year arrangement was designed explicitly as a test 
period for both parties to assess prospective longer-term settlements for the JPG. It also 
delimited the responsibilities for each agency and committed $750,000 of Army funding to 
cover costs of the FWS salaries and expenses dedicated to JPG management. 
 While the 1997 Memorandum of Agreement addressed, at least in the short-term, 
questions of liability and funding for the JPG’s management, the Army largely ignored 
questions relating to data or cleanup of UXO. These proved to be pivotal issues as the Fish 
and Wildlife Service considered the terms by which it would be willing to take lasting 
responsibility for the Jefferson Proving Ground as a new national wildlife refuge. The FWS 
appreciated the conservation potential of the JPG and considered it an important potential 
addition to the region’s refuge holdings:  
The large undeveloped blocks of forest and grassland at JPG support 
161 bird species, many of which are neotropical migratory birds. JPG has 
been designated as a GLOBALLY IMPORTANT BIRD AREA in American 
Bird Conservancy’s United States Important Bird Areas Program. JPG has 
extremely high plant and animal biodiversity and supports one of the highest 
 
450 Hartwig memo to Johnson, 1995. 
451 “Memorandum of Agreement Between U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Command and Region 3, U.S. Fish 
and Wildlife Service for Management of the Firing Range of Jefferson Proving Ground,” 5 May 1997, signed 
by John E. Longhouser, U.S. Army, and William F. Hartwig, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service; photocopy from 
Big Oaks National Wildlife Refuge files. 
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known densities of maternity colonies of the Federally endangered Indiana bat 
(Myotis sodalis)”452 (emphasis in original). 
 
But the agency still recognized that the entire site was contaminated with UXO and that the 
Army had disavowed any commitment to a thorough cleanup.  
 In an effort to create a more stable resolution that could succeed the three-year 
Memorandum of Agreement, the Fish and Wildlife Service prepared a bill that would codify 
the terms of Army liability and FWS management at the JPG. Indiana Congressman Lee 
Hamilton was keen to introduce the bill before he retired from office at the end of 1998, but 
attorneys overseeing the legislation on behalf of the Fish and Wildlife Service insisted on 
language that would unambiguously clear the agency and the Department of the Interior from 
liability for hazardous wastes and UXO. In fact, the model the lawyers from the Solicitor’s 
Office pointed to was the 1992 legislation that created the Rocky Mountain Arsenal National 
Wildlife Refuge: “Is the FWS aware of the legislation transferring the Rocky Mountain 
Arsenal? Apparently in this legislation the land is being managed as a refuge, but no transfer 
will take place until after the cleanup is complete. Both this [regional solicitor’s] office and 
Washington strongly recommend that the FWS review this option.”453 
Still smarting from the multi-billion dollar remediation at the Rocky Mountain 
Arsenal, however, the U.S. Army balked at the prospect of another cleanup and restoration 
 
452 Memorandum from William Hartwig, Regional Director, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service Region 3 to [Jamie 
Rappaport Clark] Director, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, “Legislation to Transfer Jefferson Proving Ground 
to the Service,” 6 March 1998. 
453 Memorandum regarding Proposed Draft Legislation and Transfer of Jefferson Proving Ground, from 
Thomas C. Jacobs, U.S. Department of the Interior, Office of the Solicitor to William F. Hartwig, Regional 
Director, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, 4 March 1998. 
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project with a price estimate reaching upwards of $16 billion.454 As one Army official at Big 
Oaks commented, “Why in hell would you spend $16 billion on land that you could probably 
buy for $1,000, $2,000 dollars an acre?”455 The legislative push subsequently faltered as 
neither party could come to terms over how to resolve the question of cleanup.456 
With the expiration of the Memorandum of Agreement looming at the end of Fiscal 
Year 1999 (30 September 30 1999), a move by the Indiana Air National Guard shifted the 
uneasy balance that existed between the Army and the Fish and Wildlife Service for the long-
term management of the JPG. In the spring of 1999, Indiana Air National Guard officials 
notified both agencies and the region’s new Congressman, Baron Hill, that “smart bomb” 
technologies and the continued need for air support in Kosovo and Iraq spurred a need for a 
larger impact area. The Air National Guard proposed taking over the entire 51,000 acres 
north of the firing line, with a possible accommodation for a national wildlife refuge in 
10,000 acres across the northernmost tier of land.457 
454 FWS employees familiar with both locations contend that the cleanup at the Arsenal is considerably simpler 
than that posed by the explosives at Big Oaks (e.g. interviews with Matiatos, 2004; Alan Anderson, Refuge 
Operations Specialist, Upper Mississippi River National Wildlife and Fish Refuge, Lost Mound Unit, 30 May 
2006). The containment of the hazards at RMA involves essentially a massive landfilling operation – a task that 
is familiar to most municipal engineers, while even a modest cleanup of the UXO at Big Oaks would require 
expertise in identifying and handling explosives and depleted uranium. 
455 Interview with Ken Knouf, U.S. Army site manager, Big Oaks National Wildlife Refuge, 14 December 2005. 
456 Interviews with Ken Knouf, U.S. Army, and Joe Robb, USFWS Refuge Manager, Big Oaks National 
Wildlife Refuge, 14 December 2005. 
457 See Robert J. Mitchell, Indiana Air National Guard, letter to Representative Baron Hill, 12 May 1999; 
Weslander, Eric, “Nature Refuge or Bomb Range? Indiana Wildlife Plan May be Drastically Scaled Back,” 
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The emergent interest by the Indiana Air National Guard seemed to catch the Fish and 
Wildlife Service off-guard. The FWS had generally assumed that with the JPG’s closure the 
Air Guard would soon abandon its 1,000-acre bombing range near the center of the base.458 
Suddenly the expectant wildlife refuge managers found themselves in a bidding war against a 
vastly expanded gunnery range, a change that cost them precious leverage in demanding a 
high standard of cleanup from the Army. As one FWS employee commented at the time, 
“We’re not going to stand in the way of national defense.”459 
When the three-year funding commitment ended from the Army in October 1999, the 
Fish and Wildlife Service found itself both without a refuge at the JPG site and without any 
paid staff to manage the place.460 Environmental groups issued urgent appeals to their 
members to contact the Army and elected officials in support of the JPG’s military-to-
wildlife conversion – “Support the Jefferson Proving Ground National Wildlife Refuge! 
Please don’t let this once in a lifetime conservation opportunity to protect the wildlife and 
 
Louisville Courier-Journal, 14 August 1999, 1A; Carroll, James V., “Guard Wants to Expand JPG’s Bombing 
Range,” Madison Courier, 17 August 1999, 1A; photocopied from Big Oaks National Wildlife Refuge files.  
458 See, for example, 27 February 1998 draft of FWS proposed legislation for “Old Timbers National Wildlife 
Refuge Act of 1998,” sec. 2(h); and Weslander, 14 August 1999. Photocopied from Big Oaks National Wildlife 
Refuge files. 
459 Joe Robb, quoted in Weslander, 14 August 1999. 
460 See Weslander, Eric, “Wildlife Service Suspends Work at Proving Ground,” Louisville (KY) Courier-
Journal, 29 September 1999. 
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natural areas at JPG be lost”461 – but it had become clear to supporters of a refuge at the 
Proving Ground that the Army had final say over the site’s destiny.  
The increased public attention and concern that greeted the Air National Guard’s 
proposal to take over the JPG site did, in fact, lead Congressman Hill to try to mediate a 
solution between the Army, Air Guard, and FWS. Facing the very real prospect of losing a 
50,000-acre “gift” rich with biological diversity, the Fish and Wildlife Service struggled to 
make a suitable case for itself. As one FWS employee explained to me, if his agency 
demanded too high a standard for cleanup at the JPG, the Army could simply accept the 
Indiana Air National Guard’s proposal and the refuge effort would fail.462 Concerned that it 
might lose out completely on the JPG lands, the Fish and Wildlife Service also outlined a 
proposal for joint management of the entire site with the Indiana Air National Guard – even 
as some FWS officials expressed skepticism that the arrangement would be considered a 
“compatible” use of the refuge.463 
461 “National Wildlife Refuge Proposal for Jefferson Proving Ground in Trouble!” Hoosier Environmental 
Council action alert, n/d, photocopy from Big Oaks National Wildlife Refuge files, original printed from 
website, www.enviroweb.org/hecweb/alerts/jpgAlert.htm [28 April 1999]. 
462 Interview with Jason Lewis, U.S. FWS wildlife biologist, Big Oaks National Wildlife Refuge, Madison, IN, 
15 December 2005. 
463 See Weslander, 29 September 1999; “Joint Management of Jefferson Proving Ground as Old Timbers 
Overlay NWR and as Air National Guard Jefferson Range,” undated [ca. 1999] U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 
document, photocopy from Big Oaks National Wildlife Refuge files. The Indiana Air National Guard had 
drafted its own proposal that would establish itself as the sole lessee of the JPG lands; see “Proposed 
Agreeement Between the Air National Guard and the U.S. Army for Operations at the Jefferson Proving 
Ground,” undated [ca. 1999] Indiana Air National Guard document, photocopy from Big Oaks National 
Wildlife Refuge files. 
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Overlay Refuge Status 
 
The solution that Congressman Hill finally brokered between the Army, Fish and 
Wildlife Service, and Air National Guard managed to finesse the lack of certainty regarding 
cleanup, liability, and long-term land use at the JPG. The parties simply opted to postpone 
any transfer of real property from the Department of Defense to the Fish and Wildlife 
Service. With the property remaining in DOD hands, the decision to remove UXO or treat 
other contaminants on-site similarly remained up to the U.S. Army. Unlike the Rocky 
Mountain Arsenal (described above and in Chapter Three), where property transfer is taking 
place once the Army and Shell complete the site’s remediation to the satisfaction of the 
EPA’s CERCLA criteria and the State’s RCRA standards, at the Jefferson Proving Ground 
neither property transfer nor cleanup of unexploded ordnance is actively scheduled to occur.  
This approach of creating an “overlay” refuge, where wildlife, habitat, and the 
visiting public are managed by the Fish and Wildlife Service but land title remains with the 
Department of Defense, is now being applied to approximately 20 percent of all M2W 
sites.464 Many of these locations are characterized by having extensive problems of 
contamination and no dedicated fund or legal commitment to assure full cleanups. In effect, 
an overlay arranges for a shift in nomenclature at a site without the transfer of legal 
responsibility for its conditions.465 The Jefferson Proving Ground is thus a closed Army 
 
464 Personal communication with Barbara Wyman, Realty Division program manager for base conversion lands, 
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Washington, D.C., 6 October 2003. See Table 1.2. 
465 This type of overlay should not be confused with what Fischman, p. 22, calls “overlay systems.” Fischman 
includes Wilderness, Wild and Scenic Rivers, and Nat’l Monument designations on national wildlife refuge 
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facility, disposed as directed by the 1995 BRAC, and yet the site remains technically under 
Army ownership as it is leased to be staffed and managed through 2025 by the Fish and 
Wildlife Service.466 
Overlay arrangements provide a convenient combination of instant “greening” for 
contaminated military sites while little to no cleanup or ecological restoration necessarily 
occurs. The National Wildlife Refuge System is the least visited of the four major categories 
of federal public lands, but where national wildlife refuges exist they are widely considered 
an amenity. Despite lingering problems with secondary uses of refuges (see Chapter Three), 
these lands are also in most cases the least controversial type of federal land as they have a 
dominant use – the conservation of wildlife – that is widely supported by the American 
public, yet do not come with the excess of commercialization (or crowds) that can plague the 
national parks.467 Consequently, the shift in names that usually accompanies M2W 
conversions can produce an almost immediate change in the public’s perception of a place 
and its character, from one that resonates with danger or destruction (e.g. “proving ground,” 
“arsenal,” “depot,” etc.) to one that conjures images of sanctuary and congregations of 
wildlife. 
 
lands in this category, but in each of these cases property claims remain unchanged (i.e. in the hands of the U.S. 
Fish and Wildlife Service) and the overlay refers only to additional layers of management restrictions. 
466 The terms of the overlay directed specified an initial lease period of twenty-five years with renewable ten 
year periods thereafter. Either the Army or FWS can terminate the agreement at any time with 180 days’ notice. 
See Department of the Army Permit No. DACA27-4-00-087, 2000. 
467 The decades-long dispute about opening the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge to oil development is one 
obvious exception to this characterization.  
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This public shift in perception can occur quite rapidly, especially for people with no 
prior knowledge of the site. Even at places such as the Big Oaks refuge where the local 
public holds more persistently to the former military name – virtually everyone I met in 
Indiana still referred to the refuge as either “the proving ground” or “JPG” – the knowledge 
that the facility is now managed as a wildlife refuge encourages the impression of a kinder, 
gentler landscape.  
The overlay arrangement also retains the Department of Defense in place as the 
institution bearing ultimate responsibility for its conditions. As a result, the Fish and Wildlife 
Service decreases its likelihood of getting burned financially by accepting military lands that 
come with major cleanups. Of course simply managing new refuges as a result of M2W 
conversions raises the budgetary needs of the USFWS, so these new lands can still strain 
perennially thin budgets for the agency. 
Beyond the more apparent effects on a site’s reputation and management that overlay 
status brings, this category also points to the hybrid nature of many M2W lands. These lands 
can no longer be cleanly separated as either/only spaces of militarism or spaces of wildlife 
conservation. Through a mix of natural, social, and technological processes, these conversion 
sites develop into altogether new geographies that retain qualities from multiple categories.468 
Such hybrid geographies have come increasingly into view as scholars dismantle or 
 
468 Latour contends that such interrelated networks of natural, social, and technological systems have always 
existed and that our failure to properly recognize them as facilitated lasting dichotomies such as that commonly 
ascribed between nature and society. See Latour, Bruno, We Have Never Been Modern (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1993).  
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reassemble traditional categories and apply new theoretical perspectives to questions of 
nature and society.469 
While Latour contends that nature and society were never extricable, the splintering 
effects of Cartesian reason continue to dominate popular depictions of landscapes as either 
natural or social places.470 On this common view, for example, we find wilderness – where 
the impacts of humanity are considered negligible – cast against the entirely constructed 
landscapes of cities.471 Or more to the point, we find natural wildlife refuges contrasted 
against artifactual military bases. The overlay designation that drapes wildlife refuges 
nominally over closed military bases and their continued Department of Defense ownership 
fractures this traditional separation and ought to highlight, instead, the complex qualities of 
M2W lands more generally.  
In the case of the Big Oaks National Wildlife Refuge, the landscape is still very much 
a work in progress as a variety of practices remain active on the site. I turn next to a brief 
examination of some of these activities and how they interact and contend with each other to 
continue to produce a new kind of place. 
 
469 Whatmore, Sarah, Hybrid Geographies: Natures, Cultures, Spaces (London: Sage Publications, 2002); see 
also forum in Antipode, Volume 37, Number 4, September 2005, pp. 818-845.
470 See, for example, Demeritt, David, “Social Theory and the Reconstruction of Science and Geography,” 
Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 21(1996): 484-503. 
471 See, for example, Cronon, William, “The Trouble with Wilderness; or, Getting Back to the Wrong Nature,” 
in: Cronon, W. (ed.) Uncommon Ground: Toward Reinventing Nature, (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 
1995), pp. 69-90. 
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Current Practices at the Big Oaks National Wildlife Refuge 
 
My interest in M2W conversions springs largely from asking how and why such 
changes are occurring; at many sites the question “When?” can also offer fruitful context for 
the transitions. For example, in looking at when the Jefferson Proving Ground became the 
Big Oaks National Wildlife Refuge, there is September 30, 1994, the date when the last 
round was fired at the base and the area became, through a lack of other activities, a de facto 
wildlife refuge. More formally, we could choose 1 July 2000 when the Army’s lease to the 
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service officially began and the two parties confirmed their 
administrative agreement to create an overlay refuge.472 Or the Refuge’s dedication 
ceremony on 8 July 2000 might signal the date the new refuge finally came of age.473 Of 
course, that day in turn depended upon Congressional and Presidential approval of the 1988 
BRAC recommendations that closed the JPG. Policy devotees might note that management 
as a refuge was signaled and included in the environmental analysis of the closure of the 
Jefferson Proving Ground in 1995.474 We might anticipate the future and insist that the refuge 
will come to exist only when transfer of land title from Army to FWS occurs, or perhaps 
when a full cleanup of Army munitions has been completed. The point is that the exact shift 
from Jefferson Proving Ground to Big Oaks National Wildlife Refuge is rather blurry. What 
 
472 See Department of the Army Permit No. DACA27-4-00-087, 2000. 
473 “Former Bombing Range Becomes National Wildlife Refuge,” U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, reprint from 
July/August 2000 issue of Fish and Wildlife News, online at http://news.fws.gov/articles/FormerBombing.html 
[3 December 2002]. 
474 Jefferson Proving Ground Final Environmental Impact Statement, September 1995, viewed online at 
www.jpg.army.mil/documents/site_docs2.htm [20 October 2005]. 
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seems like a discrete historical event actually builds from a number of related actions and 
diverse processes.  
In terms of the actual practices occurring at the site, however, if M2W conversions 
are more than symbolic we should expect to find certain distinctions between what occurred 
here as an Army proving ground and what occurs as a national wildlife refuge. By examining 
more closely some of the principal activities that still take place at the Big Oaks National 
Wildlife Refuge – hunting, bird watching, and fire management – I will illuminate what the 
conversion means not just as a legal measure, political calculation, or historical unfolding, 




Residents of the lands surrounding the Jefferson Proving Ground have long used the 
site for a variety of activities. As I described earlier, some of these such as agricultural 
production pre-dated the Army’s control of the site in 1941, while others were incorporated 
into the Army’s management of its facility. By 1995, when the Army completed its active 
operations at the JPG, approximately 20,000 visitors were entering the premises each year for 
some form of recreation.475 With more than four decades of guidance under Army 
management and a long history prior to that, hunting at the time of conversion had become 
established as the single most popular attraction to the Jefferson Proving Ground.476 
475 JPG Disposal and Reuse 1995, p. 16. 
476 Interviews with Ken Knouf, U.S. Army, and Joe Robb, USFWS Refuge Manager, Big Oaks National 
Wildlife Refuge, 14 December 2005.  
214
The same is now true for the Big Oaks National Wildlife Refuge. Each fall some 
1,400 deer hunters take 500-600 animals for food and/or trophies. The Army also opened the 
JPG to a spring turkey hunt in 1982 and that tradition has continued ever since.477 (The 
spring turkey hunt has grown increasingly popular under FWS management, as it now 
features a “youth hunt” as well. There is also a less popular mid-August-November hunting 
season for squirrels.478) Refuge officials estimate that hunting now represents the majority 
share of the annual use at Big Oaks, with up to 420 hunters coming in a single day during the 
peak of the deer season.479 Fishing also attracts visitors seasonally to Old Timbers Lake in 
the northeast corner of the refuge, but at a much lower level – the FWS maintains a limit of 
25 boats on the lake per day to preserve a high quality experience for anglers (bank fishing is 
unrestricted). (See Figure 5.4: Public Use Map of Big Oaks NWR.) 
 Deer hunting was a well-established activity in the rural farmlands of southeastern 
Indiana prior to the designation of the Jefferson Proving Ground, but after the Army claimed 
the base in 1940 it took more than a decade for it to offer a public hunting program on-site. 
This is not to say that hunting did not occur within the JPG until it was formally opened to 
the public. Poaching was a low-level but persistent issue, and Army insiders were commonly  
 
477 Pruitt, Pruitt, and Litwin, p. 24. 
478 JPG Disposal and Reuse 1995, p. 16; Interviews with Ken Knouf, U.S. Army, and Joe Robb, USFWS 
Refuge Manager, Big Oaks National Wildlife Refuge, 14 December 2005; see also, Big Oaks NWR General 
Squirrel Hunt Information, available online at http://www.fws.gov/midwest/BigOaks/squirrel.htm [14 March 
2006]. 
479 Interview with Dan Matiatos, Big Oaks National Wildlife refuge operations specialist, 14 December 2005. 
Deer hunters account for approximately 5,000 visitor days on the refuge, as most hunters spend multiple days 
on site before filling their tags or quitting.  
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Figure 5.4: Public Use Map of Big Oaks NWR480 
granted hunting privileges for deer within the JPG boundaries.481 Beginning in 1953, the 
Army began coordinating public hunting seasons with the Indiana Department of Natural 
 
480 Map source: “Big Oaks National Wildlife Refuge, Map & Regulations,” (Madison, IN: U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service, Big Oaks NWR, n/d [ca. 2004]).
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Resources and nearby residents embraced the chance to enter the restricted area where deer 
population density had increased substantially over the surrounding lands.482 
Although deer appear to be fenced into the Big Oaks refuge by nearly fifty miles of 
chainlink barrier around the perimeter, in fact they and most other animals can move fairly 
easily along creek corridors and other breaches in the fencing to graze on the surrounding 
farmlands. Even with its obvious gaps, the site’s perimeter fence has offered a form of 
habitat security that has limited hunting pressure relative to the surrounding lands (Figure 
5.5: Break in Perimeter Fence at Big Oaks National Wildlife Refuge). 
In order to manage the annual influx of hunters, the Army divided the JPG into 
discrete hunting units. State game officials then offered permits to hunters for specific units. 
This same approach using the same units is used by the FWS today. Hunters need to check in 
at the refuge office and follow the same routine as every other visitor: watching the safety 
video and signing the hold-harmless waiver. Once cleared, however, and unlike other visitors 
who are only allowed unaccompanied into the northeastern corner of the refuge (the area 
including and surrounding Old Timbers Lake), hunters may roam unescorted across their 
assigned units. If a wounded deer flees the unit assigned to the hunter who shot the animal, 
the FWS can either extend permission to pursue the animal into the adjacent unit, accompany 
the hunter to help track the animal, or if neighboring units are considered too dangerous to 
enter, require the hunter to abandon the chase.483 
481 According to my interviews with Ken Knouf, U.S. Army, and Joe Robb, USFWS Refuge Manager, Big Oaks 
National Wildlife Refuge, 14 December 2005. 
482 Pruitt, Pruitt, and Litwin, p. 27. 
483 Interview with Joe Robb, 14 December 2005. 
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Figure 5.5: Break in Perimeter Fence at Big Oaks National Wildlife Refuge 
Despite the widespread contamination of the refuge by unexploded ordnance, in five 
decades of managed hunting at the site no visitor has been injured by an encounter with UXO 
(there have been other hunting-related accidents and lost hunters sometimes require search 
and rescue efforts – as of 2005, hunters are now required to carry a compass).484 A number of 
JPG/Big Oaks visitors have encountered UXO, however, and the site’s current managers 
expect that any UXO-related accident involving visitors or refuge staff would spur an 
immediate closure of the site for any kind of public use.485 Considering this risk – and the 
 
484 Interviews with Ken Knouf, U.S. Army, and Joe Robb, USFWS Refuge Manager, Big Oaks National 
Wildlife Refuge, 14 December 2005; see also p. 16 of draft refuge concept plan for FWS management of JPG, 
photocopy from Big Oaks NWR files. 
485 Interviews with Ken Knouf, Army site manager, and Joe Robb, FWS refuge manager, Big Oaks NWR, 14
December 2005.
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chronic worry expressed by refuge personnel – we might ask why hunters, in particular, are 
granted such relative freedom to walk unescorted across refuge lands that have not been 
cleaned of Army munitions? 
The draft refuge concept plan for the Big Oaks refuge acknowledges some of these 
risks as follows, “One of the more difficult aspects of this plan [to manage the JPG as a 
wildlife refuge] is the conflict between public access to control the ever increasing 
population of white-tailed deer and the safety measures required because of UXO. 
Continuation of the deer hunt is considered essential because of the potential for 
overpopulation if deer are not harvested.”486 
With the deer hunt representing the single largest public activity on the refuge and an 
important outreach opportunity for the new refuge, the rationale for maintaining the hunt in 
its current condition is obviously not built upon ecological considerations alone. Perhaps 
what ought to come as a surprise is not that the FWS allows hunting to continue as it does – 
regulated hunting, wildlife conservation, and the National Wildlife Refuge System share a 
long and intertwined history in the United States, after all – but rather that the continuation of 
the hunt and its associated exposure of hunters to UXO has not precipitated a stronger call to 
clean up the JPG’s military hazards. Instead, in what managers grimly hope is not a faulty 
reliance upon inductive inference, the past use of the JPG/Big Oaks site for hunting has 
established a sense of security that on-going hunts will continue to be safe even with hunters 
side-stepping unexploded ordnance.  
 
Bird Watching  
 
486 Draft refuge concept plan, p. 12. 
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Not all refuge visitors interested in the wildlife at Big Oaks are carrying shotguns or 
rifles. Some arrive with binoculars to observe songbirds and raptors, or audio devices to 
attract them. If hunting was the activity that effectively established a significant public use of 
the JPG under Army management, since the base’s conversion to a wildlife refuge 
birdwatchers have added a significant second constituency to the site. (Even where these 
constituencies overlap, they are often separated in time as hunting is more restricted by 
season and by daylight hours than birdwatching.)  
If the leadership in the refuge’s citizen support group, the Big Oaks Conservation 
Society, is any indication, birdwatchers may now constitute the most active public interface 
with the refuge. Visiting birders come seasonally to hit songbird migrations, at odd hours to 
catch crepuscular activity, or with short notice when sightings of rare birds promise to fill out 
the devotees’ annual or life lists. The fact that several of the current FWS staff are avid 
birders themselves (a common trait in FWS employees I’ve met) no doubt serves to 
encourage local interest in birding and means that expert guides are easy to find at Big Oaks.  
The JPG was already known as a haven for birds under Army management and 
biological assessments of the base pre-conversion confirmed that more than 100 species used 
the base during breeding season alone.487 With the turn to FWS management at the site, 
birdwatching has been more explicitly identified as a priority activity. Birding now matches 
the managing agency’s mission much more closely at the site than it has in the past, but local 
birding events such as the Hanover-Madison Christmas count and “Big May Day Count” 
 
487 Pruitt, Pruitt, and Litwin, pp. 22-23. 
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have included the JPG since 1980-1981.488 One difference now that the JPG is a designated 
wildlife refuge is that these same birding events now count Big Oaks observations separately 
from those made off-site. The Big Oaks refuge, at least among avid birders, has become a 
target destination. Birders are also now invited onto the refuge specifically to participate in 
the two popular single-day counts, rather than earlier events when birders simply 
incorporated the JPG into a larger bird counting event. (For the record, the Big Oaks’ 
Christmas Bird Count identified a best of 67 species in 2001 and the May Day event has set a 
mark of 97 species.489) Every June, refuge staff conduct a breeding bird survey as a sample of 
overall bird diversity.490 Public birding programs such as the one-day counts are 
complemented by ornithological studies conducted at Big Oaks, including FWS-directed 
studies on Henslow’s sparrow populations and forest and grassland bird productivity, as well 
as a cerulean warbler study led by a Ball State University biology professor.491 
Despite its growing appeal, birdwatching at the refuge comes with its obstacles. 
Birders must be personally escorted by refuge personnel if they wish to visit anywhere but 
the northeastern corner (approximately 5,000 acres) of the refuge or come at times, such as 
pre-dawn, when birds are notoriously active but the refuge is not yet open to the public. In 
fact, the refuge is only open to the public on Mondays, Fridays, and the second and fourth 
Saturdays of each month. The schedule is constrained by limited finances as well as by the 
need to close a large portion of the refuge as a “safety fan” during aerial bombing runs 
conducted by the Indiana Air National Guard at its base near the center of the refuge.  
 
488 Pruitt, Pruitt, and Litwin, p. 23. 
489 Big Oaks NWR Birds, viewed online at http://www.fws.gov/midwest/BigOaks/bird.htm [14 March 2006]. 
490 Big Oaks NWR Birds, viewed online at http://www.fws.gov/midwest/BigOaks/bird.htm [14 March 2006]. 
491 Big Oaks NWR Birds, viewed online at http://www.fws.gov/midwest/BigOaks/bird.htm [14 March 2006]. 
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Limited visitor services may also marginalize the refuge’s ability to attract passers-by 
or birders chasing spontaneous sightings, as there is currently no visitor’s center. The FWS 
aspires to build a visitor’s center near the northeast corner of the refuge, but in the meantime 
rents a building for its “visitor contact office” from the local developer who bought all the 
land and property south of the firing line (Figure 5.6: Big Oaks National Wildlife Refuge 




In a 1998 intra-agency briefing statement prepared for the director of the U.S. Fish 
and Wildlife Service, the Jefferson Proving Ground was described as “one of the largest 
contiguous blocks of eastern deciduous forest remaining in the states of Illinois, Indiana, and 
Ohio.”492 Similar portraits of the JPG/Big Oaks site surface frequently in promotions of the 
refuge and have been buoyed by satellite images that show the forested block of the refuge 
 
492 Briefing Statement on “Legislation to Transfer Jefferson Proving Ground to the Service,” prepared for 
Director, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, 3 March 1998, photocopy from Big Oaks National Wildlife Refuge 
files.  
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Figure 5.6: Big Oaks National Wildlife Refuge Visitor Contact Office 
 
standing in clear relief against mottled fragments of agricultural lands and forest patches 
(Figure 5.7: Satellite Images of Big Oaks National Wildlife Refuge).493 
Closer inspection of the site (or its aerial photos), however, reveals that it contains a 
more diverse array of conditions than the depiction of a vast tract of forest suggests. In the 
sixty years since the Army fenced the JPG away from its agricultural Indiana surroundings, 
trees have made steady progress in reclaiming large swaths of farmland. In order to gauge the 
accuracy of their many munitions tests, though, the Army frequently set fires to keep impact 
zones clear of forest cover. Other blazes ignited from the explosions themselves. As a result, 
nearly ten percent or approximately 5,000 acres of the JPG has been classified as “grassland” 
 
493 See, for example, Meretsky, Vicky J., Robert L. Fischman, James R. Karr, Daniel M. Ashe, J. Michael Scott, 
Reed F. Noss, and Richard L. Schroeder, “New Directions in Conservation for the National Wildlife Refuge 
System,” BioScience 56(2)(February 2006): 135-143 [139]. 
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Figure 5.7: Satellite Images of Big Oaks National Wildlife Refuge494 
The Big Oaks National Wildlife Refuge appears as the dark (forested) rectangle at the center of the image. 
 
and twenty percent qualifies as “wooded grasslands,” or savanna-type lands with scattered 
trees.495 These grassland and savanna communities now represent some of the most 
ecologically valuable lands on the refuge and provide habitat for Henslow’s sparrows and 
other rare species.  
Native grasslands have grown exceedingly scarce due to widespread fire suppression 
and agricultural conversion. As Pruitt, Pruitt, and Litwin note, “Grassland wildlife species 
have experienced even more severe habitat loss than forest wildlife species. Fifty-five 
grassland species in the U.S. are listed as Federally threatened or endangered, and 728 are 
candidates for listing… In presettlement Indiana, for example, there were almost 3 million 
 
494 Image copied from: http://www.gly.uga.edu/railsback/CTW/JeffersonProvingGround.jpeg [6 April 2006]. 
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hectares (ha) of native tallgrass prairie, of which approximately 400 ha remain.”496 In order 
to maintain the grassland and savanna characteristics across 10,000-15,000 acres and keep 
the encroaching forests at bay, the FWS has continued the aggressive prescribed burning 
program established by the Army – though for primarily ecological reasons now instead of 
those related to ordnance testing.  
What began as a fire program designed around military objectives is now administered 
in much the same way but around a new suite of objectives. As I have described elsewhere, 
one of the principal tenets of M2W conversions is the idea that military activities produce 
conditions that support environmental conservation. We find this view built into the 
management of fire at Big Oaks National Wildlife Refuge: wildlife managers at the site 
readily acknowledge that the Army’s prescribed burns contributed significantly to the habitat 
amenities now valued at the refuge. 
In addition to its role in maintaining and restoring particular ecological communities at 
Big Oaks, the refuge’s fire program also carries distinct financial incentives. Fire comes from 
a different budget allocation than other refuge operations (the same is true with most federal 
land management agencies); in general terms, the more land an agency burns, the more the 
agency can expand its budget. As the Big Oaks fire specialist explained: 
I think the one reason I came here was because – the big reason – they 
were burning a couple thousand acres a year, five hundred, couple thousand 
acres a year and they were wanting to burn. They kept telling me in the office, 
you know we can be burning 10,000, 13,000 acres, we just don’t have a staff. 
And that was, you know, I’m sure a lot of people in the regional [FWS] office 
thought, that’s great work. They know about Big Oaks, they know what we’re 
here for but the other thing is acreage means money. [from whom?] From the 
national level.  You know, if you’re doing fuels treatment – [It’s a different 
 
495 Pruitt, Pruitt, and Litwin, p. 6. 
496 Pruitt, Pruitt, and Litwin, pp. 6-7. 
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pot of money?] It’s a, you can, I don’t know how you say it, but there are 
benefits to burning a lot of acres. It means more personnel, more 
money…Yeah. Fire’s a separate budget. So yeah, you can actually get to the 
staffing, appropriate staffing level, by burning a lot of acres.”497 
Prescribed fire for the FWS, then, comes with an explicit set of ecological objectives, as well 
as a less visible set of administrative goals that help boost the level of staffing and supplies 
available at the refuge.498 
In terms of how the fire program operates – its actual practices rather than its objectives 
– there is not tremendous distance between Army and FWS management, though the Army’s 
activities at the site have effectively constrained the options for FWS fire crews. FWS fire 
managers cannot freely access and administer all areas within the burn units, and are limited 
to perimeter ground ignitions to start fires.499 As the Fish and Wildlife Service’s 2001 Fire 
Management Plan for Big Oaks noted, “fire suppression options are limited on the refuge due 
to the past use-history of munitions testing by the Army. All areas of the refuge may contain 
UXO and earth disturbing activities are generally prohibited.”500 
This ruled out common approaches to managing fire such as driving all-terrain vehicles 
across management areas, bulldozing fire lines, or using aerial drips to ignite fires in the 
 
497 Interview with Brian Winters, FWS prescribed fire specialist, Big Oaks NWR, 15 December 2005. 
498 Supplies relating to fire at Big Oaks are noticeably abundant – one biologist noted that new fire-ready 
vehicles at Big Oaks outnumber refuge personnel – while more general support, such as a visitor center remain 
unfunded. 
499 Agency managers are actively pursuing an option for aerial ignitions using a remotely-controlled, unmanned 
helicopter that could operate under line-of-sight conditions from roads. Interview with Brian Winters, FWS 
prescribed fire specialist, 15 December 2005. 
500 Fire Management Plan, Environmental Assessment: Appendix K (Madison, IN:  U.S. Fish and Wildlife 
Service  Big Oaks National Wildlife Refuge, March 2001), p. 3. 
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interior of fire units. On more than one occasion, the Big Oaks’ fire personnel lamented to 
me about the general prohibition against aerial ignitions. With the widespread presence of 
UXO, helicopter use is deemed too risky out of concern for emergency landings, accidents, 
and related recovery or evacuation. FWS managers are effectively limited to working the 
perimeter of the refuge’s burn units – a process that they describe as cumbersome and 
inefficient.501 Despite these constraints, in 2006 the Big Oaks’ fire crews burned nearly 
10,000 acres across eighteen management units.502 
Under the FWS, the Big Oaks’ fire program also now comes under considerable 
oversight, both internally and from the public. Even though several Big Oaks biologists and 
the refuge manager were certified as “burn bosses,” the FWS made fire an explicit priority at 
the refuge and brought in a prescribed fire specialist whose detailed fire plans are reviewed 
through a separate chain of command than most other refuge activities (by a Fire 
Management Officer, or FMO, rather than solely the refuge manager).503 Whereas the Army 
typically conducted its activities with little to no public involvement, FWS managers now 
routinely must provide environmental analyses that assess likely impacts of their activities 
and offer the public an opportunity to comment; the 2001 Fire Management Plan described 
further in the section that follows, is one example of this.  
 
501 Interview with Brian Winters, FWS prescribed fire specialist, and David Jones, FWS fire program 
technician, Big Oaks NWR, 15 December 2005. 
502
“Big Oaks,” Newsletter of the Big Oaks National Wildlife Refuge and Big Oaks Conservation Society,
Spring 2006, viewed online at
http://www.fws.gov/midwest/BigOaks/bigoaksconservationsociety_files/06SPNL.pdf [21 September 2006].
503 Interview with Brian Winters, FWS prescribed fire specialist, Big Oaks NWR, 15 December 2005. 
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Ecological Restoration and the Public Interface at Big Oaks NWR 
In order to establish its own program of prescribed burning, in 2001 the FWS 
developed a Fire Management Plan as an appendix to its environmental assessment of the 
new refuge.504 According to the plan, fire is “a critical ecological process in maintenance of 
successional habitats required by many species of wildlife that are of management concern 
within the Region.”505 The financial incentives for a refuge fire program notwithstanding, 
there is little debate about whether or not fire promotes biodiversity at the Big Oaks site – 
clearly it keeps grasslands open, maintains certain ecological communities, and fosters 
biological complexity on the former proving ground.  
What this characterization of fire casts aside, however, is one of the persistent 
questions of ecological restoration efforts: which point in time ought to serve as the 
ecological baseline?506 As the 1994 Fish and Wildlife Management Plan for the JPG 
observed, “It should be noted that the land, which is now JPG, did not support any native 
prairie [pre-settlement]. The grasslands at JPG are a product of the prescribed burning 
vegetation management which has been done to support the military mission on the base. 
Nonetheless, these grasslands provide regionally significant wildlife habitat for grassland 
 
504 “Appendix K: U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service Environmental Assessment, Fire Management Plan, Big Oaks 
National Wildlife Refuge,” U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Madison, IN, March 2001. The plan is in the final 
stages of an update to be released in 2006. 
505 Fire Management Plan, 2001, pp. 1-2. 
506 See, for example, Pollan, Michael, Second Nature: A Gardener’s Education (NY: Atlantic Monthly Press, 
1991). 
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species.”507 Fire at Big Oaks, then, is not simply a “natural process” that fits unquestioningly 
into the matrix of this landscape; rather, we see fire more aptly as a human prescription with 
accompanying social, financial, and ecological commitments.508 
The Fire Management Plan of the JPG/Big Oaks environmental assessment lists four 
primary needs for managing fire at the site: 1) Provide for the protection of life and property; 
2) Provide for protection of habitats required by endangered and threatened species; 3) 
Implement a safe and cost effective program of resource protection and enhancement; and 4) 
Reduce hazardous fuels; and protect native biotic communities.509 Of these, only the first 
falls largely outside the range of what might be labeled an “ecological restoration strategy” 




Restoration ecology itself has come into its own as a science only recently. The Society 
for Ecological Restoration was formed in 1987, and began publishing its major professional 
 
507 Pruitt, Pruitt, and Litwin, p. 7. 
508 There are, of course, a small number of lightning-caused fires that would fit more comfortably into a 
“natural” category for fire. As a number of environmental historians have documented, even in its deeper 
history fire in North America has been in many regions an anthropogenic process. See for example, Denevan,
William M., “The Pristine Myth: The Landscape of the Americas in 1492,” Annals of the Association of
American Geographers, 82(3)(1992): 369-385; Flores, Dan, The Natural West: Environmental History in the 
Great Plains and Rocky Mountains (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2001). 
509 Fire Management Plan 2001, p. 1. 
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journal, Restoration Ecology in 1993.510 Though a number of scholars now point to 
restoration as a major trend in public policy as well as in science,511 the discipline and its 
practitioners continue to work through some thorny questions about how restoration ought to 
work.512 Much like the science of conservation biology, which also emerged in the late 20th 
Century and cleaves to such value-laden premises as “Biodiversity of organisms is good,” 
 
510 http://www.ser.org/about.asp [3 April 2006]. 
511 Historian Dan Flores, for example, has suggested that the 21st Century will become known as the era of 
restoration for U.S. public lands (see, Flores, Dan, The Natural West: Environmental History in the Great 
Plains and Rocky Mountains (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2001); the increasing popularity of 
dam removal, road removal, and similar restoration projects may indicate a broader trend restoration trend in 
society (personal communication with Martin Doyle, University of North Carolina Department of Geography); 
and emerging initiatives such as Montana’s Restoration Summit in June 2006 indicate that restoration is gaining 
momentum as a public, politically-attractive phenomenon. It presents, perhaps, the perfect opportunity to test 
ecological modernization as practical public policy, as labor unions join with environmental groups to create job 
programs restoring the environment. See also, Cunningham, G. Storm, The Restoration Economy (San 
Francisco, CA: Berrett-Koehler, 2002); Havlick, David, “Removing Roads: The Redwood Experience,” 
Conservation in Practice 3(4)(2002), pp. 28-34. 
512 Zuckerman considers a number of these, including the perception that restoration represents a human 
mastery over nature, that restoration serves to legitimate further destruction, that every ecosystem (or species) 
can be replaced (or restored), and that aesthetics play too large a role in restoration decisions. See Zuckerman, 
Seth, “Pitfalls on the Way to Lasting Restoration,” in Helping Nature Heal, ed. Richard Nelson, (Berkeley, CA: 
Ten Speed Press, 1991). 
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restoration ecology carries with it a more explicit intertwining of values and politics than are 
traditionally accommodated in the sciences.513 
The fact that something requires “restoration” is linked, of course, to the view that 
some prior quality was degraded or lost. More often than not, these conditions are established 
with some controversy or even some attribution of agency for whom (or what) caused the 
degradation in question. Road removal, for example, qualifies as a form of ecological 
restoration most clearly if one views the road as causing harm (or likely to do so), rather than 
serving as an essential artery for resource extraction, recreation, or transportation. Similarly, 
ecological restoration at M2W sites such as Big Oaks is often predicated upon an 
understanding of ecological harm (or risk) in comparison to other concerns, such as 
economics or public health. For those who would contend that the place is functioning just 
fine as it stands, there would not be a need for restoration (i.e. “If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it.”) 
The science of restoration, in other words, cannot just rely upon data points for its grounding, 
but must also establish that the data supports an act of restoration that meets the needs of a 
particular constituency or ecological attribute. 
Even at places that seem objectively to be severely degraded – such as toxic landfills, 
chemical manufacturing facilities, military bases, or other sites on the EPA’s National 
Priorities List for Superfund cleanup – there is rarely a consensus view of what, if any, 
restoration should take place. Ski towns such as Aspen, Colorado, and Park City, Utah, have 
worked vigorously to avoid Superfund listings and subsequent cleanups of old mining 
 
513 Quote is from Soulé, Michael E., “What is Conservation Biology?” BioScience 35(1985): 727-734; the 
Society for Conservation Biology formed in 1985 and its flagship journal, Conservation Biology, began 
publication in 1987; see http://www.conbio.org/AboutUs/History/ [3 April 2006]. 
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hazards out of concern that the notoriety (or the sight of Tyvek-clad cleanup crews) could 
scare off tourists. At Big Oaks, the debate has hinged more upon how to balance ecological 
objectives with concerns about visitor access and public health. This extends not just to the 
question of whether the Army should work to remove UXO from the site, but also to how the 
FWS should manage the 50,000 acres now charged to its ecologically-oriented agenda. 
As we have already seen, the Fish and Wildlife Service’s approaches to managing the 
activities of hunting and birdwatching are not resoundingly different from those brought by 
the Army prior to base closure. With prescribed fire, however, the shift to FWS management 
has come with a marked shift toward meeting ecological restoration rather than military 
objectives. As a restoration project, we might expect that the Big Oaks National Wildlife 
Refuge would invite a new suite of questions from a newly-engaged public. For instance, 
what is the Fish and Wildlife Service’s vision of a restored site? What is to be restored, and 
who is likely to benefit (or suffer) from these actions? 
 
Public Participation at Big Oaks 
 
As it turns out, since the transfer to FWS management became formalized in 2000, 
the public has not always shown great interest in what changes might ensue. Part of this may 
be attributable to a general faith in the stewardship and goals of the Fish and Wildlife 
Service, but the many decades of military use at the site seem also to have inured the public 
even to rather extraordinary impacts coming from the base. In the course of my interviews, a 
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number of local residents described earth-jarring impacts from ordnance tests at the JPG. The 
explosions rattled windows and could reportedly crack plaster from the walls of homes.514 
The off-site effects of prescribed burns, by comparison, has seemed rather mild. As the 
Big Oaks’ fire specialist described the local response:  
So burning, I mean, seeing smoke coming from this part is nothing new 
for them. One year I heard they [the Army] smoked in this church out here on 
[U.S. Highway] 421 so bad they had to close the service and not one 
complaint. They’re just used to it. And the Air Guard still burns quite a bit. 
They fire off rounds and the range burns and people are still seeing smoke 
coming from here. And we’ve continued with burning, the burning’s never 
really lagged here. We’re up to an all time high now and still no complaints.515 
Perhaps it came as little surprise, then, that from its public comment period the 2001 
Big Oaks Fire Management Plan garnered just a single letter from the public. Submitted by a 
local watchdog group named Save the Valley (or STV, “protecting the Ohio River Valley 
environment since 1974”), the letter politely deferred to the “expertise of the U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife Service and its most competent employees at Big Oaks,” and generally concurred 
with the fire plan’s goals and objectives.516 
The group’s comment letter did raise one serious objection, however, relating to the 
agency’s plan to conduct prescribed burns across a particular 14,000-acre swath of the former 
Jefferson Proving Ground: 
We do have one concern pertaining to the plan. This has to do with the 
intention to conduct prescribed burns in the area that contains depleted 
uranium (DU). As you probably know, STV is currently researching the 
potential hazards that this DU may present. In our consultation with experts in 
toxicology, radiation hazards, and risk assessment, we have been advised that 
one potential problem associated with DU is inhalation or ingestion of fine 
 
514 Interview with Richard Hill, President Save the Valley, Madison, IN, 16 December 2005.
515 Interview with Brian Winters, FWS prescribed fire specialist, Big Oaks NWR, 15 December 2005. 
516 Fire Management Plan 2001, p. 23. 
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particles of DU (DU dust). While the greatest part of the DU at Big Oaks is 
contained in relatively large pieces (whole or nearly whole projectiles and 
relatively large fragments) there may be some DU dust present. 
It is our opinion that burning in the DU area may cause some of this 
DU dust to become airborne. This dust could then be inhaled or ingested by 
F&WLS [FWS] personnel and possibly even by other persons both on and off 
the Big Oaks site. 
We would advise that prescribed burns in the DU area not be 
conducted, at least not until more information becomes available. The issue of 
the possible results of burning within the DU area should be discussed during 
the DU License Termination process. Thus, the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC) may ultimately advise whether or not such burning 
should be allowed. 
Therefore, we would recommend that prescribed burning not be 
conducted in the DU area unless and until the health and safety risks of 
burning in the DU area are completely understood.517 
This letter could be interrogated on a number of counts, but I will focus here on just 
two: first, how the agency has responded with regard to managing the DU area of the refuge, 
and second, the role of science and scientific authority in the refuge’s administration.  
 
Depleted Uranium at Big Oaks 
 
In its “Response to Comments” on the Fire Management Plan, the FWS 
acknowledged the letter submitted by Save the Valley but summarily dismissed the concerns 
it raised. As evidence of the fire plan’s safety, the FWS noted that “current data available 
suggests that levels of DU carried in smoke associated with burning natural vegetation is not 
 
517 Fire Management Plan 2001, p. 23. 
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significant” and included a single citation as support.518 In response to Save the Valley’s 
recommendation that prescribed burning not be conducted in DU areas at least until the 
health and safety risks were completely understood, the agency responded: “Comment noted. 
For the reasons explained in 1-3 above and given no new data presented we have not changed 
our proposed burn boundaries to exclude the DU area.” 
At a glance these responses might appear simply to be examples of agency 
intransigence. My interviews with Big Oaks and Save the Valley personnel, though, suggest 
instead a more complex series of interactions that reflect differing views of risk, 
environmental protection, and deference to agency authority. The respective representatives 
from each of these parties (as well as the Army site manager) have longstanding 
relationships, share ideas with each other on a regular basis, and exhibit a mutual respect. 
The formal correspondence in the public record, in other words, does not reflect the degree to 
which Save the Valley and the FWS have actually been corresponding about the issue of DU 
and prescribed fire. Fish and Wildlife Service officials, though charged with managing Big 
Oaks, also recognize that the Army still owns the land and much of the expertise in dealing 
with ordnance. Much as STV’s letter deferred to FWS expertise, the FWS itself defers to the 
Army’s expertise in dealing with munitions and depleted uranium. 
Depleted uranium, to be sure, simply falls beyond the training or interests of most 
FWS employees. As the Big Oaks’ fire specialist explained his approach to managing the DU 
 
518 Fire Management Plan 2001, p. 25. The citation provided was for: Williams, G.P., A.M. Hermes, A.J. 
Policastro, H.M. Hartmann, and D. Tomasko, Potential Health Impacts from Range Fires at Aberdeen Proving 
Ground, Maryland (Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne, IL, 1998), 84 pp. 
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area, “Maybe I should be more focused on DU but it’s just, nobody’s made it a priority of 
mine and I’m not, my education doesn’t, I guess, I’m not self-motivated to go figure out 
what’s going on with the DU and if somebody’s not going to make me, you know, from 
people I’ve talked to, it’s pretty implausible [that it would pose a health hazard] and so if 
somebody makes me deal with it, I will. But otherwise, I’m more concerned about the 
UXO.”519 
The FWS has, in fact, worked with the Army to conduct studies of DU in small 
mammals and deer (the latter is ongoing), but results have not shown significant adverse 
effects and the Army continues to exhibit little concern about potential hazards from 
exposure to depleted uranium. According to the Big Oaks’ fire specialist, “when I first got 
here [we tried] to get some other people to come out and do some research on it [DU] and it 
just never panned out… I don’t think the Army – I’m not sure, but I don’t think the Army 
thinks that’s very plausible [that burning DU could cause public health problems].”520 
The Big Oaks refuge manager, who holds a Ph.D. in wildlife biology, agreed that 
studies conducted to date have generated little specific cause for concern about DU:   
We've done several surveys of collecting small mammals, and we're 
involved with the Army now in collecting deer [tissue samples]. Depleted 
uranium is not a great substance, but does it cause problems to natural 
communities? We haven't found, as yet, any problems. There might be 
something there that we haven't seen… Would I prefer that's all gone? Yes. 
Am I seeing direct degradation of animal or plant communities? I would say, 
not really.521 
519 Interview with Brian Winters, FWS prescribed fire specialist, Big Oaks NWR, 15 December 2005. 
520 Interview with Brian Winters, FWS prescribed fire specialist, 15 December 2005. 
521 Interview with Joe Robb, refuge manager, Big Oaks NWR, 15 December 2005. 
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As for the author of the lone critical comment on the plan for prescribed burning in 
the DU area, Richard Hill is both president of Save the Valley and co-chair of the Big Oaks 
National Wildlife Refuge’s Restoration Advisory Board, a body established as part of the 
base closure process. Hill was born in southeastern Indiana and his connections to the JPG 
run quite deep: his father, wife, and father-in-law each worked on the base, and before the 
land was taken by the Army his grandfather had a farm on the site (right next to Louis 
Munier’s family’s farmstead).522 
In person, Hill comes across not so much as a critic of the FWS or Army policies 
taking place at the site as he does a local resident who has grown keenly aware of various 
perspectives of the place, many of which seem conflicting. As he recounted his group’s early 
support of the JPG’s conversion to a wildlife refuge: 
[We] were very active in promoting that to become a refuge… the 
main reasons of course being that it’s just not very useful for anything else, 
because of the unexploded ordnances that are there and the great cost and 
damage that would be done to clean it up. Now, but there’s more than one side 
to that and I can see the other side to that and I see it I think more now than I 
did then. You know then, that [M2W conversion] sounded like a good thing to 
do and you know, in a lot of ways it is. And I’m glad that it was done, but then 
I think that it was an easy way out for the Army. Which, you know, I don’t 
know if that’s necessarily a good thing or not but –  and it’s I mean, in effect, 
it’s a sacrifice zone. It’s just, a, you know, it’s a place that at least in its 
present state, it’s just a whole lot of things you can’t use it for, but then again, 
that’s not necessarily a bad thing either.  
I know I’m sounding real wishy-washy here but just a couple of years 
ago, I hooked up with Paul Cloud and Ken Knouf [of the U.S. Army] out in 
the Proving Ground and got them to give us a little tour.  And by us I mean 
the board of Save the Valley…We wanted mainly to go and look at the DU 
area because we were and still are very involved with the cleanup of that. So 
we went out there and one of the things that Wendell [Berry, who is a board 
member] said was that it was a shame that there aren’t more areas of the 
country that were totally ruined by the Army (laughs).  Because you go out 
there, there’s no trash, no litter, no sign of human anything and large, large 
 
522 Interview with Richard Hill, President, Save the Valley, Madison, IN, 16 December 2005. 
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spaces of it. I mean, and so it is, in a very odd sort of way, beautifully 
preserved.523 
Hill, like many others, recognizes that a thorough cleanup of all the UXO and DU on 
the Big Oaks refuge could be highly destructive. According to the Army’s site manager at 
Big Oaks, cleaning UXO on the base would require a surface scouring to at least four feet in 
depth (others have suggested thirty feet is more realistic), which would come only after a 
detailed assessment using magnetometers that read down two feet at a time. In other words, 
“It's basically just still almost like a strip mining operation. And that's why, you know, 
people say, ‘Why can't you clean up 51,000 acres north [of the firing line]?’ And you'd have 
this huge strip mine operation. I think most folks would agree that the safety problem can be 
managed much better than the environmental impact it might have.”524 
From the perspective of the FWS and many advocates for protection of fish and 
wildlife habitat, a thorough cleanup of the military residues at Big Oaks promised to 
undermine many of the attributes that made the place ecologically valuable. The Fish and 
Wildlife Service effectively found itself in the awkward position of having to balance 
concerns about the uncertain, lingering hazards of Army munitions against the active 
destruction (at least in the near-term) of clearing away forests, grasslands, and tens of 
thousands of acre-feet of soil in order to rid the site of its considerable Army residues.525 
523 Interview with Richard Hill, President, Save the Valley, Madison, IN, 16 December 2005. 
524 Interview with Ken Knouf, Army site manager for Big Oaks NWR, 14 December 2005. 
525 Viewed in more philosophical terms, this dilemma might be framed as the choice between “doing” versus 
“allowing” harm. See, for example Howard-Snyder, Frances, “Doing vs. Allowing Harm,” viewed online at 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/doing-allowing/ [6 April 2006]. 
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The character of the contaminants at the JPG also played a role in the Fish and 
Wildlife Service’s evaluation of how cautious it should be about taking control of the site. As 
the principal FWS and Army managers of the Big Oaks site explained: 
 FWS: “The kind of contaminants that were here, you might have a risk 
of a shell with some explosives attached to it, but they tend to be very 
discrete, tend to be nitrate-based, with –  There are some heavy metals 
involved, like arsenic and lead, things like phosphorous…  
 Army: [but chemically, there is] not much difference between 
explosives and fertilizers.  
 FWS: But yeah, you had phosphorous, nitrate. There are some 
problems with those, but as far as problems that animals or plants… Not the 
same thing as salt and PCBs, you know.”526 
There was also a geographical component to this consideration of the contaminants’ 
character, as heavy metals such as arsenic or depleted uranium were not expected to migrate 
widely across space, even as they persisted over time. As the site managers commented about 
depleted uranium at Big Oaks, (FWS): “It's big chunks of metal sitting out there, giving off 
some levels of radiation… (Army): “basically oxidizing and then flaking off, but the stuff's 
so heavy, it just tends to sit there. But you're talking about a material that's going to be there 
as long as this planet is.”527 
Scientific Authority 
 
526 Interview with Joe Robb, refuge manager, and Ken Knouf, Army site manager, Big Oaks NWR, 15 
December 2005. Note that for portions of my interviews, both managers were present simultaneously and their 
responses occasionally weaved together. 
527 Interview with Joe Robb, refuge manager, Big Oaks NWR, and Ken Knouf, U.S. Army site manager, 15 
December 2005. 
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As the federal land management agency most dedicated to purposes of conservation 
and ecosystem protection,528 the Fish and Wildlife Service is also simply oriented (and better 
equipped) to evaluate resources in terms of their biological or ecological attributes rather 
than their military liabilities. At a national meeting held by the agency in 1998 to address 
military base closure acquisition (i.e. M2W) issues, Fish and Wildlife Service officials noted 
that site assessments of military base properties rely upon the Department of Defense for 
contaminant information and that refuge staff commonly “do not have the proper training in 
the evaluation of acquired property from military base closures.”529 
The FWS generally takes pride in its scientific orientation and the training of many of 
its employees as scientists. As befits its wildlife conservation orientation and the overall 
mission of the National Wildlife Refuge System, the agency has understandably employed 
wildlife biologists more widely than contamination specialists. Even by the FWS’s standards 
the staff at Big Oaks is, in fact, highly educated and well-trained: the refuge manager has a 
Ph.D. in wildlife biology, staff wildlife biologists hold graduate degrees in the field, and fire 
specialists and others have years of experience. One biologist at Big Oaks highlighted some 
of these qualities as well, noting, “Our biological program here is much more research 
oriented [than other refuges]…We're all very much research oriented.”530 
As the FWS acquires more and more lands from military transfers, what has been a 
real strength of the agency’s personnel and training – its focus on wildlife and conservation – 
may in some cases become a limitation as ecological analyses struggle to accommodate the 
 
528 Fischman, 2003; Meretsky, Vicky J., et al., 2006. 
529 See “Minutes of FWS National Meeting On Military Base Closure Acquisition Issues,” Denver, CO, 17 
April 1998, photocopy from Big Oaks National Wildlife Refuge files. 
530 Interview with Jason Lewis, wildlife biologist, Big Oaks NWR, 15 December 2005. 
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management challenges produced by military engineers and years of military activities. At 
the very least, there is again – as we saw with the Rocky Mountain Arsenal – a privileging of 
ecological perspectives over those of public health or toxicology. Safety is commonly listed 
as a top concern, but agency money and energy consistently target ecological programming 
rather than UXO cleanup. This is not to suggest that these are particularly incompatible 
considerations, but rather to highlight that a scientific assessment of the Big Oaks refuge’s 
characteristics can still leave sizable gaps in our understanding of the conditions of the place 
and its hazards or features. Indeed, the majority of scientific studies focused on the site have 
attended to questions of ecological composition, assessments of species diversity and 
population levels, and wildlife biology; there is comparatively little detailed information on 
the effects of contaminants left over from military activities and what their fate is likely to be 
over the long term. 
The use of scientific information presents challenges for conservation efforts, as well, 
as environmental groups frequently turn to science as a source of information and credibility, 
while also questioning what it tells them.531 In fact, environmentalists often find themselves 
needing both to use and criticize scientific expertise – a move evidenced by Save the 
Valley’s consultation with experts in toxicology, radiation hazards, and risk assessment to 
gain a fuller characterization of the hazards of depleted uranium and UXO, even as it 
 
531 Yearley, Steven, “Nature’s Advocates: Putting Science to Work in Environmental Organisations,” pp. 172-
190, in Alan Irwin and Brian Wynne, eds., Misunderstanding Science? The Public Reconstruction of Science 
and Technology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 174; see also Kirsch, Scott, (2000), 
“Peaceful nuclear explosions and the geography of scientific authority,” The Professional Geographer 
52(2):179-192; Kirsch, Scott, Proving Grounds: Project Plowshare and the Unrealized Dream of Nuclear 
Earthmoving (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2005). 
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challenges the Fish and Wildlife Service’s plans to apply ecological principles to maintain 
early successional habitats. When scientific expertise serves as a primary form of 
legitimization within environmental groups, as both Yearley and Jasanoff have shown, it 
effectively leads groups to operate within the same epistemological paradigm that, 
ultimately, they may wish to subvert.532 In Yearley’s view, “science’s advocacy role is far 
from straightforward.”533 We can expand this statement to recognize that applying science to 
advocacy or policy also comes with a host of epistemological and practical pitfalls. The 
application of prescribed burns to the Big Oaks’ depleted uranium area highlights the 
prospective danger that can arise from an excessive “technicisation of knowledge” that is 
reductionistic or removes too many social elements from either nature or decision-making.534 
When federal officials use science and apply it to policy, as is particularly common 
with management or enforcement agencies such as the Fish and Wildlife Service, the 
challenges of integrating conflicting epistemologies can become quite problematic. Focusing 
on science and policy at the EPA, Jasanoff examines how the agency’s scientific findings 
support its policy recommendations, and in turn illustrates how the agency has learned from 
its experiences relating science to political authority. This suggests how the operations of the 
DOD and FWS might also function in the context of military-to-wildlife conversions.535 
532 Yearley 1996: 174; Jasanoff, Sheila, "Science, Politics, and the Renegotiation of Expertise at EPA," Osiris 
2nd Series, vol. 7(1992): 194-217, p. 196. 
533 Yearley 1996: 186-187. 
534 See Grove-White, Robin, “Environmental Knowledge and Public Policy Needs: On Humanizing the 
Research Agenda,” pp. 269-286, In: Scott Lash, Bronislaw Szerszynski and Brian Wynne, eds., Risk, 
Environment and Modernity: Towards a New Ecology (London: Sage Publications, 1996), pp. 283-284. 
535 Jasanoff, 1992. 
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What we find from this work is that agencies clearly do mobilize science to legitimate 
policy and that in order to maintain scientific credibility agencies such as the EPA, FWS, or 
DOD need to become politically savvy.536 Problems can emerge if the public loses 
confidence in scientists’ ability to function objectively or with transparency: the credibility of 
both science and policy diminish.537 Whereas advocates of a wholly objective science might 
seek to isolate this form of knowledge from the policy realm, Jasanoff contends that 
scientific authority is actually most effective when scientific facts and policy decisions are 
integrated.538 In this scenario, scientific facts will drive policy. This view hinges, of course, 
on at least two assumptions: first, that science can produce such “deconstruction-proof 
facts.”539 For when scientific facts themselves are viewed as assailable, then the entire 
strategy for agency decision-making may begin to crumble. Second, for the integrated 
science-policy approach to be successful in generating good policy, the science needs to 
address an appropriate suite of questions.  
In this respect we ought to examine M2W sites such as Big Oaks and ask whether 
studies of Henslow’s sparrows or depleted uranium levels in deer are the ones most likely to 
inform sound policy for managing heavily contaminated lands. These approaches might 
prove very successful in reaching ecological objectives. Indeed, all my experiences at Big 
Oaks supported the view that a dedicated, highly-skilled staff of biologists and fire managers 
was managing the site commendably in this regard. What remains to be seen is how well 
 
536 Jasanoff, 1992, p. 217.
537 The current Bush administrations manipulation of reports and data on climate change present a prominent
example of this effect.
538 Jasanoff, 1992, p. 142. 
539 Quoting Jasanoff, 1992, p. 217.
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these same experts – or the broader ecological orientation of the National Wildlife Refuge 
System itself – can manage the challenges presented by the complicated historical 
geographies emergent with M2W conversions.  
According to Fischman, national wildlife refuges sit in the “middle of the permissable 
uses continuum of the federal public land systems.”540 On this view, wildlife refuges with 
their common assortment of secondary uses come as a middle ground between the “exclusive 
use” regimes of military reserves and the relatively wide-open multiple use lands of the 
Bureau of Land Management. What we find at some M2W refuges, however, suggests that 
this middle range has not been found. At Big Oaks the military-to-wildlife transition and its 
associated shift to an ecological restoration agenda still has little to show thus far in terms of 
movement toward the “public use” side of the spectrum.  
In Chapter Six that follows I turn more directly to this issue as I address how M2W 
refuges function as public spaces. Do these refuges fit Fischman’s casting of places where 
traditional dualisms of nature and society are broken down, integrated, even hybridized? Can 
we learn something new from M2W sites about the role of humanity in nature? Or are people 
still virtually excluded from M2W spaces, much as they are from most areas of active 
military bases? In working through these questions, we shall also begin to consider more 
directly the fundamental premise of M2W conversions: that military activities work to 
produce environmental (habitat) amenities. This ecological militarization theory will then be 
the focus of Chapter Seven. 
 
540 Fischman, 2003, p. 3.
CHAPTER SIX 
PRODUCTION OF THE REFUGE AS PUBLIC SPACE 
 
On a bright morning in November I loaded my seven-month old daughter in the car 
and drove sixteen miles to go for a hike. We arrived at the Assabet River National Wildlife 
Refuge, in eastern Massachusetts, where a large U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service sign stood in 
front of a dirt parking lot (Figure 6.1: Assabet River NWR South Entrance). Beyond a 
boarded-up guardhouse and a shiny gate, a kiosk was stocked with brochures and maps. We 
set off on Trail C, a zigzagging path through the heart of the 2,200-acre refuge. 
Our outing thus far could fit any number of similar visits Americans make each year 
to the National Wildlife Refuge System. For more than fifty years prior to 2000, however, the 
Assabet River National Wildlife Refuge was known as the Fort Devens Sudbury Training 
Annex and served as a U.S. Army ammunition storage facility. This explains, at least in part, 
why a walk in the woods at the Assabet River refuge can include some surprises. Trail C, for 
instance, begins as a paved two-lane road, complete with yellow median stripe and speed 
limit signs (Figure 6.2: Assabet River NWR Trail). Where Trail C intersects smaller gravel 
roads or trails, these secondary routes are posted, “No Pedestrians.” In the fall, after the 
hardwoods have dropped their leaves, a handful of buildings can be seen to the side of the 
road, abandoned, boarded up, and overgrown.  As Trail C winds more deeply into the interior 
of the refuge, what at first look like wooded hummocks scattered every few hundred meters 
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reveal themselves as concrete façades of old ammunition bunkers (Figure 6.3: Ammunition 
Bunkers at Assabet River NWR.) 
 
Figure 6.1: Assabet River NWR South Entrance 
Figure 6.2: Assabet River NWR Trail 
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Compared to many military-to-wildlife conversion sites, the Assabet River refuge is a 
welcoming place. With more than ten miles of trail, the refuge is open to the public every day 
of the week from dawn to dusk and the requirement to walk only on designated trails is a 
self-enforced policy that scarcely seems threatening. Indeed, during my November hike 
several families were ambling across an open field that was lightly rimmed with “no 
pedestrian” signs. Visitors can read that the area was formerly a military site, but there is 
little hint of danger and no requirement to sign a hold-harmless waiver or check in with FWS 
authorities (who are rarely present). For those who have visited other national wildlife 
refuges, Assabet River would not seem out of the ordinary. It blends easily enough, 
ammunition bunkers and all, into its role as part of the United States’ third largest system of 
public lands.  
 
Figure 6.3: Ammunition Bunker at Assabet River NWR 
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Even within Massachusetts, however, M2W refuges present a variety of 
characteristics. Approximately eighty miles southeast of Assabet River, Nomans Island 
National Wildlife Refuge has no public interface. It’s simply closed. Although ninety-eight 
percent of the National Wildlife Refuge System is open to some form of public recreation,541 
Nomans Island is not.  
In this chapter I consider how military-to-wildlife conversion sites function as public 
spaces. At one level I treat this as a question of management: what current policies and 
programs at these sites restrict, regulate, encourage, or direct public use? How open to the 
public are these spaces? These inquiries move us, in turn, toward a deeper consideration of 
landscape that extends from the previous chapters’ examination of how particular M2W sites 
are produced.  
According to Mitchell, unless we are willing to accept a view of landscapes as 
“morally neutral,” we ought to recognize that “the historical form of a place structures the 
social relations of that place.”542 As we have already seen with the case examples at the 
Rocky Mountain Arsenal and Big Oaks refuges, these are not relict landscapes that simply 
exist; rather, they have been and continue to be actively produced through a combination of 
politics, science, and discourse. These processes of landscape production – from the 
application of eminent domain and the eviction of rural residents to the military activities that 
ensued to the decisions to close and convert bases – play critical roles in shaping how people 
 
541 Fischman, Robert L., The National Wildlife Refuges: Coordinating a Conservation System Through Law,
(Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 2003), p. 30. 
542 Mitchell, Don, The Lie of the Land: Migrant Workers and the California Landscape (Minneapolis, MN: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1996), p. 3. The quote “morally neutral” comes from Mitchell quoting James 
Parsons, “A Geographer Looks at the San Joaquin Valley,” Geographical Review 76 (1986): 371-389, p. 387. 
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today understand and interact with these places as they now exist as valued sites of 
biodiversity, as contaminated brownfields, and as particular locations where militarism and 
environmental conservation are represented as compatible.  
In order to expand our understanding of the public function of M2W refuges beyond 
issues of access and use, I consider in this chapter how these sites may create public benefits 
or risks. For this, I look in particular at how M2W refuges and their historical productions 
and technologies fit Ulrich Beck’s characterization of “Risk Society.”543 Are these, in fact, 
places where military and related commercial technologies created hazards over time which 
we continue to lack the ability to fully grasp or remedy? Or, are there risks at these sites that 
we can now manage in a democratic fashion? M2W refuges are in fact both places in 
transition and places with overlapping characteristics. This ontological instability may be 
interpreted productively through concepts of hybridity, which I emphasize in this chapter as 
well.  
These seemingly disparate theoretical lenses – landscape production, Risk Society, 
and hybridity – are ultimately linked by a common association with science and technology, 
and the question of how much M2W sites are transitioning (if at all) to a more open, 
democratic set of values versus remaining embedded within technocratic structures of a 
militarized state. To conclude this chapter, I examine how M2W sites can contribute to new 
geographies of knowledge production or erasure. What role does the conversion and 
renaming of M2W sites play in diminishing or encouraging a genuine, public understanding 
of militarized space?  
 
543 See Beck, Ulrich, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity, trans. by Mark Ritter (London: Sage 
Publications, 1992). 
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Land Management on M2W Refuges 
 
When the United States designated the world’s first national park at Yellowstone, in 
1872, it established a set of priorities for management that have influenced federal public 
land policies ever since. The National Park Act of 1916 committed the U.S. “to conserve the 
scenery and the natural and historic objects and wild life … as will leave them unimpaired 
for the enjoyment of future generations.”544 The weighting of this mandate has drawn 
considerable attention and debate over the years, as it seems to provide a dual mission of 
conservation and public use. A two-pronged objective stirs little trouble when both ends are 
mutually compatible, but proves problematic if public enjoyment conflicts with historic, 
aesthetic, or natural conservation.545 
544 16 USC§1. 
545 In 2000, National Park Service director Robert Stanton issued an order intended to clarify conservation as 
the principal and overriding mission of the agency’s mandate. By these terms, visitor services and public use 
remain a priority at national parks, but if these conflict with conservation then managers must recognize that the 
Park Service has “but a single purpose, namely, conservation.”545 Stanton’s order remains subject to the changes 
of subsequent administrations, however, and the George W. Bush administration actively worked to rewrite 
national park directives to privilege a wide array of public uses – regardless of their impact on conservation 
objectives; see Farquhar, Brodie, “Revealed – Secret Changes to Park Rules,” High Country News, 19 
September 2005. In June 2006, Secretary of the Interior Dirk Kempthorne signaled a return to prioritizing 
conservation when the dual mandates appear to conflict, e.g. “Draft Management Policies to Guide the National 
Park Service,” (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Interior, National Park Service, 16 June 2006). 
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In 1997, the National Wildlife Refuge System finally received a mission statement of 
its own to guide its management priorities.546 As I described in Chapter Three, the 1997 
National Wildlife Refuge Improvement Act sought to rid the refuges of incompatible 
secondary uses and established an ecological mission for national wildlife refuges: “The 
mission of the System is to administer a national network of lands and waters for the 
conservation, management, and where appropriate, restoration of the fish, wildlife, and plant 
resources and their habitats within the United States for the benefit of present and future 
generations of Americans.”547 
The final phrase’s emphasis on public benefit, versus the national parks’ public 
enjoyment gave notice that the Fish and Wildlife Service should consider public use a 
management option rather than a fundamental requirement. In this, the agency (and 
Congress) intended to avoid the dual mandate problem that has long hampered the National 
Park Service. The FWS was even more explicit in its regulations to implement the 1997 Act 
that conservation was not to be subverted to other goals or uses of national wildlife refuges: 
“the first and foremost goal of the Refuge Improvement Act is to ensure that wildlife 
conservation is the principal mission of the Refuge System.”548 Despite these efforts to 
 
546 The 1997 Act came in response to President Clinton’s Executive Order 12996, which in turn, responded to a 
series of GAO reports that were critical of incompatible secondary uses on national wildlife refuges. Clinton’s 
executive order described a mission for the National Wildlife Refuge System that was largely reiterated by 
Congress in the 1997 legislation. 
547 Public Law 105-57, sec. 4, 9 October 1997. 
548 65 Federal Register 33893 [2000]. Following legislative Acts, federal agencies publish implementing 
policies that provide a more detailed set of rules for how they will comply with the new legislation. For the Fish 
and Wildlife Service, these are developed in the Fish and Wildlife Service Manual, available online (as it is 
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establish more unified management direction with a strong ecological emphasis, the FWS 
must still contend with multiple missions at many refuges.  
Each wildlife refuge in the national system comes with its own establishment 
document – a Presidential order, administrative transfer, purchase, or legislative Act – and 
these, in turn, include their own particular purposes that must be reconciled with the 
overarching mission of the National Wildlife Refuge System.549 Where the respective 
purposes conflict, the 1997 Refuge Improvement Act defers to the primacy of the 
establishment document.550 This means that the refuge system’s ecological mission set forth 
by Congress in 1997 may be rebuffed or modified where a particular refuge’s purposes chart 
a course other than conservation. At Crab Orchard NWR, for instance, the establishing 
purposes include the development of approximately 1,100 acres for industrial operations – 
including a General Dynamics defense munitions manufacturing facility – that are widely 
viewed as conflicting with the ecological management goals of the refuge system.551 This 
seeming incompatibility is justified by the Fish and Wildlife Service simply by citing the 
 
completed) at www.fws.gov/policy/manual.html. Fischman takes issue with this focus insofar as it discounts the 
importance of plant conservation despite the equal treatment of plants and animals in the 1997 legislation. 
549 Fischman, p. 123; see also, pp. 163-182. 
550 Fischman, p. 80. 
551 See Crab Orchard National Wildlife Refuge Draft Environmental Impact Statement/Comprehensive 
Conservation Plan, Executive Summary (Ft. Snelling, MN: U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, September 2005), p. 
viii and passim, viewed online at www.fws.gov/midwest/Planning/craborchard/DraftEIS/deisSummary.pdf [28 
June 2006]. 
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refuge’s original intent, “Industrial operations is one of the legislated purposes of the 
refuge.”552 
At most M2W sites the conservation mission is kept intact or may seem even stronger 
than the system-wide norm due to restrictions on public use. At locations such as Nomans 
Island NWR or units in the Remote Pacific Islands NWRs, public use is proscribed – a 
management approach that some consider the best possible result for plant or wildlife 
conservation. One refuge manager of a converted Air Force base described this approach as 
the Air Force’s version of wildlife conservation – they simply put a fence around their land 
and call it good.553 Whether or not a hands-off approach truly is the most effective for 
conservation remains a matter of some debate, but a prohibition against public use precludes 
any number of potential conflicts with the system’s conservation mission. A ban on public 
use also runs counter to such hunting programs as the Duck Stamp Act (see below) that have 
long been a staple of the National Wildlife Refuge System. 
Despite the fact that some form of public use is permitted on nearly every unit within 
the refuge system,554 such access has never been an established right for all refuges. The first 
wildlife refuges were specifically designated to protect wildlife from the public, for example 
at Pelican Island, Florida, where the hunting of plume birds was threatening populations with 
 
552 Crab Orchard National Wildlife Refuge Draft Environmental Impact Statement/Comprehensive 
Conservation Plan, Appendix J: Compatible Uses (Ft. Snelling, MN: U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, September 
2005), p. 327, viewed online at www.fws.gov/midwest/Planning/craborchard/DraftEIS/deisAppendixJ.pdf [28 
June 2006]. 
553 Personal communication with anonymous refuge manager, July 2006.
554 As I noted earlier in this chapter, Fischman reports that 98% of all refuges allow some form of public access 
or recreation; see supra 1 above. 
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extirpation. Initially this and other refuges were necessarily kept off-limits to public use 
simply to ensure the survival of the species in question – in some cases it required armed 
vigilance to enforce such restrictions.555 
As hunters developed as an important constituency for the refuge system, most 
significantly following the passage of the Migratory Bird Hunting (“Duck”) Stamp Act in 
1934, hunting increasingly became accepted at refuges and drafted into management 
regulations. A number of M2W refuges now hearken back to the earlier prohibitions on 
public use, including hunting (see Table 6.1). Such prohibitions still fit easily within the 
refuge system’s management regulations, although the 1997 Refuge Improvement Act 
identified “priority general public uses” of the National Wildlife Refuge System that included 
such “wildlife-dependent recreation” as hunting, fishing, wildlife observation and 
photography, and environmental education.556 
Especially on units designated with endangered species protection as a foremost 
priority, many refuges restrict access either seasonally or in certain areas to protect ecological 
attributes. The reason for the restriction at M2W sites, however, is very different. The 
principal reason refuges such as Nomans Island, Big Oaks, and others limit public use is not 
to protect wildlife or plants – though this is a happy by-product that FWS and DOD 
publications often foreground – but simply because the places are too dangerous or too 
contaminated to allow visitors. The limits on public use often resemble similar regulations 
555 The first warden of the nation’s first national wildlife refuge, Paul Kroegel at Pelican Island, reportedly 
patrolled for several years armed with his personal shotgun and a salary that ranged as high as $1.00/month. See 
Fulfilling the Promise: The National Wildlife Refuge System (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the 
Interior, Fish and Wildlife Service, National Wildlife Refuge System, March 1999). 
556 Fischman, p. 90; see also, PL 105-57, Sec. 3, 9 October 1997. 
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Table 6.1: Public Use of M2W Refuges557 
Refuge Name and 
Location 
Public Use? Activities Allowed Prohibitions Comments 
Aroostook, ME558 Selected areas 
7 days/wk 
Hiking, fishing derby 




approx. 80% of 




Assabet River, MA559 7 days/wk hiking, hunting, 
birdwatching 
no hiking off 
designated routes; 
no dogs 




Big Oaks, IN560 M, F, 2nd & 4th 
Sat. 
deer, turkey, and 
squirrel hunting in 
season, fishing, 
birdwatching 
No travel off-roads 
except 4,000 acres 
in NE corner 
Hold-harmless 
waiver and safety 
video required; all 
visitors sign in/out 
Caddo Lake, TX561 no  No public access May start limited 
group tours and/or 
deer hunt by fall 
2007 
Great Bay, NH562 7 days/wk Hiking, x-c skiing, 
limited weeklong deer 
hunt 






Guam, Pacific563 7 days/wk Fishing, swimming, 
snorkeling, barbecueing 
No hunting Military mission 
granted priority; 
contact/nature 
center open in  
Oct. 2006. 
Approx. 40,000 
visitors per year. 
Kingman Reef, Pacific  no permitted research only no public access special use permit 
only for qualified 
researchers 
Mountain Longleaf, AL564 7 days/wk; 
limited to 30% 
of area 
Hunting, hiking, bird 
watching, photography 
no fishing  Approximately 
10,000 
visitors/year; 
557 All refuge activities are limited to day use only unless specifically authorized. 
558 Telephone interview with William Kolodniki, Aroostook and Moosehorn NWR project leader, 6 July 2006; 
and personal communication 7 July 2006. 
559 Assabet River NWR website, viewed online at http://www.fws.gov/northeast/assabetriver/ [6 July 2006]. 
560 From personal communication with FWS personnel and materials collected during research visit to 
BONWR, 14-16 December 2005. 
561 Personal communication with Paul Bruckwicki, Caddo Lake refuge manager, 11 July 2006.
562 Personal communication with Jimmie Reynolds, Great Bay NWR refuge manager, 7 July 2006. 
563 Personal communication with Chris Bandy, Guam NWR refuge manager, 10 July 2006.
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UXO and lead 
contamination  
Midway Atoll, Pacific Since 2002 
open to cruise 
ship 
passengers  
 Reopening to 
public dependent 
upon staffing and 
funding 
Nansemond, VA no boating allowed on 
adjacent Nansemond 
River 
 guided tours by 
FWS officials may 
be arranged 
Nomans Island, MA no   UXO and other 
hazards remain 
Occoquan Bay, VA Thurs-Sun    
Oxbow, MA 7 days/wk hiking, hunting, 
birdwatching 
No dogs  
Patuxent Research 
Refuge, MD 
Yes hunting in season  visitor check-in 
and access pass 
required 









Rocky Mountain Arsenal, 
CO 
weekends only Tram rides, catch-and-
release fishing, 
photography 









7 days/wk Hiking, x-c skiing, and 
bird watching limited to 
road and runways 
no hunting, no 




Upper Mississippi River, 






fishing and boat access 
outside buoyed areas 
only 
 UXO training 
required for all 
refuge volunteers 










UXO may extend 
4 miles offshore 
564 Telephone interview with Steve Miller, refuge manager Mountain Longleaf NWR, 7 July 2006; and
Mountain Longleaf NWR website viewed online at http://www.fws.gov/southeast/mountainlongleaf/index.htm
[18 May 2006].
565 Shawangunk Grasslands NWR Visitor Opportunities website viewed online at
http://www.fws.gov/northeast/shawangunk/visitor%20opportunities.htm [7 July 2006].
566 Vieques NWR websites viewed online at http://www.fws.gov/southeast/pubs/facts/vieques.pdf and
http://www.fws.gov/southeast/vieques/QsAs.pdf [7 July 2006].
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applied on other refuges, but an examination of the site histories reveals that such restrictive 
policies in fact come from different motives. This deeper look is critically important not just 
to provide the public with a clearer understanding of what processes created M2W sites, but 
also to highlight which actors or institutions were involved in creating the hazards that now 
exist. These historical contexts also illuminate some of the possibilities and limits for future 
land uses. 
In many cases the Fish and Wildlife Service provides clear information that the new 
refuges are not widely open to public use because of military contamination, but these 
explanations come housed in a broader discourse that highlights the environmental 
protections offered by such restrictive management. The Nomans Island refuge brochure, for 
example, first turns to the ecological amenities of the site – “these 628 acres of upland and 
wetland habitat support many migratory bird species including the peregrine falcon during 
fall migration” – before moving to the more sobering news that, “Due to its prior use as a 
bombing range and the possibility of unexploded ordnance, the island is closed to the 
public.”567 Framed in this manner, the reading public may be less likely to question why the 
DOD has refused to clean up even this one square mile of contaminated land and instead can 
feel confident that the off-limits island serves as a fine ecological sanctuary. This points to 
one of the less tangible yet key hazards to such military-to-wildlife conversions: they may 
foster a blithe public acceptance of these places as havens for wildlife without examining or 
holding accountable the actions and institutions that produced such lands. 
 
567 Eastern Massachusetts National Wildlife Refuge Complex (Sudbury, MA: U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, 
June 2001), p. 14. 
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This lack of concern or understanding is not necessarily common to the FWS 
personnel assigned to manage M2W sites. A number of the current M2W refuge managers 
express a strong interest in overseeing a thorough DOD cleanup of their refuges to ensure the 
safety of their staff, the visiting public, and the resident wildlife and ecosystems. The catch, 
of course, is that the military holds the major purse strings but only occasionally shares the 
same commitment to a complete cleanup.568 At more than one remediated M2W site, FWS 
personnel are working to assess the long-term physiological condition and reproductive 
success of wildlife in order to gauge whether the DOD’s cleanup actually protects wildlife in 
a meaningful way. 
Whether intentional or inadvertent, the discursive erasure of military practices is often 
facilitated by emphasizing an M2W site’s newfound ecological amenities. Fish and Wildlife 
Service information about the Shawangunk Grasslands National Wildlife Refuge, which 
emerged from the closure of the Galeville Military Airport in 1994, (the Department of 
Defense transferred the land to FWS control in 1999), highlights the refuge as “one of New 
York’s top 10 areas for grassland dependent migratory birds.”569 This type of framing 
reverberates in popular accounts of M2W sites. One author of a newspaper travel piece on 
the Shawangunk Grasslands refuge recounted, “As I followed the wildflower-fringed gravel 
path, I had to remind myself that the sunny meadow spread before me was once an airport. It 
 
568 The various refuge managers’ anecdotal evidence of this is corroborated by lawsuits, agency memos, and the
continued absence of remediation work at sites such as the Rocky Mountain Arsenal, Big Oaks, Aroostook, and
other M2W refuges.
569 Shawangunk Grasslands National Wildlife Refuge website, “History,” viewed online at 
www.fws.gov/northeast/shawangunk/history.htm [18 May 2006]. 
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was so easy to forget.”570 This type of description scarcely reflects the fact that the only 
“trails” at the Shawangunk refuge are the obvious concrete runways from its former use as an 
airfield for Army, special operation drills, and FBI landings (see Figure 6.4: Diagram of 
Shawangunk Grasslands NWR, and Figure 6.5: Photo of Shawangunk Grasslands NWR 
“Trail”). 
Figure 6.4: Diagram of Shawangunk Grasslands NWR  
The National Wildlife Refuge System’s ecologically-focused mission also becomes 
an asset in explaining public use restrictions at the new Shawangunk refuge: 
Unlike national parks, state parks, and state forests, the management 
priority at national wildlife refuges is ‘Wildlife First.’ These lands are 
managed by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, which is the only agency of 
the U.S. Government whose primary responsibility is fish, wildlife, and plant 
conservation. Public uses of national wildlife refuges must be compatible with 
plant and animal conservation. Our guiding legislation identifies priority 
 
570 Rothbaum, Rebecca, “Wildlife Lives on Shawangunk Grasslands,” Poughkeepsie Journal, 20 June 2002. 
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public uses on national wildlife refuges that can be allowed if they are 
compatible with the management of that refuge for wildlife.571 
Only after these opening explanations does the diligent reader learn that, 
“Because of potential safety hazards left by the military, public access is restricted to 
existing roadway and runways”572 (emphasis in original). Also coming later is the fact that 
the ecologically valuable grassland is a by-product of the old military runway: “The 
grassland that you see today was created when the military filled a wetland with tons of earth 
to make the airstrip in the 1940’s [sic]… The grassland persisted over the past 50 years by 
routine mowing and livestock grazing to remove emerging woody plants.”573 
As I noted earlier, the Fish and Wildlife Service can scarcely be accused of deceiving 
the public; the agency’s publications, exhibits, and employees are quite open about the 
military past of these new refuges. The overriding narrative that sweeps across these places, 
however, serves to foreground the new management goals of fish, wildlife, and plant 
conservation. At Shawangunk Grasslands the interested visitor can easily find lists of bird 
species that frequent the refuge, but will search fruitlessly to find further information on what 
types of hazards were left behind by the military, or what military activities took place during 
more than four decades at the site. In fact, public information is so scant about the military 
past of this place – it was officially kept as an auxiliary airfield controlled by the U.S. 
 
571 Shawangunk Grasslands National Wildlife Refuge website, “Visitor Opportunities,” viewed online at 
www.fws.gov/northeast/shawangunk/visitor%20opportunities.htm [18 May 2006]. 
572 Shawangunk Grasslands National Wildlife Refuge website, “Visitor Opportunities,” viewed online at 
www.fws.gov/northeast/shawangunk/visitor%20opportunities.htm [18 May 2006]. 
573 Shawangunk Grasslands National Wildlife Refuge website, “History,” viewed online at 
www.fws.gov/northeast/shawangunk/history.htm [18 May 2006]. 
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Military Academy at West Point – or the content of its military residues we may not even 
flinch at the irony of the Fish and Wildlife Service’s parting admonition for refuge visitors to, 
“Leave only footprints, take only memories.”574 Only the cynical few may be left to wonder: 
was this the guiding principle for operators of the Galeville Military Airport as well? 
 In terms of the management policies or programs actually in place to encourage or 
prevent public use, the range we find at M2W sites fits easily within the variety that exists 
 
Figure 6.5: Photo of Shawangunk Grasslands NWR “Trail” 
574 Shawangunk Grasslands National Wildlife Refuge website, “History,” viewed online at 
www.fws.gov/northeast/shawangunk/history.htm [18 May 2006]. 
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system-wide. Area or seasonal closures are a common feature of many refuges, but as I have 
already noted the reasons for closure are quite different at M2W refuges. In addition to the 
reasons highlighted above, it is important to illuminate the causes of these public closures 
because they signal an increasing management liability that the U.S. Fish and Wildlife 
Service is poorly equipped to bear. The FWS already stakes claim to being the most 
impoverished federal land management agency: it receives fewer dollars per acre than the 
BLM, National Park Service, or U.S. Forest Service. The agency’s deferred maintenance 
backlog in 2002 was estimated at $663 million, roughly twice its annual appropriation for 
refuge operation and maintenance.575 Ultimately, the reason so many M2W refuges currently 
operate with severe limits on public access or use is not because this is necessarily the 
preferred way to manage the lands for their conservation mission, but rather because the 
Department of Defense has not cleaned most of their closed bases to any thorough degree 
and the FWS has neither the money nor the expertise (in most cases) to conduct the cleanup 
itself. One FWS official summed up this “definite liability” of receiving military lands for 
M2W refuges by commenting, “When you arrive as a manager [at an M2W refuge], your 
first response is, ‘Oh my God, why did we take this?’”576 
With many M2W lands, their limited function as public spaces is at least in part a 
concession to the DOD’s greater claim to authority and money. In the previous two chapters’ 
examples from the Rocky Mountain Arsenal and Big Oaks refuges, we could see how the 
characteristics of these M2W landscapes emerge from a particular set of practices and events. 
Even if we choose to embrace the environmental amenities that can now be found in such 
 
575 Fischman, 2003, pp. 118-119. 
576 Personal communication with anonymous refuge manager, July 2006.
262
places, we must not overlook the often-destructive military practices that contributed to their 
production. In fact, when we manage to extend our gaze beyond the boundaries of M2W 
refuges or similar sites of ecologically-oriented military spaces, we find that the physical and 
social destructiveness of the U.S. military continues apace, often as a result of military base 
consolidations, the creation of international installations, or outsourcing military activities to 
private contractors. 
In order to consider the theoretical implications of this view of landscape production, 
in the next section I turn more directly to what Mitchell calls the “social struggle” of these 
sites as it becomes naturalized into environmental policies.577 These policies, in turn, often 
influence how we relate to these public lands.  
 
Coexisting Landscapes  
 
As should by now be clear, the management policies for many wildlife refuges 
include restrictions on the types of uses permitted, as well as the timing or location of public 
access. Although in some instances these restrictive policies may seem to come simply as a 
result of natural circumstances – endangered bald eagles roosting in cottonwoods of the 
Rocky Mountain Arsenal, for example, or the presence of rare grassland communities in 
Northeastern or Midwestern sites – the landscapes of these places are also always the product 
of social contestations. Grasslands did not just appear at the Big Oaks or Shawangunk 
Grasslands refuges; rather, they were created through a series of actions: the shelling, 
clearing, and burning of agricultural lands following the designation of the Jefferson Proving 
 
577 Mitchell, 1996, pp. 34-35. 
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Ground, for the first, and the filling, mowing, and grazing of a wetland at Shawangunk. 
These actions, in turn, did not just happen, but were produced through a series of decisions. 
As we saw in each of the previous two chapters, the ecological amenities that are now 
highlighted at both the Rocky Mountain Arsenal and Big Oaks now that they are national 
wildlife refuges were only made possible through the federal appropriation (condemnation) 
of the respective places from their agricultural and residential conditions prior to 1941, and 
then later through the decades-long manufacturing and testing of military weapons at these 
sites.  
When we work to see the deeper histories and politics built into M2W landscapes we 
need to understand what actions created these landscapes, toward which suite of objectives, 
and with what kinds of extended consequences. When visitors today walk through a field 
tittering with the song of bobolink at the Shawangunk Grassland refuge or pass by an otter-
filled creek at Big Oaks, they may easily forget that these places were not always just so. 
Imagining this often is exactly the appeal of coming to wildlife refuges or other protected 
lands that can hold our gaze so differently from the urban spheres we increasingly inhabit, 
but we deceive ourselves if we slip too comfortably into the “natural” embrace of such 
places. As Mitchell cautions, “Since social struggle is strategic, compromises often gain the 
appearance of stability: landscapes become naturalized; they become quite unremarkable.”578 
In many respects, M2W refuges actually do seem remarkable and may well stand out 
from other kinds of federal lands by more clearly blending social and natural elements. M2W 
sites differ considerably from one another, with an array of landforms, land use histories, and 
habitat types, but each brings to the fore some element that clears the temptation to view 
 
578 Mitchell, 1996, p. 31. 
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these as wholly “natural” places. At the Rocky Mountain Arsenal, Tyvek-suited remediation 
workers, heavy machinery, and triple-lined landfills stand out from the open fields and 
prairie dog colonies; at Big Oaks, UXO and radiation hazard signs caution visitors back to 
the roadways; the Shawangunk Grasslands sparkles with the sounds of songbirds, but 
(newspaper travel reports notwithstanding) it is impossible not to notice that the refuge 
“trails” are an aging grid of airplane runways. The Lost Mound Unit of the Upper Mississippi 
River refuge, Big Oaks, and Assabet River refuges are dotted with overgrown ammunition 
bunkers, while the wetlands and forests of the Oxbow refuge cannot entirely muffle the 
machine-gun rattle and heavy thuds of artillery practice at the still-active portion of adjacent 
Fort Devens. From this peculiar mix of features, M2W refuges emerge as a type of hybrid 
space – seemingly natural places shaped by military technologies. In the next section, I 
examine one of these landscapes and its hybridized mix of characteristics by turning to the 
map that illustrates public use of the Big Oaks National Wildlife Refuge. 
 
The Big Oaks NWR Public Use Map 
 
The map of Big Oaks shows a patchwork of access categories across the 50,000-acre 
expanse of the site, including day use, hunting areas, roads, streams, and closed areas. One 
shaded block that stands out in the north-central part of the refuge is labeled, “Air National 
Guard Range – No Access” (Figure 6.6: Big Oaks NWR Public Use Map).  
In the place portrayed by this map we can witness both past productions and current 
landscapes as they coexist. Even as Indiana Air National Guard bombing runs seem to be 
very different in nature from U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service activities dedicated to 
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conservation, these actions in fact occur within the same perimeter fences of the Big Oaks 
National Wildlife Refuge. Unlike many M2W sites where FWS managers contend primarily 
with the residues of past military actions, within Big Oaks we find military exercises 
concurrent with the FWS’s conservation programs. 
A 1,033-acre Air National Guard parcel, nestled within the boundaries of the national 
wildlife refuge, continues to function as an active air gunnery range for the Indiana Air 
National Guard where, “almost daily, fighter jets come into this area from five states to test 
shooting accuracy,” including air-to-ground bombing and strafing.579 During its 
environmental analyses, the Fish and Wildlife Service considered such activity 
“incompatible” with the refuge so the bombing range was kept apart as an inholding “until 
such a time when the range is no longer needed and the land can be transferred to the 
refuge.”580 In fact, the Air National Guard offers benefits recognized by some of the Big 
Oaks’ FWS staff. The Guard currently maintains all forty-eight miles of perimeter fencing 
that encircles the refuge, and also covers maintenance and repairs on a portion of the refuge 
roads. These services represent a contribution of more than $50,000 annually that the FWS 
likely would not be able to afford on its own.581 
Although the bombing range is technically not part of the wildlife refuge, the 
targeting area exists fully within the Big Oaks’ refuge boundary. Most weeks from Tuesday 
through Friday the Air Guard conducts aerial operations dropping duds at ground targets. 
This requires the FWS to keep out of a one to two-mile buffer surrounding the targeting zone 
 
579 JPG Disposal and Reuse 1995, p. 11. 
580 JPG Disposal and Reuse 1995, p. 11.  
581 Personal communication with Dan Matiatos, Assistant Refuge Manager, Big Oaks National Wildlife Refuge, 
IN, 14 December 2005. 
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for approximately one hour (during hunting seasons this sometimes also requires a 
rearrangement of assigned hunting units).582 One or two times per year the majority of the 
entire refuge is also closed off as a safety fan for a precision guided range that includes live 
munitions (Figure 6.7: Big Oaks NWR Aerial Bombing Ranges and Safety Fans). 
The environmental impact statement for the JPG’s closure and proposed reuse as a 
refuge includes only a brief assessment of the consequences of bombing practice occurring 
inside a wildlife refuge:  “Potential conflicts exist between the Public Use Plan and the Air 
National Guard activities. People using adjoining areas for wildlife oriented activities would 
be subjected to the noise generated by low flying jets… Future planning efforts will need to 
look at this issue to determine if relocation of the range to a better location is feasible.”583 
The FWS has long assumed that the Indiana Air National Guard would soon terminate its 
mission at the Jefferson range, but military officials have given no indication that this will be 
the case. As I pointed out in the previous chapter, the FWS actually has no control over the 
fate of the Air Guard base. According to the terms of the Army’s lease to the FWS, “The Air 
National Guard’s range use schedule will have precedence over wildlife management 
activities,”584 and it is far from clear whether the FWS or Indiana Air National Guard holds 
the stronger hand in dictating future uses of the site. 
The Big Oaks refuge is subjected to hazards that go beyond the nuisance of low 
flying jets or the regular closure of a portion of its lands. In 1998, an Indiana Air National 
Guard pilot lost control of his F-16 jet and was forced to eject. His aircraft exploded upon  
 
582 Personal communication with Dan Matiatos, 14 December 2005. 
583 JPG Disposal and Reuse 1995, p. 11. 
584 Memorandum of Agreement, p. 2.
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Figure 6.6: Big Oaks NWR Public Use585 
585 Source: http://midwest.fws.gov/BigOaks/recreationmapall.htm [3 March 2004]. 
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Figure 6.7: Big Oaks NWR Aerial Bombing Ranges and Safety Fans586 
impact in the JPG.587 Such events bring a sobering element of reality to the mandatory visitor 
training currently in place to orient the public to likely hazards of the Big Oaks site. The Fish 
 
586 Map source: Department of Army Permit No. DACA27-4-00-087 for the National Wildlife Refuge at
Jefferson Proving Ground, Indiana, 5 July 2000, photocopy from Big Oaks NWR files. Safety fans, or zones of
exclusion, are drawn as prominent black ovals surrounding the conventional and laser bombing ranges.
587 18 November 1998, Atlanta Journal and Constitution, p. 7A, “Pilot Safely Ejects Before Jet Crashes.”  
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and Wildlife Service requires all visitors of the Big Oaks site to watch a 20-minute video that 
illustrates the various hazards present at the site, then sign a hold-harmless agreement (see 
Appendix B: Release and Acknowledgment of Danger – Hold Harmless Agreement for Big 
Oaks National Wildlife Refuge). Of course, Air National Guard activities also impact the 
refuge’s non-human inhabitants – presenting another potential hazard wildlife must contend 
with in addition to UXO and DU at Big Oaks.588 
Portraying Landscapes 
 
Even as cluttered with information as the Big Oaks Public Use map (Fig. 6.6) may be, 
it actually represents only a portion of the social struggle over this landscape that has taken 
place, and in some cases continues; like any map, it both reveals and conceals particular 
contestations over place. We find landscape features such as roads, streams, and lakes clearly 
portrayed. With the map’s demarcation of hunting units and a block designation for day use 
in the northeast corner we can infer that the public has access to certain spaces, at least, while 
other notations (Air National Guard range, barricade) clearly establish that such access has 
limits. There is no indication, however, that the areas open for hunting or day use remain 
cluttered with military hazards, and that hunting exists in these particular units not because 
they are known to be safe, but simply because hunting has occurred here for decades. To the 
contrary, closures that appear on the map with a form of explanation (i.e. “closed – UXO”) 
suggest that open areas might actually be free from such dangers. 
 
588 Similar conflicts over military activities as “secondary uses” of national wildlife refuges emerged from the 
GAO reports discussed in more depth in Chapter Two.  
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There is also no indication on the public use map of the temporary closures that affect 
the refuge periodically during aerial bombing practices; no hint that Fish and Wildlife 
Service Director Jamie Clark sought and failed to secure a five-year sunset provision for the 
Air National Guard base’s existence inside the refuge boundaries589 or that the FWS and Air 
Guard ever competed for exclusive control of the entire 51,000 acres north of the firing line. 
The map does not offer any explanation why public day use is only permitted in one corner of 
the refuge, or reveal that the FWS sought and failed to secure an Army cleanup of the entire 
northern tier of the refuge. The zone harboring depleted uranium (“Closed – DU”) appears 
static and contained on this map, regardless of the questions that continue to be asked about 
its movement through biological and physical transport, or the fact that its Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission permit remains open and allows for additional radioactive materials 
to be deposited on site.590 
It may be tempting to dismiss such a list of questions and concerns because of course 
a single map can only present a select amount of information about a particular place and 
each of these points in some ways might seem rather mundane. This brings us back directly 
to Mitchell’s point that strategic struggles and compromises can gain an appearance of 
stability that seems unremarkable.  Central to our consideration of the Big Oaks refuge ought 
to be the message that it remains a remarkable place. If a map serves to naturalize the 
presence in the landscape of such extraordinary landscape features as thousands of pounds of 
 
589 Personal communication with Joe Robb, Big Oaks National Wildlife Refuge Manager, Big Oaks NWR, IN, 
16 December 2005. 
590 See minutes from Big Oaks National Wildlife Refuge Restoration Advisory Board, 30 April 2003, pp. 75-
100. There is no indication that the Army has active plans to add to the quantity of DU currently present on site 
at Big Oaks. 
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depleted uranium or millions of rounds of military explosives, then we may quickly lose 
track of the meaning of the very processes that produced these characteristics. We may, in 
short, grow to understand such places as simply national wildlife refuges rather than also 
recognizing their lasting existence as militarized spaces. 
 
Public Hazards and Risk Society 
 
One way to view M2W refuges more openly as spaces characterized by elements of 
wildlife conservation and militarization is through the lens offered by Ulrich Beck’s 
theorization of “Risk Society.”591 In describing risk society, Beck points to two stages of 
modernity: the first is characterized by reliance on nation-states and a period of 
industrialization; the second stage emerges with the aging of stage one and is characterized 
by society’s inability to insure itself against the hazards produced by the risks taken during 
industrialization. In this second stage, hazards and social structures are no longer bounded by 
political territories: “The very idea of controllability, certainty or security – which is so 
fundamental in the first modernity – collapses. A new kind of capitalism, a new kind of 
 
591 See, for example, Beck, Ulrich, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity, translated from German by Mark 
Ritter, (London: Sage Publications, 1992); Beck, Ulrich, Ecological Politics in an Age of Risk (Cambridge, UK: 
Polity Press, 1995); and Beck, Ulrich, World Risk Society (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press [US publication by 
Blackwell, Malden, MA] 1999). 
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economy, a new kind of global order, a new kind of society and a new kind of personal life 
are coming into being, all of which differ from earlier phases of social development.”592 
M2W conversions and the opening of military spaces to new kinds of uses provide a 
fitting example of this description of a reordering of hazards and the breakdown of seemingly 
rigid boundaries. Much as military base conversions can open up previously closed spaces to 
increased public scrutiny and use, they also release hazards into a more public sphere. In 
some cases, such as contaminated soils becoming airborne or toxins entering groundwater, 
the hazards have long extended beyond the confines of DOD boundaries but information 
about the hazards was carefully guarded or simply unknown. In other instances, the opening 
of military spaces to new uses as wildlife refuges actually exposes the public to dangers that 
had been more limited under military management. One chilling example of this was recalled 
by a biologist working at the Upper Mississippi National Fish and Wildlife Refuge’s Lost 
Mound Unit. In order to conduct a mussel survey, state researchers were grubbing blindly in 
the Mississippi River sediments to catch and identify the mollusks. One particularly large 
“mussel,” once brought to the surface and washed of mud, turned out to be a hand grenade.593 
Munitions experts later identified the grenade as a “practice dummy,” but there is plenty of 
live ordnance still buried in the site’s Mississippi mud. 
In still other cases, such as hunting at Big Oaks, the on-site exposure may be very 
little changed as lands change from military control to FWS management, but the public 
 
592 Beck, World Risk Society, 1999, p. 2. In addition to the two stages of modernity, Beck also describes a third 
epoch of “pre-industrial society” typical of traditional societies. In addition to Beck, 1992; and Beck, 1995; see 
also Mythen, Gabe, Ulrich Beck: A Critical Introduction to the Risk Society (London: Pluto Press, 2004). 
593 Personal communication with Ed Anderson, Illinois Department of Natural Resources District Natural
Resources Biologist, Savanna Field Station, 30 May 2006.
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awareness of hazards may actually diminish as the reputations of these places shift from 
explicitly requiring caution to pointing instead toward conservation and the assurance of 
safety connoted by the label “refuge.”594 Given the conditions of aging infrastructure at many 
M2W sites, the historical processes and decisions by which these places were created, and 
the array of hazards now present, these places in many ways appear as prime examples and 
particular locations that fit Beck’s terms of Risk Society. What remains less certain, however, 
is how this view of M2W refuges as components of risk society can inform public 
management and understanding. Will these places provide scientists and federal managers 
with new opportunities to critically examine the relationship between technology, militarism, 
and the environment, as Beck’s theory might suggest, or will these spaces perpetuate existing 
institutions and environmental politics? 
 
No Refuge from Risk Society 
 
According to Beck, a risk society emerges after individuals and institutions 
systematically take risks over a period of decades. The ultimate consequences may be neither 
foreseeable nor, ultimately, fully remediable. Military venues such as the JPG present a 
classic case of this type of activity. Artillery exercises are planned and conducted with little 
apparent regard for the long-term condition of the place in which they occur, or the prospect 
that such sites might one day be opened to different priorities incompatible with hazardous 
military residues. As a case in point: the JPG’s disposal and reuse analysis estimated that the 
cost of cleaning up millions of rounds of unexploded ordnance that litter the Big Oaks 
 
594 Admittedly, the entry process at Big Oaks likely instills a certain cautiousness in most visitors. 
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National Wildlife Refuge would range from $8,500 to $22,000 per acre for a clearing depth 
of four feet. To clear UXO to a ten foot depth (which would still leave some ordnance in 
place), the cost estimates jump to $30,000 per acre for a “best case scenario” up to $88,000 
per acre for less optimal conditions.595 
As risk societies mature into Beck’s second phase, risks begin to dominate “public, 
political and private debates.”596 From Congress to BRAC Commissions to refuge managers 
or local citizen advocacy groups, we now find ourselves needing to engage with these 
hazards that had formerly been hidden or seemed contained. The distribution of risks is also 
characteristically uneven in both space and time; unlike blighted industrial districts, toxic 
repositories, or other residues of the first modernity that spark cries of environmental 
injustice, the risks of Beck’s new era spread more broadly across class lines. Military sites 
and their toxic and explosive hazards were produced over a period of decades in restricted 
areas and are now entering society via shifting land designations that render the closed 
military spaces into the more open realm of wildlife refuges. These refuges in many cases are 
viewed as amenities that attract leisure-class visitors as well as wealthy developers.  
Remediating the hazards of latter day risk societies is an extremely costly proposition. 
As Beck notes, there is also a certain asymmetry to risks and hazards.597 Though clearly 
related, risks and hazards often involve different constellations of people. Military activities 
over the years involved risks taken by a number of military planners and personnel; today’s 
hazards primarily affect refuge staff trying to manage and clean up their newly acquired sites. 
 
595 Disposal and Reuse 1995, pp. 4-40 – 4-41. 
596 Beck 1996: 27. 
597 Beck 1996: 37. 
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This shift in exposure actually shows in EPA standards for cleaning up contaminated M2W 
sites. The typical EPA standard at these locations is gauged to protect the health of a wildlife 
refuge worker – a less rigorous threshold than that required for most commercial or 
residential uses where exposure is expected to be essentially continuous. Even though the 
public coming to visit these lands face a more temporary exposure, they too are subject to 
hazards created during years of military activity. (Of course, there is also an array of resident 
wildlife at any site that receives only occasional monitoring and is not necessarily covered by 
the EPA standards.) There are also off-site hazards that may be inadequately considered – or 
impossible to determine – as management activities such as prescribed burning or 
transporting contaminated soils, physical processes such as wind and water, recreational 
activities, or biological transport via wildlife may mobilize dangerous substances and 
disperse them beyond the site boundaries. 
There is in fact a good deal of uncertainty about how best to deal with problems such 
as contaminated soils, ammunition bunkers, UXO, depleted uranium, and other military 
residues that linger at most M2W sites. What the effects of management activities will be, 
and if enough cleanup is even possible to ensure human safety on (or off) the site remains 
uncertain and disputed. According to Beck, it is not possible in any practical sense to insure 
against the production of some hazards generated by risk societies: we undertake the actions, 
such as building a nuclear reactor (Beck’s example) or impacting 50,000 acres with tons of 
explosives and depleted uranium (to use the Big Oaks refuge as an example), in a myopic 
state of optimism or ignorance. At best, we postpone effective understanding of the 
consequences of such actions to many years or generations hence. Even over time, however, 
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science and technology may produce hazards that scientists cannot fully consider or mitigate 
against. 
This latter point emerges clearly at many M2W sites where a common response from 
federal officials is that complete cleanup simply is not possible. At the Rocky Mountain 
Arsenal, the consolidate-and-contain remediation strategy currently underway was adopted in 
part due to a lack of other attractive options. A number of citizens who participated in the 
decision-making process for the Arsenal’s conversion advocated for what they saw as a more 
complete cleanup, in which contaminated soils would be hauled off-site for treatment or 
stockpiling in a location removed from a metropolitan area. Federal authorities ruled against 
this option primarily for reasons of cost and scientific uncertainty: there was no way to 
guarantee the safety of hauling thousands of truckloads of contaminated material on public 
roadways to a remote destination.598 As it turns out, and much in accord with Beck, even the 
alternative being implemented at the Arsenal comes with no guarantee of a permanent, safe 
resolution. Landfilling toxic materials is, at best, an imperfect science and it comes with a 
long record of failures. For a reminder of this we need to look no farther than the Arsenal’s 
Basin F landfill that leached contaminants into groundwater with disastrous results; when it 
was completed in 1956, Basin F was widely touted for being “leakproof.”599 
598 These same risks of transportation were deemed acceptable when it came to shipping radioactive waste to the
Department of Energy’s Yucca Mountain site in Nevada.
599 “Asphaltic Membrane is Used to Leakproof a Lake,” Engineering News Record, 22 November 1956, pp. 40-
41 (Rocky Mountain Arsenal JARDF document # B5600033); and “Leakproof Bottom Underlies 100-acre Lake 
Near Denver,” Omaha (Nebraska) World-Herald, 11 November 1956 (Rocky Mountain Arsenal JARDF 
document # B5600032). 
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Risk Society and Ecological Modernization 
 
At first glance, the trend toward technological decay and hazard highlighted by Beck 
seems to conflict with one of the dominant environmental discourses of recent decades, 
ecological modernization, which presents technological solutions to environmental and 
economic problems.600 As Christoff characterizes the decline of this rosy view of technology, 
“Optimistic notions of progress, based on uncritical belief in the benefits of the scientific and 
industrial appropriation of Nature, have now collapsed into anxiety and mistrust.”601 
While this anxiety and mistrust is most evident in the realm of high-consequence 
technologies such as nuclear, chemical, ecological and genetic engineering, the lesson 
brought by an awareness of risk society is that some technologies simply cannot be 
controlled over the long term.602 This exact lesson emerges from a number of M2W 
conversion locations. Land managers have discovered that they cannot fully insure against 
the hazard of chemical contamination, radiation, the volatilization of depleted uranium 
through prescribed burns, or unexploded ordnance deemed too ubiquitous to countenance any 
concerted cleanup. At some basic level, most M2W refuges rest upon the shaky foundations 
of risk society even as policymakers seek to explain military-to-wildlife conversions through 
the terms of ecological modernization (or more specifically, ecological militarization, which 
I examine in the next chapter). 
 
600 See Hajer, 1995.
601 Christoff, Peter, “Ecological Modernisation, Ecological Modernities,” Environmental Politics 5(1996), p. 
496. 
602 See Blowers, Andrew, “Environmental Risk Policy: Ecological Modernisation or the Risk Society?” Urban 
Studies 34(5-6)(1997): 845-871.
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In fact, risk society and ecological modernization can be seen as related explanations 
of contemporary environmental politics and public policy as both rely upon certain 
constructions of science and technology. This is a point highlighted by Cohen, “The role of 
scientific rationality in promoting economic and environmental progress is particularly 
central in both the risk society and ecological modernisation.”603 The question remains, 
however, whether these two perspectives can somehow be reconciled to contribute toward a 
productive, enduring, and environmentally safe society. For this task, a “strong” form of 
ecological modernization may present a real prospect for change that genuinely addresses 
environmental problems and conservation, thoughtfully integrates modern technologies, and 
brings decision-making more fully into civil society.604 
In its strongest form, ecological modernization does not simply accommodate 
existing institutions and technologies, but rather challenges the status quo of industrialization 
to ecologize, or reorient along more holistic and diverse priorities. These would necessarily 
extend across traditional environmental, social, and cultural boundaries adhered to by weak 
ecological modernization, thereby constructing new geographies of nature and society. That 
is, “strong ecological modernisation therefore also points to the potential for developing a 
range of alternative ecological modernities, distinguished by their diversity of local cultural 
and environmental conditions although still linked through their common recognition of 
human and environmental rights and a critical or reflexive relationship to certain common 
technologies, institutional forms and communicative practices.”605 
603 Cohen, Maurie J., “Risk Society and Ecological Modernisation,” Futures 29(2)(1997), pp. 105-119 (p. 106). 
604 Christoff, 1996.
605 Christoff, 1996, p. 496.
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In this version, ecological modernization manages to operate not in spite of or in 
opposition to the existence of risk society, but rather as a discourse fully informed by this 
critical view of technology and its responsiveness to questions of risk and authority. As 
Cohen points out:  
Increasing incertitude about the virtues of technological advance and 
public recognition of science’s shortcomings can facilitate the democratisation 
[sic] of technical knowledge. This reorientation generates the possibility for 
the lay public to gain control over its technology while encouraging science to 
overcome its reductionist tendencies. With the emergence of a more holistic 
science, space is created for a process of social learning to emerge. In such a 
manner, the most odious effects of a risk society can be contained and it 
becomes feasible to envision a future built upon more humane technology.606 
Recognizing, then, that it ought to be possible to work from a position informed for 
the better by risk society and ecological modernization, I examine in the next chapter the 
more pointed question of whether military-to-wildlife refuge conversions represent examples 
of such integrative and productive change.  
 
Learning from Risk Society 
 
In addition to M2W sites’ relevance to Beck’s Risk Society, another productive 
reason for turning to this theory is that it presents a view that is not exclusively pessimistic. 
In fact, Beck chides the “ontological pessimism of certainty” that relieves us “of all 
responsibility for action.”607 In place of this motive for inaction, Beck sees the destabilizing 
qualities of Risk Society as offering opportunities for change: “Where everything is at stake, 
 
606 Cohen, 1997, p. 108.
607 Beck, World Risk Society, pp. 88 and 86, respectively. 
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everything can and must be rethought and reexamined.”608 Framing M2W refuges as 
constituents of Risk Society in this context presents an opportunity to consider these changes 
as broader contributions of social change. As I have highlighted already, M2W conversions 
can open military spaces to more transparent and public decision-making processes. Beck 
notes a similar opening of decision-making that comes with the onset of risk society and 
suggests that institutional reform of private corporations and the sciences (and I would add, 
federal agencies), “could encourage environmental innovations and help to construct a better 
developed public sphere in which crucial questions of value that underpin risk conflicts can 
be debated and judged.”609 
This points to the possibility that M2W conversions could contribute to changes in 
society that extend beyond the mere renaming of military bases to an actual examination of 
what kinds of actions occur on military bases, how far-reaching the impacts of these 
activities can be, and what underlying values are represented or fostered in these spaces. This 
perhaps seems a tall order, but increased public awareness about what actually occurs on 
military bases may well come as an essential early step in spurring broader public debate 
about militarization generally. Unlike the human casualties and environmental consequences 
of foreign wars, the impacts that we uncover from many domestic military bases strike in 
many ways much closer to home.  
This may be rather obvious geographically, as local residents learn about toxic 
groundwater plumes, airborne pollutants, or other hazards that affect them directly. These 
may also come in the form of physically maimed and psychologically damaged soldiers 
 
608 Beck, World Risk Society, p. 88. 
609 Beck, World Risk Society, p. 5. 
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returning from combat to communities and institutions no longer willing or able to support 
them.610 Or, as U.S. President (and General) Dwight D. Eisenhower once noted, “Every gun 
that is made, every warship fired, signifies in the final sense a theft from those who hunger 
and are not fed, those who are cold and not clothed.”611 
We may also recognize, however, that the risks taken during years of activity at 
military bases have generated hazards that differ from those of war by virtue of their 
“peaceful” origins, or what Beck calls “normal birth.”612 These impacts differ from war 
damage in their genesis from, “the centres of rationality and prosperity with the blessings of 
the guarantors of law and order. They differ from pre-industrial natural disasters by their 
origin in decision-making, which is of course conducted never by individuals but by entire 
organizations and political groups.”613 What we find at military bases once they are opened 
somewhat to public inspection is that violence has been done to the land, water, plants, 
animals, atmosphere, and more, but not directly to humans in the same way it is during 
warfare.  
In order to understand M2W conversions in a way that contributes constructively to a 
more democratic politics, we must also recognize that even as the products now found at 
 
610 See Lutz, xx; and de Yoanna, Michael, “Pattern of Misconduct: Fort Carson Soldiers Allege Abuse and
Intimidation,” Colorado Springs Independent, 13-19 July 2006, pp. 14-19. De Yoanna’s article describes
heightened levels of suicide, substance abuse, and drunk driving among soldiers returning from active duty in
Iraq, many of whom have been diagnosed as suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder but instead of
receiving institutional support from the Army face dishonorable discharges and a loss of employment and health
and education benefits.
611 Eisenhower quoted in Barnett, p. 96.
612 Beck, World Risk Society, p. 50.
613 Beck, World Risk Society, p. 50. 
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these sites become naturalized and viewed as part of the landscape, the liabilities that come 
with these products should not in turn be accepted as natural hazards. To return to Beck, 
“Risks always depend on decisions – that is, they presuppose decisions. They arise from the 
transformation of uncertainty and hazards into decisions.”614 The hazards of unexploded 
munitions, chemical contamination, discarded jet fuel, and other military residues come as a 
result of risks taken and decisions made during an earlier stage of industrial and military 
development – a stage that is now aging but also continues in new forms and in new 
locations around the world.  
If M2W conversions are to contribute meaningfully to real political change and 
democratization, then we also need to reveal the chronic uncertainty of the risks that have 
been taken in these places rather than simply accept experts’ assurances of safety. As Beck 
contends, “The exposure of scientific uncertainty is the liberation of politics, law and the 
public sphere from their expert patronization by technocracy. Thus the public 
acknowledgement of uncertainty opens the space for democratization.”615 We see this 
increased democratization of military spaces taking various form among the M2W 
conversion sites, from citizen groups such as Save the Valley and the Sierra Club at Big Oaks 
and the Rocky Mountain Arsenal, respectively, to the stronger role of public regulatory 
agencies such as state health departments and the federal EPA, to more visible indigenous 
claims to land at Vieques and Pacific island sites.616 
614 Beck, World Risk Society, p. 74. 
615 Beck, World Risk Society, p. 61. 
616 See, for example, Davis, Jeffrey Sasha, “Representing place: ‘Deserted isles’ and the reproduction of Bikini 
Atoll,” Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 95 (3)(2005): 607-625; Davis, Jeffrey Sasha, 




While the M2W conversion process generally opens up previously closed spaces to 
NEPA assessments, public hearings, Restoration Advisory Boards, regulatory oversight, and 
other forms of public engagement that are typically rare on active bases, the increased 
transparency may be only a passing phase if the resulting wildlife refuge (or other conversion 
category) remains completely closed to public use. At M2W refuges where there is no DOD-
sponsored cleanup, no visitor center, or no public access, the actual public engagement with 
the places may remain at or below levels maintained during military management. The 
opacity of these places, in other words, has the potential to return even in the absence of an 
active military. 
Such entirely “closed” M2W settings as Nomans Island and the Pacific island refuges 
still come with some political appeal as elected officials can point at least nominally to a new 
national wildlife refuge established in their districts rather than to a brownfield military base, 
but the deeper political opening that Woodward and others highlight for military conversions 
may not much apply to these settings.617 In these cases we can see again how scientific 
analyses alone may be incapable of establishing sufficient understanding of M2W sites. The 
ecological amenities of such places may be exceptionally well-protected behind locked gates 
and fences or in remote island settings, but the biological indices that establish this will tell 
 
justice” presentation at the Annual Meeting of the Association of American Geographers, Chicago, Illinois, 
March 2006. 
617 e.g. Woodward, Military Geographies, p. 54.  
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us very little about the broader contexts and meanings that produced such favorable 
conditions. Conservation biology’s opening premise that “biodiversity is good,” for example, 
can lead us to the logical conclusion that M2W conversions also are good if they serve to 
protect biological diversity.   
We should be wary of such broad determinations from one perspective, however 
worthwhile it may be, as the complex characteristics of M2W sites call for more multi-
faceted analyses. While this point may by now seem obvious, I return to it here because of 
the authoritative role that certain sciences come to play at many M2W refuges and how this 
affects public perceptions of these places. Staffed predominantly by experts with training in 
wildlife biology, conservation biology, or other natural sciences, M2W sites are cast as 
refuges for biodiversity and day-to-day management proceeds accordingly.  
While I support this conservation goal in its broader outlines – such environmental 
protections remain an essential component to maintaining a recognizable and sustaining 
biosphere – we should be wary of the assumptions built into our embrace of such militarized 
places as refuges. There is a reason why we smile only wincingly at remarks such as Wendell 
Berry’s comment from the Big Oaks refuge (quoted in Chapter Five), that it is “a shame that 
there aren’t more areas of the country that were totally ruined by the Army.”618 When granted 
a fuller sense of the historical contexts of Big Oaks or other M2W locations, most observers 
likely agree that militarization is not the most desirable conservation strategy. We can find 
reason to appreciate some of the qualities now extant in these sites, but should not lose sight 
of the other characteristics that remain here as well. M2W refuges by another name are 
 
618 The quote is actually from Richard Hill, paraphrasing Berry from his visit to Big Oaks. See Chapter Five. 
From the context of the original quote, Berry is clearly aware of the irony of his remark. 
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simply “demilitarized zones,” which like the DMZ dividing the Korean Peninsula remain 
both highly militarized and the product of political conflict, social upheaval, and physical 
destruction. I suspect that few among us would actively prescribe this approach to creating 





Since the protection of biological diversity rests at the core of much of what we find 
valuable and positive about M2W refuges, it may be worth taking a moment to examine its 
construction and implications. Whatmore offers a pointed critique of the very concept of 
biodiversity, contending that it “fuels the scientific zeal for classification with a new moral 
purpose” and leads to the creation of increasingly institutionalized and commodified 
interactions with wildlife.619 This type of critique also resonates with animal rights activists 
who often point to the meaning of individual lives rather than attending primarily to 
population or species-level concerns. Both these positions seek to break down the dualistic 
separations between an “us” of humanity versus a “them” of the rest of the world’s biota. On 
this view, we should treat other living things as if they matter.620 
The Linnaean system of taxonomy that categorizes individuals into groups of similar 
kinds – into separate kingdoms, phyla, and so on down to species and sub-species – is of 
 
619 Whatmore, Hybrid Geographies, 2002, p. 21. For a more thorough consideration of biodiversity, see Takacs, 
David, The Idea of Biodiversity: Philosophies of Paradise (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996).
620 Whatmore, p. 31, uses this phrase to distinguish from a view built solely from an economic valuation of 
wildlife. 
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course an inherently dualistic project that depends upon either-or distinctions. Thus we have 
the functionally clear tool of a dichotomous key: either you have flower-like bracts or you do 
not.621 In this way, our understanding of biological diversity and our ability to identify it 
depends very much upon an institutionalized process that shapes our interactions with other 
organisms. This no doubt can lead to a heightened appreciation of certain individuals over 
others and generates a hierarchy of values – a version of what Whatmore laments as 
commodification. According to Takacs’ history of the creation of biodiversity as a concept, 
this was partly the intent: scientists sought to translate their research into terms that could be 
marketed politically without losing the prestige of objectivity.622 For those still operating 
somehow outside this system of classification, the value of the individual may remain 
untainted by an institutionalized framework. In this way, for example, my young daughter 
can see in a bird its iridescent plumage, its nimble hopping, and the marvel of flight what I 
dismiss as European starling. She sees starlings as if they matter; I see a non-native pest, 
Sturnus vulgaris.
Institutionalized systems of knowledge production can of course be extremely 
effective for a variety of purposes. Without some system for identification and classification, 
it might well be impossible to know when entire categories of organisms teetered on the 
brink of extinction. Tempting though it may be to blame contemporary environmental 
problems upon rifts triggered by the rational constructions of Descartes or Linnaeus, there is 
ample evidence that wildlife extinctions and other significant environmental transformations 
 
621 In recent years many of these seemingly clear distinctions have also come under scrutiny. See for example, 
Stamos, David N., The Species Problem: Biological Species, Ontology, and the Metaphysics of Biology
(Lanham, MD: Lexington Press, 2003).
622 Takacs, 1996.
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were also wrought by human societies operating outside such epistemologies.623 Ongoing 
projects to categorize and protect biodiversity may contribute to certain forms of wildlife 
commodification as Whatmore suggests, but we should recognize that these institutionalized 
approaches also help ensure organisms’ continued existence over the long term. If our lasting 
objective is to create a “better” set of relationships across categories – less hierarchical, rigid, 
commodified, or dualistic – a useful precondition in the case of human-wildlife interactions 
should at least be to encourage the prospect that representatives from all sides continue to 
exist. However tainted by institutionalized knowledge my view may be of European 
starlings, I suspect I still have a better chance of learning to treat them as if they matter than I 
do with the extinct Carolina parakeet.624 
Whatmore, too, ultimately adopts a rather pragmatic baseline for her critique of 
biodiversity. In fact, her ultimate vision is one that seems particularly appropriate for wildlife 
refuges with such militarized pasts as M2W sites: “the wildlife sanctuary…still has a place 
but it is no longer one of last resort or without a past. Rather, such sites mark one kind of 
dwelling-place in which to configure human-animal relations in ways which account of the 
social habits and ecological orderings of all their inhabitants.”625 In other words, we ought to 
 
623 For example, Denevan, William M., “The Pristine Myth: The Landscape of the Americas in 1492,” Annals
of the Association of American Geographers, 82(3)(1992): 369-385; Flores, Dan, The Natural West: 
Environmental History in the Great Plains and Rocky Mountains (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 
2001); Martin, Paul S., “Pleistocene Overkill,” Natural History (December 1967)pp. 32-38. 
624 Horgan makes a similar point in his review of Takacs’s critique of the concept of biodiversity; see Horgan, 
John, “It’s Not Easy Being Green,” review of The Idea of Biodiversity by David Takacs in 12 January 1997
New York Times Review of Books.
625 Whatmore 2002, p. 34. 
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acknowledge and bear witness that these refuges exist amid the contested settings of science, 
technology, and policy. We find here, as well, that it is important to make visible the forms 




Running through the trend of recent military closures generally, and M2W 
conversions more particularly, is the peril of historical erasure. As bases close and become 
known for new types of land use, we face the prospect of losing the memory of what 
happened in these places and what these actions promoted in terms of our national values, 
politics, and environment. As Mitchell warns, “one of the purposes of landscape is to make a 
scene appear unworked, to make it appear fully natural. So landscape is both a work and an 
erasure of work.”626 M2W conversions work doubly to naturalize sites of military 
production: the places become known publicly as wildlife refuges, which in turn are 
supposed to be natural places constituted largely outside the realm of culture. 
 There are, conversely, ways that M2W conversions could work to secure our cultural 
memory of the institutions and actions that predominated in creating the landscapes we now 
identify as new wildlife refuges. As I have already suggested, the often-dramatic hybrid 
qualities of these places can spur us to think more integratively about nature and society as 
co-producers of these landscapes and the changes occurring here. It may be, however, that 
labeling these militarized-naturalized sites as “wildlife refuges” fails to fully capture this 
sense. We may be lulled by this nomenclature into an oversimplified understanding of these 
 
626 Mitchell, Lie of the Land, p. 6. 
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landscapes and their production. This very concern emerged from the hearings held for the 
conversion of the Rocky Mountain Arsenal into a wildlife refuge, as a representative of The 
Wilderness Society suggested that the site should not be called a national wildlife refuge 
because it would weaken the popular understanding of this network of lands dedicated to 
wildlife conservation.627 
There is a certain irony to The Wilderness Society’s expression of concern here, as 
the concept of wilderness, itself, has come under attack for its possible contributions to 
cultural erasure and a nature-society dualism. Cronon’s influential critique of wilderness 
(1995) signaled that there may be broader risks associated with land preservation efforts that 
seem to close off spaces as natural at the exclusion of the social.628 With this 
characterization, “wilderness leaves precisely nowhere for human beings actually to make 
their living from the land.”629 
The prospective forfeiture of any lasting sense of the complex social relations built 
into M2W refuges stands out as one of the fundamental risks found with these conversions. 
Richard Misrach offers at least one way through this pitfall of lost sociopolitical memory 
 
627 “Rocky Mountain Arsenal National Wildlife Refuge Act of 1991,” transcript of hearings by the House of 
Representatives, Military Installations and Facilities Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services and 
the Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation and the Environment Subcommittee of the Committee on Merchant 
Marine and Fisheries, Denver, CO, 9 September 1991.  
628 Cronon, William, “The Trouble with Wilderness; or, Getting Back to the Wrong Nature,” in: Cronon, W. 
(ed.) Uncommon Ground: Toward Reinventing Nature, (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1995), pp. 69-
90. For further consideration of Cronon’s concerns, see Callicott, J. Baird and Michael P. Nelson, eds. The 
Great New Wilderness Debate, (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1998); and Havlick, 2006.
629 Cronon, 1995, p. 80. 
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with his provocative proposal for a Bravo 20 National Park.630 A stark landscape littered with 
craters, bomb casings, UXO, and the charred remains of military targets (including school 
buses and communications towers), the Bravo 20 site scarcely conjures up associations with 
America’s scenic national parks. In order to retain and commemorate the blend of social and 
environmental attributes extant in places such as the Nevada Bravo 20 bombing range, 
Misrach envisions an environmental memorial that invites the public to explore, confront, 
and consider the site as it combines violence, power, politics, and nature: 
Bravo 20 would be a unique and powerful addition to our current park 
system. In these times of extraordinary environmental concern, it would serve 
as a permanent reminder of how military, government, corporate, and 
individual practices can harm the earth… it would be a national 
acknowledgment of a complex and disturbing period in our history… Bravo 
20 would not only provide a graphic record of our treatment of less celebrated 
landscapes but also help deter their destruction in the future.631 
Misrach’s vision is explicitly political and critical – he suggests that the Bravo 20 visitor 
center, “be devoted to the history of military abuse in peacetime. Displays and exhibits will 
include our radioactive experiments on the residents of the Marshall Islands in the Pacific, 
the contamination of continental America by tests at the Nevada Nuclear Test Site, the 
Colorado Rocky Flats nuclear weapons plant and Hanford nuclear area in Washington State, 
chemical weapons storage, toxic waste disposal, and the confiscation of land and airspace 
throughout America.”632 (See Figure 6.8: Bravo 20 National Park Proposal.) Yet the 
photographs and text that accompany his proposal make clear that there is also an element of 
 
630 Misrach, Richard (with Myriam Weisang Misrach). Bravo 20: The Bombing of the American West 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990). 
631 Misrach, p. 95. 
632 Misrach, p. 95.
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beauty in this place that contributes to the project serving as a memorial for abused lands as 
well as a form of environmental protection. Misrach’s depiction illustrates how an 
environmental memorial could preserve not only a snapshot of land but a sense of the 
processes and institutions that created the land’s form. It would, in other words, maintain the 
visibility of the landscape’s production and press the public to learn from these actions. 
 Misrach is neither alone in his vision nor, in some respects, outlandish. In addition to 
the scenic national parks for which it is most well-known, the U.S. National Park Service 
currently manages dozens of historical sites that recognize and commemorate military 
battles, massacres, and other events that do not necessarily reflect favorably upon the United 
States’ national heritage.633 The refuge manager of the Aroostook NWR  in northern Maine 
noted that this M2W site would have made an excellent national park in order to preserve the 
place’s cultural legacy; as Loring Air Force Base, the site was the nearest nuclear-armed 
domestic base to Moscow throughout the Cold War.634 
This points to one of the common explanations of the value of learning about history: 
that we may learn from the past to inform the present and future.635 Foote addresses this 
concern, as well, in his work on how landscapes of violence are commemorated or 
 
Figure 6.8: Bravo 20 National Park Proposal636 
633 These include sites such as the Sand Creek Massacre National Historic Site, Little Bighorn Battlefield
National Monument, and Big Hole National Battlefield.
634 Personal communication with William Kolodnicki, 6 July 2006.
635 See, for example, the Forest History Society’s motto, “By understanding the past, we shape our future;”
www.foresthistory.org.
636 From Misrach, p. 99.
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obliterated. When he turns in particular to how lands associated with late twentieth-century 
militarization are being expunged from public view, he muses, “Perhaps it would be better if 
more of these reminders of the Cold War were kept to commemorate a period when the entire 
world seemed at all times only moments away from nuclear destruction. It is my hope that 
these largely forgotten sites of the past fifty years will one day be marked in the landscape as 
reminders – and warnings – for future generations.”637 
A pivotal turn in this process of commemoration versus historical erasure comes with 
the Department of Defense’s ability to convince the public that it has already moved beyond 
the problems of the past. Put more in terms of Beck’s risk theorization, the DOD seeks to 
 
637 Foote, Shadowed Ground, p. 357.
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generate public trust by appearing to have insured society against historical risks.638 By 
greening military bases and committing them toward new projects of environmental 
conservation, the federal government works to assure the public that the military practices 
that produced technologies ranging from chemical weapons to depleted uranium ordnance to 
nuclear missiles can be successfully managed, and that these hazards can become 
ecologically benign or even helpful.
The key framing for this transformation to succeed rests upon what I call ecological 
militarization.639 In the chapter ahead I turn more fully to this particular discourse of change 
that casts military activities as compatible with environmental protections. This, in turn, may 
influence how the general public learns to recognize over the long term the contested 
character of M2W spaces. 
 
638 Beck, World Risk Society, p. 50, calls this the “calculus of risks” and maintains that the DOD and other 
institutions have, in fact, produced uninsurable hazards. 
639 As I have noted elsewhere, ecological militarization extends from the broader discourse of ecological 
modernization. On the latter, see for example, Hajer, 1995; Dryzek, 1997; Massa, Ilmo and Mikael Skou 
Andersen, “Special Issue Introduction: Ecological Modernization,” Journal of Environmental Policy and 
Planning 2(2000):265-267; Fisher, Dana R., “Ecological Modernization and its Critics: Assessing the Past and 
Looking toward the Future,” Society and Natural Resources 14(2001): 701-709. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
ECOLOGICAL MILITARIZATION: A NEW ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS FOR 
THE MILITARY 
Among the diverse characteristics of military-to-wildlife conversions and the array of 
legal processes by which they are enacted, one aspect of these changes that holds constant is 
the presentation that military activities and environmental conservation are at some level 
compatible. In this final chapter, I examine a key discourse at work in M2W conversions, 
ecological militarization, and assess what the consequences may be of accepting this version 
of compatibility between the military and the environment.  
Ecological militarization extends from the substantial existing literature on ecological 
modernization, so my analysis opens with a brief examination of this broader discourse. 
Ecological modernization brings technological, growth-oriented responses to bear upon 
environmental problems. Whether such responses represent a thorough reworking of existing 
practices and ideologies or a superficial treatment of symptoms depends, at least in part, upon 
whether they are characterized by ecological or economic principles, and how fully we open 
the process to democratic and public engagement versus entrusting it to experts and 
traditional institutions of power.640 After sharpening this discourse analysis to the more 
 
640 Hajer, Maarten A. The Politics of Environmental Discourse: Ecological Modernization and the Policy
Process (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995); Dryzek, John S. The Politics of the Earth: Environmental Discourses
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specific cases of military-to-wildlife conversions, I close by assessing how M2W conversions 
could foster a genuine transformation of militarized spaces that leads to a democratic and 
open environmental politics, as well as a more robust understanding of militarization and its 




Ecological modernization rests upon the view that ecological crises can be overcome 
by technical and procedural innovation and that existing institutions can respond sufficiently 
to environmental problems.641 More simply, ecological modernization contends that 
economic growth and environmental protection are compatible, even complementary 
goals.642 In this, the discourse offers a route through (post)industrial society that can be both 
politically and environmentally attractive and often promises win-win solutions.  
 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2nd edition, 2005), pp. 172-176; and Christoff, Peter, “Ecological
Modernisation, Ecological Modernities,” Environmental Politics 5(1996): 490.
641 See Hajer, 1995, pp. 25-26. More generally on ecological modernization see: Mol, Arthur P.J., “Ecological 
Modernisation and Institutional Reflexivity: Environmental Reform in the Late Modern Age,” Environmental 
Politics 5(1996): 302-323; Mol, A. and D. Sonnenfeld, “Ecological Modernisation around the World: an 
Introduction,” Environmental Politics 9(1)(2000): 3-16; Mol, A. and Gert Spaargaren, “Ecological 
Modernisation Theory in Debate: A Review,” Environmental Politics 9(1)(2000): 17-49; Gonzalez, George A., 
“Local Growth Coalitions and Air Pollution Controls: The Ecological Modernisation of the U.S. in Historical 
Perspective,” Environmental Politics 11(3)(2002): 121-144. 
642 See Hajer, Maarten, A., “Ecological Modernisation as Cultural Politics,” In: Lash, Scott, Bronislaw 
Szerszynski and Brian Wynne (eds.) Risk, Environment and Modernity: Towards a New Ecology (London: Sage 
Publications, 1996), pp. 246-268; and Gonzalez, 2001, p. 327. 
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The accommodation of existing institutions and values leads to a principal critique 
that ecological modernization fails to challenge basic capitalist ideologies and may be 
coopted into little more than a rhetorical greenwashing strategy. As Christoff describes 
ecological modernization: “there is a danger that the term may serve to legitimise [sic] the 
continuing instrumental domination and destruction of the environment, and the promotion of 
less democratic forms of government, foregrounding modernity’s industrial and technocratic 
discourses over its more recent resistant and critical ecological components.”643 Even so, as 
Dryzek counters, ecological modernization may also offer, “a plausible strategy for 
transforming industrial society into a radically different and more environmentally defensible 
(but still capitalist) alternative.”644 This tension between ecological modernization as a 
strategy for legitimizing industrial society versus one dedicated to reforming it remains 
actively contested. It also emerges frequently in the context of military conversions as new 
M2W refuges are commonly seen as either superficial, least-cost designations to cover up 
damage wrought by military activities, or they are viewed as beacons of change signaling a 
streamlined and newly environmentally conscientious Department of Defense. 
The common casting of military-to-wildlife conversions as win-win scenarios where 
managerial and technological innovation produce military and environmental “goods,” nests 
rather easily within the ideas of ecological modernization. As I highlighted in Chapter One, 
this presentation of military-environment compatibility emerges from the innermost circles of 
the federal government, with Dick Cheney noting in 1990, “Defense and the environment is 
 
643 Christoff, 1996, p. 497. Hajer, 1996; Harvey, 1996; Dryzek, 1997; and Gonzalez, 2001; each raise versions of
these critiques.
644 Dryzek, John S. The Politics of the Earth: Environmental Discourses (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2nd
edition, 2005), p. 179.
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not an either/or proposition. To choose between them is impossible in this real world of 
serious defense threats and genuine environmental concerns.”645 
As I turn in the sections that follow to a more detailed examination of ecological 
militarization as a policy discourse that facilitates M2W conversions, the parallel features 
and perils of ecological modernization never drift far from view. As I build toward the 
conclusion of the dissertation I move to an examination of how we may develop a stronger 
version of ecological militarization that contributes to genuine social change, environmental 




Beyond the two federal institutions I have highlighted throughout this dissertation – 
the U.S. Department of Defense and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service – one of the more 
formalized venues for the promotion of ecological militarization is the Center for 
Environmental Management of Military Lands (CEMML) at Colorado State University. 
Based in Fort Collins, Colorado, CEMML functions as a quasi-independent research 
organization – housed within Colorado State University, but largely funded by DOD 
contracts – that supplies environmental professionals to work in military settings. Its 
promotional materials succinctly state one of the fundamental premises of ecological 
militarization: “CEMML recognizes that military land use and resource conservation are 
 
645 Quoted in Dumanoski, Dianne, “Pentagon Takes First Steps Toward Tackling Pollution,” Boston Globe, 9
September 1990. 
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compatible goals that can be accomplished through the integration of sustainable land 
management practices.”646 
Though the Center for Environmental Management of Military Lands may be 
distinctive in its mission to advance the idea that military activities and environmental 
conservation fit neatly together, this same storyline comes through elsewhere from an array 
of sources including scientific publications, DOD and FWS reports, newspaper accounts, 
conservation organizations, Congressional hearings and legislation.647 From these diverse 
accounts, we can identify three principal elements held in common by ecological 
militarization.  
 
646 Center for Environmental Management of Military Lands website viewed online at
http://www.cemml.colostate.edu/ [11 July 2006].
647 I have provided examples of these throughout the previous chapters. As representative examples, see: Kim, 
Ke Chung, “Preserving Biodiversity in Korea’s Demilitarized Zone,” Science 278:5336(10 October 1997): 242-
243; Leslie, Michele, Gary K. Meffe and Jeffrey L. Hardesty, Conserving Biodiversity on Military Lands:  A 
Handbook for Natural Resource Managers (Washington, D.C.: The Department of Defense Biodiversity 
Initiative, U.S. Department of Defense, and The Nature Conservancy, 1996); Hoffecker, John F.,Twenty-Seven
Square Miles (Colorado: U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Rocky Mountain Arsenal National Wildlife Refuge,
2001); Schmidt, William E., “Nature Sows Life Where Man Brewed Death,” New York Times, 12 March 1989,
sec. 1, part 1, page 1; “National Wildlife Refuge Proposal for Jefferson Proving Ground in Trouble!” Hoosier 
Environmental Council action alert, n/d, photocopy from Big Oaks National Wildlife Refuge files, original 
printed from website, www.enviroweb.org/hecweb/alerts/jpgAlert.htm [28 April 1999]; “Rocky Mountain
Arsenal National Wildlife Refuge Act of 1991,” 9 September 1991, Joint Hearing Before the Fisheries and
Wildlife Conservation and the Environment Subcommittees of the Committee on Merchant Marine and
Fisheries [serial No. 102-61] and the Military Installations and Facilities Subcommittee of the Committee on
Armed Services, House of Representatives, 102nd Congress, 1st Session; PL 102-402.
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First, military practices and environmental conservation represent compatible 
activities that provide for the national defense and protection of biodiversity. In particular, 
the streamlining and modernizing of military operations in response to contemporary 
geopolitics creates new opportunities to protect plants, wildlife, and habitat. Next, existing 
institutions, current and advancing technologies, and centralized managerial responses can 
adequately accommodate requirements for cleanup, remediation, public safety, and 
conservation at military sites undergoing conversion. And third, economic and strategic 
considerations trigger the initial changes in land management objectives at military bases, but 
the nature of militarized places often dictates their reclassification to national wildlife 
refuges. Whether bases are closed as a result of the BRAC process, legislation, or other 
means, no one seriously claims that such closures occur first and foremost out of a desire to 
protect rare plant or animal populations. Once economic or military considerations direct a 
site into closure, then ecological factors are often parlayed to generate support for a wildlife 
refuge designation. 
 Upon examining these characteristics of ecological militarization more 
closely, we find that the structure of this discourse in many respects matches what 
critics describe as a “weak” version of ecological modernization (Table 7.1).648 Based 
largely upon the experience of the United States, ecological militarization pertains 
primarily within the context of a highly-industrialized state capable of externalizing 
many of the impacts of military activity. While the UK, Germany, and other 
developed states also have former military sites that are now either officially 
 
648 Christoff, 1996; Gonzalez, 2001.
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sanctioned or informally known as wildlife refuges, few less developed countries 
have either the incentive or the means to decommission militarized sites.649 
Table 7. 1: Two Types of Ecological Modernization650 
Weak Ecological Modernization Strong Ecological Modernization
Economistic     Ecological 
Technological (narrow)   Institutional/systemic (broad) 
Instrumental     Communicative 
Technocratic/corporatist   Deliberative/democratic 
Closed and shallow    Open and deep 
National     International 
Unitary (hegemonic)     Diversifying 
 
Indeed, the federal “streamlining” of the military infrastructure in the United 
States (and of U.S. bases in Germany) is largely made possible by: a) the expansion 
of U.S. military activities into the overseas territories of less developed regions such 
as Central and Southeast Asia; b) the shifting of militarization to less developed 
regions within the United States, such as the arid lands of the Intermountain West and 
Southwest, including lands long claimed as sovereign and still inhabited by Native 
Americans; and c) the outsourcing of military security, food service, energy and 
transportation supplies, and other essential services to private contractors such as 
Halliburton, Blackwater, Wackenhut, and others.651 
649 One obvious exception comes from sites in the former Soviet Union where decommissioning occurs due to
technological failure, lack of funds, and/or the obsolesence of the technology.
650 Modified from Christoff, 1996, p. 490.
651 In the ongoing war in Iraq, for example, the U.S. military is supplying approximately 130,000 troops, while
private contractors contribute 50,000. See Latham, Lewis, “Lionhearts,” Harper’s (September 2006): 9-11.
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Military streamlining, and the base closures and conversions associated with 
this effort, are thus not at all synonymous with a process of demilitarization. At the 
White Sands complex in New Mexico, for example, more than 43,500 missile firings 
took place between 1945 and 1993; the current rate is 1,000-plus training missions 
and more than 3,000 nuclear effects tests each year.652 The fact that U.S. military 
expenditures rose 48 percent from fiscal year 2001 to 2007 is but an additional 
measure of an increasing trend of militarization even as domestic installations close 
and face reclassification.653 Ongoing military campaigns in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the 
geographically and temporally unbounded “War on Terror” further emphasize the 
continued extensive reach of the United States’ military objectives.  
Similar to ecological modernization’s reliance upon state or corporate 
institutions,654 ecological militarization also operates with what is essentially a 
technocratic, centralized response to military base closures. As I have pointed out 
previously, the process of base closure does open up military sites to new levels of 
public scrutiny – both as a result of the NEPA process’s public comments and open 
hearings, as well as with any subsequent formalization of public use and visitor 
services – and this can certainly shape cleanup and management actions to varying 
degrees. For example, at the Rocky Mountain Arsenal, the base conversion process 
 
652 Kuletz, pp. 58-59.
653 Office of Budget and Management Department of Defense budget, viewed online at
www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2007/pdf/budget/defense.pdf [31 August 2006].
654 Langhelle, Oluf, “Why Ecological Modernization and Sustainable Development Should not be Conflated,” 
Journal of Environmental Policy and Planning 2(2000), p. 309; see also Mol and Spaargaren, 1993, p. 454;
Dryzek, 2005; and Gonzalez, 2001.
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directly corresponded to lawsuits, Congressional and State intervention, media 
attention, and citizen activism that continue to influence the remediation and public 
use occurring at that site.  
In most every M2W case, however, the ultimate decision-making authority 
still rests with such centralized institutions as the Department of Defense and, to a 
lesser degree, the Fish and Wildlife Service. To point again to the example of Rocky 
Mountain Arsenal, the Remediation Venture Office’s consortium of Army, FWS, and 
Shell managers wields the greatest power on a day-to-day basis, with the Army the 
lead authority within that triumvirate. The RVO’s power is tempered by the terms of 
court rulings, regulatory agencies, and legislation, but even these come from 
institutions of centralized authority: the State of Colorado, the U.S. Department of 
Justice, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, and the U.S. Congress. 
Consonant with ecological modernization, the treatments prescribed to assist 
in the reclassification of M2W sites consistently turn to science and technology rather 
than citizen participation or local processes. One version of this is characterized by 
Big Oaks National Wildlife Refuge’s policy on the management of depleted uranium: 
when the local citizens’ group Save the Valley raised concerns about the possible 
effects of burning contaminated areas, the agency dismissed the questions with a brief 
reference to a study conducted at the Department of Energy’s Argonne National 
Laboratory.655 A different type of response at M2W sites, but one that also defers to a 
narrow view of technology and control, is present at sites such as Noman’s Island 
 
655 Fire Management Plan, Environmental Assessment: Appendix K (Madison, IN: U.S. Fish and Wildlife 
Service  Big Oaks National Wildlife Refuge, March 2001), p. 25. 
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NWR or former bases in the Pacific where the new refuges are simply kept off-limits. 
At several of these locations, the only access permitted is to credentialed scientific 
investigators. Debates about the condition or character of these places, or how they 
ought to be managed in the future, are thus carefully restricted to those conversant in 
particular kinds of scientific knowledge.  
My point here is not that science is a poor way of understanding these places. 
Clearly science and technology can offer important insights in assessing 
contamination levels at M2W sites, determining ecological condition and function, 
mapping hotspots of biodiversity and/or contamination, providing strategies for 
cleanup, and more. In many instances, the specialized training needed to identify and 
clean up hazards at former military sites will almost certainly come from the same 
disciplines that informed the production of these hazards, whether these are chemists, 
soil scientists, explosives technicians, or nuclear engineers. Even accepting all of this, 
however, we can still recognize that by restricting the knowledge base and decision-
making authority within M2W sites to the same epistemologies responsible for their 
construction, we may not open these spaces considerably to new politics or values.  
The degree to which this maintenance of the status quo prevails depends in 
part upon how science is managed. If, as Irwin and Wynne point out, we grant science 
“automatic authority in framing what the issues are,” then M2W spaces may well 
remain places largely characterized and controlled by centralized institutions of 
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science and technology.656 Science can also be applied more democratically, 
however, serving not as ultimate authority but more openly as a “key resource in 
public issues.”657 Leopold makes a similar distinction in how science can be utilized 
differently for purposes of “man the conquerer versus man the biotic citizen”; in this, 
there is “science the sharpener of his sword versus science the searchlight on his 
universe”658 (emphases in original). 
 A reliance upon a technocratic, authoritarian form of science can, in turn, contribute 
to a belief common to weak ecological modernization that there are no limits to what human 
ingenuity can achieve. Inspiring though this may be in some contexts, it can also lead 
disastrously toward hubris. The promise of technological innovation can promote a view that 
effectively encourages carelessness over precaution: if we trust that we can develop 
technologies that will clean up any mess, then we may be less assiduous about preventing 
disasters in the first place.  
At M2W sites this faith in society’s long-term ability to repair and restore the 
environment has often been layered with a protracted disregard for any impacts of military 
activity.659 It remains unclear whether this latter view stems from military officials following 
orders with little attention to local conditions, a behind-closed-gates attitude that military 
 
656 Irwin, Alan and Brian Wynne, “Introduction,” pp. 8-9, In: Irwin, Alan and Brian Wynne, eds., 
Misunderstanding Science? The Public Reconstruction of Science and Technology (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996). 
657 Irwin and Wynne, 1996, pp. 8-9.
658 Leopold, Aldo, A Sand County Almanac and Sketches Here and There (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1987 [1949]), p. 223.
659 See for example, Shulman, 1992.
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actions need not attend to environmental regulations or common safety precautions, a view 
that environmental conditions had no bearing on the national security mission of the military, 
or some combination of these and other factors. The consequence of this combination of 
views is, however, quite clear in the chronic contamination problems that haunt military 
installations and their environs.  
At many M2W sites it has also become evident that technologies do not, in fact, 
currently exist that can sufficiently respond to the chemical, explosive, or nuclear hazards 
that still reside in these places. Whether future societies will manage to develop new 
techniques remains to be seen, but the fact that planning horizons for the current tasks of 
isolation and containment at venues such as the Rocky Mountain Arsenal are framed in terms 
of one thousand years or more, rather than decades, suggests that current land managers and 
policymakers remain skeptical over the pace of technological cures (and aware of the current 
hazards).660 
The carefully bounded geographical focus of ecological militarization also resembles 
weak ecological modernization in that social justice holds little if any bearing upon decision-
making.661 There is, for one, the disregard of individuals affected by the military practices 
both inside and outside even the most environmentally protective bases. Soldiers trained at 
 
660 The same is true of the disposal of nuclear waste. At the Rocky Mountain Arsenal,the current remediation
project is based upon a one thousand year design life; see Shakely, 2004. The planning horizon for the federal
Yucca Mountain nuclear depository is ten thousand years; see Kuletz, Valerie L. The Tainted Desert:
Environmental Ruin in the American West (NY: Routledge, 1998); and U.S. Department of Energy Yucca
Mountain Repository, online at www.ocrwm.doe.gov/ym_repository/about_project/index.shtml [4 September
2006].
661 See Langhelle, 2000.
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North Carolina’s Fort Bragg who are subsequently posted to Iraq might well envy the on-
base treatment accorded the federally endangered red-cockaded woodpecker. Reports of 
elevated levels of substance abuse, domestic violence, and post-traumatic stress disorder 
among active-duty Army personnel returning home also highlight some of the social costs 
that rarely get factored into the win-win depictions of ecological militarization.662 
While many of these impacts on individuals reverberate through military 
communities, the siting and expansion of military bases generate even more profound social 
disruptions and may also be viewed as a matter of social injustice. The military’s dislocation 
of families and entire communities appeared as a point of historical concern in my earlier 
examinations of the Rocky Mountain Arsenal and Big Oaks M2W conversions (Chapters 
Four and Five), but similar policies continue in the present as well. Fort Carson’s 236,000-
acre Piñon Canyon Maneuver Site is but one case in point: created in 1983 through a 
combination of land purchases and condemnations, the Army announced in 2006 that it seeks 
to expand the site by more than 400,000 acres to make it the Army’s largest single training 
site.663 The area under consideration for the expansion currently includes more than 5,000 
people, two towns, and several schools.664 A map published in the La Junta (CO) Democrat 
 
662 See Lutz, 2001, on the social disruptions common among Fort Bragg soldiers returning home to Fayetteville,
NC; or De Yoanna, Michael, “Pattern of Misconduct: Fort Carson Soldiers Allege Abuse and Intimidation,”
Colorado Springs Independent, 13-19 July 2006, pp. 14-19, for an account of the PTSD-related issues at Fort
Carson, Colorado.
663 Louden, Tamara, “Army Expansion Plans Have Ranchers on Edge,” The Denver Post, 13 August 2006, pp.
1E-2E; De Yoanna, Michael, “Targeting Paradise,” Colorado Springs Independent, 10-16 August 2006, pp. 14-
17.
664 Louden, p. 1E; De Yoanna, Michael, “Army Manuevers,” Colorado Springs Independent, 24-30 August
2006, p. 11.
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Tribune and attributed to Army sources showed additional plans for expansion that would 
stretch the base boundaries to the Colorado-Kansas-Oklahoma border and encompass up to 
2.3 million acres. Such a move that would consume the region’s cattle industry, family farms, 
Comanche National Grassland, and numerous historic and archaeological sites.665 
This type of consolidation and expansion of military training sites highlights, again, 
the point that M2W conversions come not as a step toward demilitarization so much as they 
represent a shifting of military priorities and geographies. The turn toward massive, 
consolidated bases far removed even from rural populations promises to close military 
practices off from view ever further, presenting a countervailing trend against the public 
opening of military bases that occurs during the closure and conversion process. Kuletz 
describes this type of closed, militarized landscape as it currently exists in Nevada, Arizona, 
and New Mexico as a “Geography of Sacrifice.”666 The Department of Defense, for its part, 
acknowledges that a shift toward larger, consolidated bases in remote areas will allow it to 
conduct activities that currently attract opposition:  
 In many geographic regions, the [Armed] Services are constrained in 
their ability to train because of encroachment near maneuver areas and live-
fire ranges. Examples include limits on air operations due to noise, ordnance 
limits at various ranges, reduced availability of ranges for live fire, restrictions 
on the use of landing beaches, and pressures from local communities to halt 
training activities such as artillery firing and air strikes.667 
There is also a growing international aspect to these issues of social justice as the 
U.S. military sets up bases or temporary staging areas in Uzbekhistan, Indonesia, Saudi 
 
665 De Yoanna, 2006; Louden, 2006.
666 Kuletz, 1998, p. 77 and passim.
667
“Base Realignment and Closures: Report of the Defense Secretary’s Commission,” December 1988, p. 20,
retrieved from www.dod.mil/brac/docs/1988.pdf [24 August 2006].
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Arabia, Kuwait, and other geopolitical hotspots. At one level this is nothing new – the U.S. 
has a long record of establishing military bases and operations in farflung locations, from the 
Philippines and the islands of the Pacific to South America and the islands of the Caribbean – 
but the systematic BRAC closures that have advanced domestic military base conversions 
since 1988, as well as post-Cold War withdrawals from western Europe, might tempt some to 
falsely assume that the U.S. is diminishing its international military presence as well. 
 Ecological militarization’s highlighting of environmental amenities at active or closed 
military sites may also promote the false impression that ecological considerations operate on 
a similar plane of importance as economic or strategic considerations in determining base 
closures. From its first effort to its most recent, the Base Realignment and Closure 
Commission has made very clear that base closures are prioritized on strategic 
considerations, first and foremost. In 1988, the closure commission’s report noted, “While 
cost reduction was an important reason for its chartering, the Commission decided that the 
military value of a base should be the preeminent factor in making its decisions.”668 Of the 
eight ranked criteria identified for the 2005 BRAC, the first four attend explicitly to “military 
value” considerations, the next three address economic and logistical concerns, and the last 
points to environmental impact669 (Table 7.2). 
 
668 Base Realignment and Closures, 1988, p. 6.
669 Although the 1988 BRAC included nine rather than eight criteria, the list has remained essentially unchanged
for each iteration of closures. The 2005 list consolidated two earlier points into one, and added detail for several
of the criteria without substantively changing them.
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Table 7.2: 2005 Final Selection Criteria for DOD Base Closure and Realignment670 
Military Value 
 
1. The current and future mission capabilities and the impact on operational readiness of the 
total force of the Department of Defense, including the impact on joint warfighting, training, 
and readiness. 
2. The availability and condition of land, facilities, and associated airspace (including training 
areas suitable for maneuver by ground, naval, or air forces throughout a diversity of climate 
and terrain areas and staging areas for the use of the Armed Forces in homeland defense 
missions) at both existing and potential receiving locations. 
3. The ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, surge, and future total force 
requirements at both existing and potential receiving locations to support operations and 
training. 




5. The extent and timing of potential costs and savings, including the number of years, 
beginning with the date of completion of the closure or realignment, for the savings to exceed 
the costs. 
6. The economic impact on existing communities in the vicinity of military installations. 
7. The ability of the infrastructure of both the existing and potential receiving communities to 
support forces, missions, and personnel. 
8. The environmental impact, including the impact of costs related to potential environmental 
restoration, waste management, and environmental compliance activities. 
 
This list illustrates how thoroughly military and strategic elements are privileged over 
economic concerns, which in turn rate higher than environmental considerations. In fact, far 
from a demilitarization project, the BRAC process is cast as a means of strengthening the 
United States’ military capabilities. As the Secretary of the Army commented in 2002, “The 
[2005] BRAC will… realign the Army’s infrastructure to maximize our warfighting 
capabilities and efficiency”671 (emphasis added). 
 
670 Adapted from: “Memorandum for Infrastructure Executive Council Members, Infrastructure Steering Group
Members, Joint Cross-Service Group Chairman,” 2005 Base Closure and Realignment Selection Criteria, from
Michael J. Wynne, Acting Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (Washington,
D.C.: 4 January 2005); retrieved from www.dod.mil/brac/docs/criteria_final_jan4_05.pdf [24 August 2006].
671 Quoting Secretary of the Army Thomas E. White, 12 December 2002, retrieved from
www.dod.mil/brac/army.htm [24 August 2006].
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What we find happening with M2W conversions, then, is not so much a “greening” of 
the U.S. military as it is an attempt to wrap the ongoing (and growing) project of American 
militarization in a new ecologically protective cloak. Viewed in this light, we can see that 
criterion number eight’s environmental focus (in Table 7.2) is not oriented toward the 
protection of prime environmental amenities at closing bases, but rather factors 
environmental issues into the process as a means of cost-avoidance. BRAC closure sites 
bearing heavy loads of contamination thus have a predisposition toward possible refuge 
designation; as I noted earlier, the cleanup standard for a wildlife refuge is tiered toward the 
lesser standard of a non-resident Fish and Wildlife Service employee or other temporary 
visitors, rather than the stricter terms needed to accommodate residential or many other 
commercial developments. By these terms, despite the best efforts of refuge managers and 
other FWS staff working to fulfill the wildlife refuge system’s conservation mission, 
ecological militarization and M2W conversions may offer much greater support for 
militarization than they do ecology.
If all this suggests that M2W conversions match the weak form of ecological 
modernization noted earlier, then in the interest of redirecting policy we ought to ask: Is there 
a way to shift these processes of ecological militarization to create a “strong” version? How 
could we attain a more ecological conversion of military lands that fosters a democratic 
politics and an opening of public space? 
Before turning to these practical questions more fully, I should note that the form that 
ecological militarization assumes as a discourse is important in its own right. As Woodward 
highlights, “The control of space is as much a discursive as it is a physical act, in that control 
is wrapped up in arguments about defence [sic] and security in order to legitimize military 
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claims to space.”672 Much as military land use has been characterized by its opacity and 
restrictiveness, the discursive framing of military-to-wildlife conversions can also serve as a 
barrier to alternative perspectives. It is in the interest of prying open new discourses and 
creating new kinds of (closing) military spaces that I turn in the next section to how M2W 
conversions might be produced as representatives of a strong form of ecological 
militarization, or perhaps more accurately, an ecological demilitarization. 
 
Social Change, Environmental Conservation, and Demilitarization 
 
In its starkest form, the difference between policies driven by weak versus strong 
ecological militarization is characterized by authoritarian technological regimes that 
conveniently integrate environmental protections, versus institutions characterized by open 
democratic processes and genuine care for the environment. If we are to generate the changes 
promised by the strong version, reform of both discourse and policy will be needed. To 
accomplish this type of project, Harvey contends we must articulate environmental 
transformation with alternate modes of production.673 For M2W conversions, one example of 
this might be elevating citizens and grassroots institutions into decision-making positions. 
Hajer, in turn, calls for an approach of “reflective awareness” that renews debate about what 
kind of relationships of nature, society, and technology we wish to build.674 Until ecological 
militarization truly promotes a relationship between these elements that is grounded in an 
ethic of inclusiveness and justice, however, it will likely serve more as a tool for powerful 
 
672 Woodward, 2004, p. 37.
673 Harvey, 1996, p. 401. Harvey was referring to the broader context of ecological modernization.
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government or military interests than the human and wildlife communities M2W conversions 
purport to benefit. 
In the interest of encouraging movement toward a strong version of ecological 
militarization – one that ultimately contributes to actual demilitarization and increased 
environmental protection – I suggest four realms of military-to-wildlife conversions where 
important changes ought to occur. These include the role of science and technology, a 
transfer of institutional control, the publicizing and preservation of landscape productions, 
and attentiveness to impacts beyond base closure sites.675 
Recasting Science and Technology 
 
A number of issues of science and technology rest at the core of M2W conversions. 
As I have chronicled throughout this dissertation, scientists played fundamental roles in 
developing the military products that were manufactured, tested, stored, or discarded at 
military installations now facing closure. As bases close and convert to new uses as wildlife 
refuges, the expertise of scientists continues to be called upon for projects ranging from 
plant, wildlife and habitat surveys to soil, air, and water quality monitoring; public health 
assessments; demolition or demilitarization of buildings, chemical compounds, and 
 
674 Hajer, 1996, pp. 265-266. Hajer, too, addresses modernization, not militarization.
675 Barnett (2001, p. 107) draws a slightly different list of terms that military conversions should meet if they are
to contribute to structural change: they must seek a positive environmental outcome; be of a non-coercive 
nature; be restricted to action within the same country; be implemented with involvement of Green groups and 
local stakeholders; and the fundamental policy goal must not be to perpetuate the security establishment but to 
convert it. 
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explosives; cleanup and containment of contaminants; ecological remediation and 
restoration; and more.  
In most all of these applications, science is employed from positions of authority, 
controlled and funded by the Department of Defense, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, 
Environmental Protection Agency, or other government or corporate entities. Public input 
and local knowledge is typically limited to comment periods and hearings required by the 
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), or to Restoration Advisory Boards (RABs) and 
similar bodies mandated by Superfund legislation and cleanup requirements for federal 
facilities.676 The NEPA process and RABs do expose decision-makers to a broad range of 
public views on military conversions, and in some cases the conversations that result can lead 
to important outcomes or foster trust and respect across long-standing military-civilian or 
environmentalist-bureaucrat schisms. The decision-making authority, however, remains 
firmly vested in the domain of powerful institutions.  
One way that citizens have sought to recast these traditional lines of power is by 
deploying their own scientific expertise and technologies into the public realm. With 
increasing access to Geographic Information Systems (GIS) and other digital technologies, 
for example, environmental groups and other non-governmental organizations since the mid-
1990s have been able to publish detailed maps to rally public attention. Whether focused 
 
676 See “Restoration Advisory Board Guidelines,” DOD Base Reuse Implementation Manual (Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense and Environmental Protection Agency, September 1994); retrieved from
www.acq.osd.mil/installation/reinvest/manual/rab.html [30 August 2006]. See also, “Restoration Advisory
Board (RAB) Implementation Guidelines,” Federal Facilities Restoration and Reuse (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Department of Defense and Environmental Protection Agency, 27 September 1994); retrieved from
www.epa.gov/fedfac/documents/rab.htm [30 August 2006].
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upon wildlife and habitat amenities or toxic plumes and other forms of contamination, these 
maps leverage the authority granted by sophisticated cartographic technologies to garner 
public trust and command attention from federal or state officials.677 
Incorporating scientific and technological expertise has proven to be a powerful 
strategy for conservation groups more broadly. As Yearley points out: “In modern Western 
societies it is accepted that wildlife and the natural environment need advocates; scientific 
expertise has emerged as the form of advocacy which commands the greatest legitimacy. A 
scientific interest in nature also motivates many supporters of conservation organisations, 
while the organisations themselves harness scientific expertise for practical tasks such as 
reserve management and the monitoring of biodiversity.”678 This embrace of science and 
technology remains problematic in many cases, though, as a number of citizen activists find 
themselves positioned as users and critics.679 One outcome of this conflicting perspective 
may be the mainstreaming trend common to large environmental organizations, which no 
longer call for radical change in economic or political structures so much as they push for 
highly technical win-win solutions typified by ecological modernization. This diminishment 
 
677 In the mid-1990s I participated in this type of effort directly by mapping road densities across national forests
with designated grizzly bear habitat, then confronting the U.S. Forest Service with data and GIS maps that were 
far more detailed and sophisticated than the agency’s own. 
678 Yearley, Steven, “Nature’s Advocates: Putting Science to Work in Environmental Organisations,” pp. 186-
187, In: Irwin, Alan and Brian Wynne, eds., Misunderstanding Science? The Public Reconstruction of Science 
and Technology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 172-190. 
679 Yearley, 1996, p. 187, makes a similar point, and also notes that some environmentalists – even as they use
science to advance their agendas – remain uncomfortable with modernism more broadly. See also Dryzek, 
1997. 
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of truly independent critiques is what spurs Jamison, for one, to call for a new breed of 
“partisan social scientists” to challenge and recast existing environmental discourses.680 
As in many other cases, the assertion of a strict dualism here misrepresents the range 
of possibilities that exist. Environmental activists can surely be intellectually dexterous 
enough to both use and critique applications of science and technology.681 Scientists (social 
and otherwise) can both hold strong normative convictions and carry out rigorous, credible 
research programs. And science itself, as I have already pointed out, need not be viewed as 
only a monolithic project (i.e. Big Science) predetermined to grant ever more authority to 
institutions of power; science can also be used to foster more democratic constructions of 
knowledge that lead to genuine social and environmental reforms.682 
One means of pursuing just such ends with M2W conversions may be to better 
accommodate lay perspectives and local knowledge. This is not to present these exactly as 
alternatives to science or approaches to be held on par with such expertise as that provided by 
specialists in contamination biology, demilitarization of explosives, or systems ecology; 
rather, by integrating lay knowledge more genuinely into conversion activities taking place at 
 
680 Jamison, Andrew, “The Shaping of the Global Environmental Agenda: The Role of Non-Governmental 
Organisations,” p. 243, In: Lash, Scott, Bronislaw Szerszynski and Brian Wynne, eds., Risk, Environment and 
Modernity: Towards a New Ecology (London: Sage Publications, 1996), pp. 224-245. 
681 Irwin, Alan, Alison Dale and Denis Smith, suggest as much in highlighting how savvy citizens actually are 
in turning to sources of scientific information, and the levels of trust they grant depending upon the source. See 
“Science and Hell’s Kitchen: The Local Understanding of Hazard Issues,” pp. 47-64, In: Irwin and Wynne, 
1996. 
682 As Irwin and Wynne point out, both “science” and “the public” are more diverse than often portrayed and 
this complexity needs to be considered critically; see Irwin, Alan and Brian Wynne, “Introduction,” p. 8, In: 
Irwin and Wynne, 1996, pp. 1-17. 
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closing military bases we may create a more humane science less bound to reductionistic or 
technocratic knowledge.683 Such as shift turns upon a constructivist view at least to the extent 
that we acknowledge science is embedded as social knowledge and that “constructions of 
society” are linked to scientific accounts.684 What this does, in effect, is present science not in 
a position of automatic authority but in a propositional status that asks what scientific 
knowledge can do for us. It reorients science as responsive to social interests rather than 
dictating the rules society must obey. Or, as Grove-White presents it, by reintroducing 
notions of human nature into science we infuse research agendas with important aspects of 
“lived experience.”685 
In addition to granting citizens a more robust voice in decisions pertaining to M2W 
conversions, this democratization of scientific authority could respond more effectively to the 
particularities of local conditions. Scientific knowledge and lay knowledge each rely upon 
versions of control, but traditional scientific knowledge depends upon the ability to control or 
restrict experimental conditions; lay knowledge, on the other hand, turns more to local, 
contextualized knowledge as a means of establishing control of diverse local conditions.686 
As my descriptions of M2W sites and their geographic histories should by now have made 
clear, the scientific template – and subsequent policy formulations – for remediating the 
 
683 See Wynne, Brian, “May the Sheep Safely Graze? A Reflexive View of the Expert-Lay Knowledge Divide,” 
In: Lash, Szerszynski and Wynne, 1996, pp. 44-83. 
684 The quote is from Irwin and Wynne, 1996, pp. 8-9; see also Longino, Helen, Science as Social Knowledge:
Values and Objectivity in Scientific Inquiry (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990).  
685 Grove-White, Robin, “Environmental Knowledge and Public Policy Needs: On Humanizing the Research 
Agenda,” pp. 283-284, In: Lash, Szerszynski and Wynne, 1996, pp. 269-286. 
686 Wynne, 1996, pp. 70-71.
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Rocky Mountain Arsenal may bear little relevance to the small airstrip in New York State 
now called Shawangunk Grasslands NWR or the Jefferson Proving Ground’s expanse of 
bombing range. In these instances, only a scientific effort deeply informed by local 
knowledge and local concerns will ultimately prove successful in establishing public trust 
and creating genuinely protective and “open” refuges in the future. 
 
Institutional Change and Agency Control 
 
Much like the previous point relating to science and technology, the issue of 
institutional control rests to large degree upon considerations of authority. Whether at sites 
such as the Rocky Mountain Arsenal where some land title has actually been transferred from 
the Army to the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, or at the many “overlay” refuges where 
ownership and liability remain with the military, ultimate control of these places still resides 
predominantly with the Department of Defense. In order to support the ecological portion of 
ecological militarization – as well as the conservation mission of the National Wildlife 
Refuge System that M2W sites are joining – the balance of power at military-to-wildlife 
conversion locations needs to tip convincingly toward the FWS.  
The ongoing extent of DOD control stems in part from the fact that the military’s 
annual budget towers above the Fish and Wildlife Service’s by a factor of more than 360 to 
one.687 The FWS receives the lowest funding of any federal land management agency and the 
 
687 According to the U.S. Office of Management and Budget, in fiscal year 2005 expenditures for the
Department of Defense were $474 billion compared to $1.3 billion for the Fish and Wildlife Service. See
www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2007/pdf/budget/defense.pdf and
www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2007/pdf/budget/interior.pdf [31 August 2006].
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National Wildlife Refuge System (which constitutes just a portion of the FWS’ entire budget) 
continues to suffer from a deferred maintenance backlog that at more than $660 million 
amounts to roughly twice its annual appropriation from Congress.688 As it receives new, 
heavily contaminated lands from the Department of Defense, the National Wildlife Refuge 
System faces ever-more-daunting budget shortfalls. This exacerbates an unevenly dependent 
relationship between the FWS and the military, where the DOD has a vast budget but little 
incentive to thoroughly clean M2W sites whose daily management responsibilities have been 
shifted to the Fish and Wildlife Service. During my interviews and off-the-record 
conversations, several M2W refuge officials noted that they wished the DOD would dedicate 
more time and resources into cleanup activities, but that there was little FWS employees 
could do to press the point. At most M2W locations, the DOD has worked to clean sites 
aggressively only when faced with emergency situations, or when compelled by legislation, 
court judgments, or other legal settlements. 
This points to another way in which the FWS remains dependent upon Defense 
personnel: in most instances when unexploded ordnance, toxins, or other hazards surface at 
M2W refuges, wildlife officials lack the training or expertise to defuse or decontaminate the 
threat. This results in refuge area closures that range from the relatively short-term – such as 
shutting down bridge construction for a few days at Big Oaks until an Army bomb squad 
from Ft. Knox can attend to exposed UXO689 – to the weekends-only policy for public visits 
 
688 The fiscal year 2007 budget for refuge maintenance and operations is $382 million. See
www.fws.gov/budget/2007/Fy%202007%20GB/01.01%20general%20statement.pdf [31 August 2006]. See also
Fischman, 2003, pp. 118-119.
689 This incident was related to me during my interview with Big Oaks National Wildlife Refuge manager Joe
Robb, 14 December 2005.
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at the Rocky Mountain Arsenal following the sarin bomblets episodes of 2000-2001, to the 
complete closure of sites such as Noman’s Island and Pacific Island refuges. In each of these 
cases, the past actions by and ongoing reliance upon the military constrain how FWS 
managers can conduct refuge operations. 
Although it is clear from the priorities established by the BRAC Commission that 
military and strategic objectives take precedence in determining military closures, many 
FWS officials may not realize initially how pervasively the influence of the military would 
remain at M2W sites. At a 1998 FWS meeting dedicated to “Military Base Closure 
Acquisition Issues,” wildlife officials noted that their agency must operate on a short timeline 
with incomplete information when considering whether or not to request transfers of closing 
military lands. As the agency’s Realty Division program manager for base conversion lands 
explained the process and its drawbacks: 
FWS has only 30 days to express interest in closing military bases. 
After expressing interest, the Service has only 60 days to look at the property 
and decide if we want it. The Service then prepares a 1334 [form to request 
transfer]… even though at that point, we do not know contaminant levels. 
After this action is taken, it is extremely difficult for the Service to back out of 
the acquisition… Although the Service policy requires a level I contamination 
survey be performed on the property, most Regions are not accomplishing 
them because the DOD accepts cleanup responsibility. The problem usually 
remains that DOD cleanup standards are less than the Service desires for trust 
resources and public use.690 
One final element that looms over the relationship between the Department of 
Defense and Fish and Wildlife Service in managing M2W sites is the question of national 
security. Despite conservationists’ earnest explanations that protecting natural resources 
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translates to important long-term domestic security issues, the military retains the ability to 
trump all claims to land and resources if it identifies a national security emergency. As I 
highlighted in Chapter Five, this very scenario surfaced during negotiations over the future of 
the Jefferson Proving Ground. When the Indiana Air National Guard expressed interest in the 
entire 50,000 acre tract, Fish and Wildlife officials found themselves squeezed into a position 
of compliance with little leverage for a full Army cleanup of the site. As a FWS official 
working to close the deal that would lead to the Big Oaks refuge designation commented to a 
local reporter, “We’re not going to stand in the way of national defense.”691 
Wildlife officials and conservation advocates found themselves similarly pinched 
shortly after the attacks of 11 September 2001 when Bush administration officials invoked 
national security claims to announce that military training and base operations would no 
longer be subject to a suite of federal environmental regulations. One message from such 
instances is that ecological militarization may be permitted or encouraged, so long as the 
militarization component can proceed unhindered. 
Changing this paradigm will no doubt require a long-term shift in national priorities, 
but granting the FWS more genuine control of M2W sites would represent a meaningful first 
step. Legislation or court orders that compelled the DOD to respond to FWS requests for 
funds, cleanup, technical assistance, and other actions at these locations would surely not 
fully redress the current imbalance between the two institutions, but could at least liberate 
 
690 Quoting Barbara Wyman, Realty Division program manager for base conversion lands, U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service, Washington, D.C., from “Minutes of FWS National Meeting On Military Acquisition Issues,”
Denver, Colorado, 17 April 1998 [photocopy obtained from Big Oaks National Wildlife Refuge files].
691 Quoting Big Oaks NWR manager Joe Robb in Weslander, Eric, “Nature Refuge or Bomb Range? Indiana
Wildlife Plan May be Drastically Scaled Back,” Louisville Courier-Journal, 14 August 1999, p. 1A.
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wildlife officials to manage lands with greater authority and in fuller accord with the 
principles of the National Wildlife Refuge System.  In addition, the transfer of sufficient 
funds and decision-making authority from the DOD to the FWS at military-to-wildlife 
refuges could represent a modest but symbolic fracture in the military’s position of authority 
among federal institutions. 
 
Environmental Memorials and Hybrid Places  
 
One of the consequences of the institutional disparities addressed above is that M2W 
refuges remain in a state of contamination purgatory – no longer active as military sites, yet 
actively affected by the chemical, explosive, radioactive, infrastructural, or other residues of 
years of DOD management. In many cases, these places come into FWS jurisdiction with no 
serious cleanup in sight. Considering their conditions, M2W refuges’ classification into the 
National Wildlife Refuge System strikes many observers (and some FWS officials) as 
inappropriate. Even as national wildlife refuges remain the least visited of any major type of 
federal public land, to most Americans the title “national wildlife refuge” conjures pristine 
places carefully managed to protect flora and fauna. As Fischman casts this fanciful vision, 
“Imagine a network of federal lands and waters designed to sustain healthy 
ecosystems…[and] serve as a refuge for animals and plants.”692 
By converting a closing military base into a national wildlife refuge there is 
undoubtedly a perception of reduced hazard, increased environmental safety, and an overall 
 
692 Fischman, 2003, p. 1. The quote is describing what the Fischman sees as the aspiration of the National
Wildlife Refuge System in a state he contrasts with its actual condition.
323
“greening” of the site and its surroundings. Woodward describes this shift as part of a 
discursive strategy that “obscures the idea that military activities themselves are 
environmentally damaging.”693 This, in turn, raises an important set of questions: how might 
such conversions be processed differently in order to better preserve not just their landscapes 
but the histories of production that created these landscapes? In other words, how might we 
direct military-to-wildlife conversions in such a way that the places are not superficially 
rendered as safe and that retains a memory of what practices occurred? How do we publicize 
these places in meaningful ways? 
 One response, inspired by Misrach’s proposal for the Bravo 20 area described in the 
previous chapter, is that closing military sites should not be reclassified as national wildlife 
refuges but instead should contribute to an entirely new category of land (and historical) 
preservation. This new land type could be called National Environmental Memorials, much 
as Misrach suggests, and constitute part of a new National Restoration Lands System that 
includes areas degraded by high road densities, burdened with obsolete dams, scarred by 
mining waste, or impacted by other actions of industrial society now scheduled for removal 
and/or ecological restoration. These lands could be managed under a consolidated mission by 
different agencies, much like the National Wilderness Preservation System. This type of 
structure could also facilitate mechanisms for diverting defense funds into restoration 
activities – the DOD, U.S. Forest Service, Bureau of Reclamation, Army Corps of Engineers, 
 
693 Woodward, 2004, p. 102.
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mining corporations, and other responsible parties could be identified and compelled to fund 
the restoration programs dedicated to the new Restoration Lands System.694 
Such a system would provide the FWS with crucial bureaucratic allies and legal 
leverage in the effort to clean up military sites, while the social and environmental histories 
of M2W sites would remain more transparent. At the very least, Environmental Memorials 
would spur public interest in contaminated places and what happened (and is still happening) 
in these and similar sites. This could also encourage a perceptual integration of the natural 
and social characteristics of these places and discourage the simplistic impression that 
degraded military sites (as social places) have been transformed into pristine wildlife refuges 
(natural places). By openly acknowledging the complex histories of M2W refuges, a National 
Environmental Memorial could facilitate some reconciliation of the paradox of these sites’ 
qualities without needing to explain it away. Hybrid places replete with social and natural 
histories, M2W refuges could then inspire new management approaches and new 




Perhaps the greatest risk presented by military-to-wildlife conversions is not the 
prospect that an individual deer or turkey hunter will accidentally detonate a bomb at the Big 
Oaks NWR or that toxins consolidated at the Rocky Mountain Arsenal will leak once again 
into groundwater or even that adding such militarized sites will undermine the objectives, 
 
694 Existing Superfund cleanups similarly tap into an array of responsible parties to complement federal
appropriations.
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reputation, or management of the National Wildlife Refuge system; greater than these still, is 
the prospect that by accepting M2W conversions as a natural progression for land 
management we will fail to look beyond the boundaries of these new refuges.  
Military conversions typically do not address the underlying power of the military to 
resist genuine change.695 The marketing of ecological militarization serves as a key strategy 
to obscure the broad array of destructive activities that the Department of Defense continues 
to project across what must truly be considered a global theater of conflict.696 In this effort, 
M2W conversions clearly can contribute to the DOD’s attempts to focus public attention not 
upon the devastation wrought by military actions in Iraq or other hotspots of conflict but 
instead to a “celebration of biodiversity” (or biological hotspots) and goals of environmental 
protection that resonate with beauty, quietude, and refuge.697 One of the serious risks in 
accepting this type of discourse is described by Ross, “If the Pentagon succeeds in its kinder, 
gentler mission, it may result not in the greening of the military but in the militarization of 
greening.”698 
In order for M2W conversions to go beyond a discursive strategy and work to effect 
institutional change and environmental protection, they will need to be coupled with an 
actual process of demilitarization that extends well beyond the borders of existing military 
bases or wildlife refuges. Without this geographically expansive shift, the localized 
environmental protections won by military-to-wildlife conversions are simply offset by 
 
695 See Barnett, 2001, p. 105.
696 See Woodward, 2004.
697 Woodward (2004) emphasizes similar points; see pp. 90-91.
698 Ross, A., “The Future is a Risky Business,” The Ecologist 26(1996): 42-44, quoted in Woodward, 2004, p.
102.
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similar or worse impacts at newly consolidated, expanded, or privatized training locations, as 
well as in war zones.699 
Far from emerging from a process of natural landscape evolution, M2W refuges 
ought to be noticed and understood as the intentional products of politics, science, and 
discourse operating in distinctive ways across unique social and natural terrain. Military 
control, Woodward points out, “is exerted not only through material practices which affect 
the natural environment, but also through discursive or representational practices through 
which those material practices are made meaningful. The study of militarized environments 
requires attention to both.”700 
We may still find it is possible to manage and understand lands such as the Big Oaks 
National Wildlife Refuge, the Rocky Mountain Arsenal, and other M2W refuges in ways that 
accommodate the complex and confusing historical, political, environmental, economic, and 
scientific circumstances of such places. To do so, however, will press us to move beyond 
highly technicized or reductionistic approaches. A conscientiously socialized science will no 
doubt prove essential, as will a concerted push to renegotiate our understanding of the natural 
and social landscapes currently committed to militarization. 
 
699 See, for example, Kiefer, Christie W., “Militarism and World Health,” Social Science and Medicine
34(7)(1992), pp. 719-724.
700 Woodward, 2004, p. 103.
327
Appendix A: Questions Used in Semi-Structured Interviews 
 
Cluster One – U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service employees 
 
1. Why is the FWS taking over management of former DOD sites? 
2. What are the greatest challenges you are encountering with this conversion? 
3. What kind of public support or opposition have you encountered? 
4. How does the FWS decide which DOD sites to accept? 
5. Who is paying for maintenance work and remediation? What is the annual budget versus 
estimated cost? 
6. How does this refuge differ from others where you have worked? 
7. How are you educating the public about this area’s history, where they can go, and what 
they can do here? 
8. Are any legal waivers, training, or hold-harmless agreements required for visitors? (if so, 
request copies) 
9. What is the public’s role in the management of these lands? 
10. (How) Have you been affected by the change of administrations in D.C.? 
 
Cluster Two – U.S. Department of Defense employees 
 
1. Why is the FWS taking over management of former DOD sites? 
2. What are the greatest challenges you are encountering with this conversion? 
3. What kind of public support or opposition have you encountered? 
4. How does the DOD decide which sites to convert to NWRs? Why is this site converting to 
a NWR versus other uses?  
5. What military operations occurred here? Why and when did they stop? 
6. Do you think it’s important for the public (local or national) to know about this site’s 
history? 
7. What is the public’s role in the management of these lands? 
8. (How) Have you been affected by the change of administrations in D.C.? 
 
Cluster Three – Local stakeholders 
 
1. Why is the FWS taking over management of former DOD sites? 
2. What are the greatest challenges you are aware of with this conversion? 
3. Has there been any public support or opposition? 
3. What do you see as the greatest benefits to such change? 
4. What do you see as the greatest risks to such change? 
5. Have you visited this site? Why? What did you do there? 
6. What other federal public lands have you visited in the past three years? What other types 
are you aware of? 
7. What is the public’s role in the management of these lands? 
8. Have you noticed any differences associated with the change of administrations in D.C.? 
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Appendix B: Release and Acknowledgment of Danger – Hold Harmless Agreement for 
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